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Abstract
This study analyzes mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections. It examines the twentieth century State Reorganization Movement
that separated most gubernatorial elections from presidential elections, and evaluates the
electoral consequences of these reforms against their stated aims. This study also
attempts to provide an explanation for the occurrence of mixed partisan outcomes in
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. It tests the thesis that campaign
strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the primary
factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and presidential candidates of
different parties in the same election year. The methodology for testing this thesis
incorporates data interpretation, media analysis, and case studies of two 2004
gubernatorial elections featuring personal interviews with campaign participants and
observers. The data thus collected indicate the validity of this study’s thesis, albeit with
minor qualifications. Yet conclusive quantitative data are not available to test the thesis
further. As a result, this study is indicative but not conclusive.
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Chapter I: Introduction to the Study of Simultaneous Gubernatorial
and Presidential Elections

In recent years, it has become commonplace to label states ‘red’ or ‘blue’ in
accordance with their vote for a Republican or Democratic presidential candidate. These
partisan labels vastly oversimplify the nation’s political landscape, implying monolithic
political characteristics among the states that fail to account for either varying degrees of
polarization or the full range of electoral outcomes. In fact, voters in so-called red or blue
states often defy such partisan categorizations by electing to other offices candidates of a
different party than their presidential favorite.
A particularly compelling illustration of state electorates’ complex voting
behavior is found in state selection of gubernatorial and presidential candidates of
different parties. Although the specific functions of governors and presidents differ in
many important respects, their offices are unique within their respective spheres of
government, as primary sources of legislative agendas and symbols of executive
leadership. Shared partisan affiliation is a strong, although not a foolproof, indicator of
coherent values and policies. Assuming that voters have clear hopes for the direction of
their government, one would expect voters to support gubernatorial and presidential
candidates of the same political party. Yet modern voters do not behave with the
coherence or predictability often ascribed to them by such assumptions.
This study demonstrates state electorates’ complex voting behavior by focusing
on simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. To explain the causes of mixed

partisan outcomes in such elections, this study analyzes the campaign strategies used by
gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations in years when the politics
winds blow against their party in the state presidential race.
Why Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections?
Following the 2004 elections, twenty-one out of fifty U.S. governors served in
states whose voters selected a presidential candidate of another party that year. Included
among these states were many that produced the nation’s most lopsided presidential
votes: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming.1 Why
not, then, study all the states that have produced mixed partisan outcomes in
gubernatorial and presidential elections? Why restrict this study’s focus to simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections? This study’s focus on simultaneous elections is
designed to provide the most accurate analysis of partisan incoherence in gubernatorial
and presidential elections. This study is also designed to consider the dramatic
ramifications of state reform efforts to strengthen American governorships over the past
century, and to evaluate the success of these efforts against their stated aims.
Analytical Advantages of Simultaneous Versus Separated Gubernatorial and
Presidential Elections
Analysis of mixed partisan outcomes in all fifty states’ recent gubernatorial and
presidential elections would be fascinating. Why, for example, have Massachusetts voters
selected Republican candidates in four consecutive gubernatorial elections while
overwhelmingly selecting Democratic candidates in presidential elections? Answers to
1

Democratic presidential states with Republican governors included: California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont. Republican presidential states
with Democratic governors included: Arizona, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming.

this question and others pertaining to all states, irrespective of their gubernatorial and
presidential election schedules, are worthy of thorough study. Unfortunately, a general
study of this nature would confront substantial analytical barriers. Separated
gubernatorial and presidential elections are influenced differently by disparities in voter
mobilization and political contexts; voter mobilization is much higher in presidential
election years (see Chapter V), and influential atmospheric conditions, such as the
economy, can change dramatically between an off-year gubernatorial election and a
presidential election year. Simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections eliminate
such disparities in voter mobilization and political contexts. As a result, they provide a
superior method for examining mixed partisan outcomes in gubernatorial and presidential
elections.
Contemporary Relevance of Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections
Today, simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections occur in only eleven
out of the fifty states.2 In recent decades, typically one-third to nearly one-half of these
elections has favored gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different parties. In
2004 this occurred in Montana, North Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia, and very
nearly occurred in Washington.3 The fact that so few states today hold simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections represents a dramatic change from the early
twentieth century when presidential elections coincided with gubernatorial elections in
more than three-quarters of the states.
2

The eleven states that hold simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections include: Delaware,
Indiana, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia.

3

A recount found that Democratic gubernatorial candidate Christine Gregoire defeated Republican
gubernatorial candidate Dino Rossi by a 129-vote margin in 2004. The initial vote tally showed Rossi
defeating Gregoire, in a state that voted heavily that year for Kerry.

Historical Relevance of Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections to
Reforms of the Governorship
Simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections are much less common
today than they were a century ago, due to state reform efforts that isolated many
gubernatorial elections from the presidential election cycle. In the twentieth century the
State Reorganization Movement emerged in many states for the purpose of strengthening
traditionally weak governorships. Many states amended their constitutions to expand
gubernatorial terms and also to separate gubernatorial elections from presidential
elections. The latter reform was aimed at eliminating the influence of presidential
coattails in gubernatorial elections. The widespread enactment of these two reforms
indicates the success of the State Reorganization Movement. During the twentieth
century, the number of states holding simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
elections was reduced from a high of thirty-seven out of forty-eight states (as recently as
1932) to eleven out of fifty states by the century’s close. Similarly, the number of states
allowing one, two, and three-year gubernatorial terms declined from twenty-four out of
forty-five states to only two out of fifty states.
How To Explain Mixed Partisan Outcomes in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and
Presidential Elections?
Having controlled for differences in voter mobilization and political contexts, this
study is designed to test the thesis that campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates
and their state party organizations are the primary factors affecting state voter choice of
gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year. To
test this thesis, several key questions must be answered: What is the effect of presidential
elections on simultaneous gubernatorial elections? Do gubernatorial candidates believe

that presidential politics are relevant to their elections? If so, how do they incorporate
presidential politics into their campaigns? What campaign strategies do gubernatorial
candidates of the same party as the state’s losing presidential candidate use to address the
simultaneous presidential election? How do they speak about their party’s presidential
candidate? How do they distinguish themselves from that candidate? Do state voters
carefully distinguish between gubernatorial and presidential elections?
Methodology
Thorough analysis of information from many sources is required to answer the
above questions and test this study’s thesis. To that end, this study analyzes the relevant
literature in the fields of elections and voting behavior, focusing specifically on the
literature about changes in gubernatorial power, straight and split-ticket voting, state
versus national political alignments, electoral contributions of political parties, and the
significance of election campaigns. It also presents the 2004 gubernatorial elections in
Vermont and Montana as case studies. The Vermont and Montana gubernatorial elections
were won by candidates of the party whose presidential candidates lost their states by
landslides in the same year. The case studies are based primarily on media analysis, data
interpretation, and personal interviews with campaign participants and observers.
Analysis of Literature Relevant to This Study
A substantial body of political science literature is relevant to this study,
providing insights into the factors underlying voters’ choices of gubernatorial and
presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year. This body includes
analyses of changes in gubernatorial power, straight and split-ticket voting, state versus

national political alignments, electoral contributions of political parties, and the
significance of election campaigns. The works of Larry Sabato, Mark Tomkins, Dennis
Simon, James Campbell, James Gimpel, Paul Herrnson, and Susan Howell are
particularly relevant. Sabato details the transformation of the governorship into a more
consequential, professionalized institution. He also discusses the significance of
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections, concluding that the latter obscures
the former. Tomkins’ study of voting behavior in gubernatorial and presidential elections
leads him to conclude that voters choose deliberately between the two. Simon’s study of
voting behavior in gubernatorial and presidential elections leads him to conclude the
opposite, that presidential coattails determine individual votes and gubernatorial elections
in many cases. Campbell finds evidence of presidential coattails in simultaneous state
legislative elections. Gimpel’s study of state versus national voting patterns leads him to
conclude that voters typically align differently in state versus national elections. Herrnson
argues that political party organizations make important electoral contributions, despite
losing influence in recent decades. Howell finds that institutional factors typically
determine electoral outcomes, not campaign activities.
Review of Relevant Literature
Analysis of why voters choose gubernatorial and presidential candidates of
different parties in the same election year involves several related areas of study in
elections and voting behavior. First, to understand recent changes in the American
governorship and the electoral consequences of a strengthened governorship, Sabato

(1978), Ransone (1982), and Holbrook (1993) are particularly useful.4 Second, important
works concerning straight and split-ticket voting include Miller (1955), Key (1956), Press
(1958), Trilling (1976), Campbell (1986), Tomkins (1988), Simon (1989), Fiorina (1991),
Petrocik (1991), and Feigert (1979).5 Third, works that analyze state versus national
political alignments are relevant, including Erickson, Wright, and McIver (1993), Brown
and Wright (1991), Carsey and Wright (1998), Jackson and Carsey (2002, 1999), Partin
(1995), Holbrook (1987), Renner (1999), Gimpel and Schuknecht (2002), and Gimpel
(2003, 1999, 1996).6 Fourth, Herrnson (1988, 1986) explores the contributions of

4

Larry J. Sabato, Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie: The American Governorship Transformed, 1950-1975
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1978); Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., The American
Governorship (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982); Thomas Holbrook, “Institutional Strength
and Gubernatorial Elections: An Exploratory Analysis,” American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 21 (July, 1993),
pp. 261-271.
5

Warren E. Miller, “Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology,” The Public
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 19 (Winter, 1955), pp. 353-368; V.O. Key, Jr., American State Politics: An
Introduction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965); Charles Press, “Voting Statistics and Presidential
Coattails,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 52 (December, 1958), pp. 1041-1050; Richard J.
Trilling, Party Image and Electoral Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976); James E. Campbell,
“Presidential Coattails and Midterm Losses in State Legislative Elections,” American Political Science
Review, Vol. 8 (March, 1986), pp. 45-63; Mark E. Tomkins, “Have Gubernatorial Elections Become More
Distinct Contests?” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 50 (February, 1988), pp. 192-205; Dennis M. Simon,
“Presidents, Governors, and Electoral Accountability,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 51 (May, 1989), pp.
286-304; Morris P. Fiorina, “Divided Government in the States,” in Gary W. Cox and Samuel Kernell,
eds., The Politics of Divided Government (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991); John R. Petrocik,
“Divided Government: Is It All in the Campaigns?” in Ibid.; Frank Feigert, “Illusions of Ticket-Splitting,”
American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 7 (October, 1979), pp. 470-488.
6

Robert S. Erickson, Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Robert D. Brown and Gerald C. Wright, “Elections and State Party
Polarization,” American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 20 (October, 1992), pp. 411-426; Thomas A. Carsey and
Wright, “State and National Factors in Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections,” American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 42 (July, 1998), pp. 994-1002; Robert A. Jackson and Thomas M. Carsey, “Group
Effects on Party Identification and Party Coalitions Across the United States,” American Politics Research,
Vol. 30 (January, 2002), pp. 66-92; Randall W. Partin, “Economic Conditions and Gubernatorial Elections:
Is the State Executive Held Accountable?” American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 23 (January, 1995), pp. 8195; Thomas Holbrook, “National Factors in Gubernatorial Elections,” American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 16
(October, 1987), pp. 471-483; Tari Renner, “Electoral Congruence and the Autonomy of the American
State Party,” American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 27 (January, 1999), p. 122-132; James Gimpel and Jason E.
Schuknecht, “Political and Demographic Foundations for Sectionalism in State Politics,” American Politics
Research, Vol. 30 (March, 2002), pp. 193-214; James Gimpel, Patchwork Nation (Ann Arbor, Michigan:
University of Michigan, 2003); James Gimpel, “Contemplating Congruence in State Electoral Systems,”

political party organizations to electoral campaigns.7 Finally, Gosnell (1950) and Howell
(1982) consider whether campaigns make a difference in electoral outcomes.8
Sabato on the Modern Governorship and Gubernatorial Election Scheduling
Larry Sabato’s Goodbye to Good-Time Charlie analyzes the transformation of
governorships between 1950 and 1975, from positions of limited responsibility to
positions of substantial consequence, independence, and professionalism. His work, as it
pertains to this study, is particularly useful in evaluating the development and
significance of the State Reorganization Movement.
Sabato also comments on the significance of simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections. He writes, “Too often the platforms and pronouncements of
gubernatorial aspirants… have been lost in the glare surrounding tumultuous presidential
contests, and the state issues have been relegated to the back pages of the newspapers.”9
Consequently, he recommends separating all gubernatorial and presidential elections.
“Scheduling elections in the off-years or odd-numbered years makes sense [because
voters then] have a better chance to evaluate the candidates and their programs wisely
and unencumbered by the distractions and complexities of presidential politics.”10 Many

American Politics Quarterly, Vol. 27 (January, 1999), p. 133-140; James Gimpel, National Elections and
the Autonomy of American State Party Systems (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996).
7

Paul S. Herrnson, “Do Parties Make A Difference? The Role of Party Organization in Congressional
Elections,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 48 (August, 1986), pp. 589-615; Herrnson, “The Importance of
Party Campaigning,” Polity, Vol. 20 (Summer, 1988), pp. 714-719.
8

Harold F. Gosnell, “Does Campaigning Make a Difference?” The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 14
(Autumn, 1950), pp. 413-418; Susan E. Howell, “Campaign Activities and State Election Outcomes,”
Political Behavior, Vol. 4 (1982), pp. 401-417.
9

Sabato, op. cit., p. 149.

10

Ibid.., p. 149.

state reformers attempting to separate gubernatorial elections from presidential election
cycles have used such arguments.
Tomkins on the Weakness of Presidential Coattails in Gubernatorial Elections
Tomkins analyzes gubernatorial and presidential elections held between 1947 and
1986. He chooses gubernatorial elections for comparison because they “[offer] a set of
quasi-autonomous but highly visible contests for analysis.”11 Tomkins notes that some
people believe gubernatorial elections have been “nationalized” by increased media focus
on issues applicable to state and national politics (health care, education, and so forth),
increasingly expensive gubernatorial campaigns that require out-of-state fundraising,
weakened state parties, and the growth of nationally potent interest groups. However, he
finds that short-term forces in the states were relatively stable in gubernatorial
competition during the period studied, while they fluctuated more in presidential
elections. This leads him to conclude that “the gubernatorial election contest has, in
general, become more distinctive from the national context, reflecting a more fully
autonomous office.”12 In other words, he believes gubernatorial elections are beyond the
influence of presidential coattails.
Simon on the Strength of Presidential Coattails in Gubernatorial Elections
Unlike Tomkins, Simon finds that presidential coattails play a clear and decisive
role in gubernatorial elections. He claims that voters’ attitudes toward presidential
performance act as a “mechanism of accountability” by which they judge members of the
president’s party in all other elections. “[Citizen] evaluations of presidential performance
11

Tomkins, op cit., p. 193.

12

Ibid.., p. 192.

operate as an influence on voting in gubernatorial elections,” Simon writes, and “the
impact of these evaluations is sizable enough to alter both the voting of individuals and
the outcomes of gubernatorial contests.”13 Moreover, he suggests that efforts to insulate
gubernatorial elections by scheduling them in non-presidential years has had the opposite
effect of what was intended by state reformers. “Rather than insulating gubernatorial
elections from national politics, holding gubernatorial elections in midterm years has, in
practice, produced the unintended consequence of reducing the vote garnered by
candidates of the president’s party,” he claims.
Campbell on the Strength of Presidential Coattails in State Legislative Elections
Presidential coattail effects are most often discussed in relation to U.S.
congressional elections. They are used to explain the fact that a president’s party typically
loses seats in midterm elections. Campbell examines presidential coattail effects in state
legislative elections to determine whether they experience the same trends as national
legislative elections. He finds that presidential coattail effects are quite evident in state
legislative elections: “The analysis indicates that the president’s party gains seats in
presidential elections in proportion to the presidential vote in a state, and subsequently
loses seats in mid-term elections also in proportion to the prior presidential vote in the
state.”14
It is also worth noting that much of what Campbell writes about the relationship
between state legislatures and presidents applies to this study’s focus on governors and
presidents. He writes,

13

Simon, op cit., p. 286.

14

Campbell, op cit., p. 45.

State legislatures and presidents deal at different levels of government and for the most
part are concerned with different issues. Nevertheless, parties are generally known by the
presidential candidates they nominate, and candidates for state legislative seats are a good
deal less well known to voters than the congressional candidates who ride presidential
coattails. Therefore, even though one can make a case that there may be no good policy
reasons for coattails to affect state legislative races, many voters may use the presidential
vote as a guide in casting a vote for the state legislature because they lack other
information.

This description of presidential coattail effects for the most part mirrors the argument
advanced by many, including Sabato above, to explain the consequences of simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections. Like the relationship between state legislatures
and presidents, governors and presidents also work on different levels of government and
handle many different issues.
Gimpel on State Voter and Party Autonomy
Gimpel and Schuknecht recognize the unique executive relation between
governors and presidents. They analyze substate sectionalism, in terms of political
partisanship, by studying gubernatorial and presidential election results in Connecticut
between 1928 and 2000.15 Gimpel also expresses particular interest in simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections in National Elections and the Autonomy of
American State Party Systems, when arguing that simultaneous choices of gubernatorial
and presidential candidates of different parties in Utah, Montana, and Washington
represent “not merely a fluke or an accident of the off-year election calendar.”16 This
comment, however, stems from Gimpel’s discussion of the local implications of
presidential Republicanism in western states; simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
elections are not the focus of his analysis.

15

Gimpel and Schuknecht, op cit.

16

Gimpel, National Elections and the Autonomy of American State Party Systems, p. 24.

Gimpel’s work is primarily important to this study because of its findings on the
differences between state versus national political alignments. In the 1950s, V.O. Key
described state parties as “but the shadow of their national counterparts.”17 Gimpel’s
National Elections explains that by the mid-1990s state parties had become largely
autonomous of national control, and the political cleavages that defined them were
typically different from those in national politics and in other states.18 Gimpel also
challenges the notion advanced in many other works, including those of Key, Sabato,
Simon, and Campbell, that national politics exert a powerful influence on state level
elections. Instead, Gimpel posits that electoral coalitions align differently for state versus
national elections, often producing mixed electoral outcomes. Thus Gimpel’s work
contributes importantly to understandings of voting behavior and state party activities,
two research areas that are relevant to analysis of mixed partisan outcomes in
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections.
Herrnson on the Electoral Contributions of Political Parties
Herrnson (1988) notes the many reasons why political parties are widely
considered to be less important in modern elections than they were in previous decades.
These reasons include decreasing partisanship, the influence of special interests and
political action committees, candidate-centered elections, and the rise of professional
consultants. Despite these developments Herrnson concludes that parties remain relevant
in modern elections; “party activity in elections reveals that parties are meeting the

17
18

Key, op. cit., p. 18.

On page 206 of National Elections and the Autonomy of American State Party Systems, Gimpel writes,
“States maintain their own unique political identities and react to national circumstances differently.”

challenges posed by the new politics and that parties really do matter.”19 Their
contributions include campaign funds, professional services and strategic advice,
facilitating relationships between campaigns and potential consultants and special interest
contributors, voter registration, get-out-the-vote efforts, and advertisements on behalf of
the party ticket.
Howell on the Significance of Election Campaigns
Howell

divides

campaign

activities

into

five

categories:

researching

constituencies; personally reaching the electorate through speeches and public
appearances; mobilizing voters; gaining the support of political elites, including
organizations, political leaders, and business leaders; media advertising. She concludes
that these activities typically do not determine election outcomes. Instead, she finds in
three-quarters of elections that the outcomes are attributable to four institutional factors:
incumbency, competition levels, candidates’ years of political experience, candidates’
prior elective offices. Incumbency is the most important factor, accounting for 56% of
variance in vote percentage. She writes, “The painfully obvious conclusion is that
campaigning, in many instances, is a waste of time.”20
This Study’s Contribution to the Literature
Sabato, Tomkins, Simon, Campbell, Gimpel, Herrnson, and Howell provide
analyses relevant to the study of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial
and presidential elections. However, further analysis is necessary to fully understand the
characteristics and implications of the phenomenon. This study updates and clarifies the
19

Herrnson, “The Importance of Party Campaigning,” p. 714.

20

Howell, op cit., p. 414.

arguments made in their work by focusing exclusively on one revealing aspect of
electoral behavior.
Focusing Sabato’s Analysis of Gubernatorial Transformation and Evaluating His
Conclusions About Gubernatorial Election Scheduling
Sabato analyzes the transformation of state governorships and the scheduling of
gubernatorial elections. This study focuses Sabato’s work by analyzing the entire
historical development of the State Reorganization Movement, particularly in terms of
gubernatorial election scheduling. This study also measures the electoral significance of
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections against the aims of state reform
efforts, by examining mixed partisan outcomes in such elections. The data presented in
this study indicate that, as Sabato contends, mixed partisan outcomes are more likely to
occur in separate versus simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. The data
also indicate, however, that presidential elections do not obscure simultaneous
gubernatorial elections to the extreme argued by Sabato. Scholarly understanding of the
actual, against the perceived, impact of simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
elections is enhanced by this study’s analysis of their outcomes over the last forty years.
Testing Tomkins’ Conclusions About Presidential Coattail Effects in Simultaneous
Gubernatorial Elections
Tomkins makes an important contribution to the literature of the field by
challenging popular notions of presidential coattail effects. His work, however, can be
significantly strengthened by two elements unique to this study. First, Tomkins does not
focus on simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections, although he notes the
important correlation claimed by state reformers between voting patterns in simultaneous

versus separated elections. For reasons set forth above, simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections are uniquely valuable bases for assessing presidential coattail
effects and voting behavior. Second, Tomkins does not make a significant attempt to
explain why voters in some states choose gubernatorial and presidential candidates of
different parties in any year, let alone the same year. This study improves on Tomkins’
work and makes a unique contribution to the literature of the field, by proposing that
campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the
primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and presidential candidates
of different parties in the same election year.
Testing Simon’s Conclusions About Presidential Coattail Effects in Gubernatorial
Elections
This study tests Simon’s conclusion that presidential coattails exert a decisive
influence in gubernatorial elections. It does so by examining the most recent electoral
data from presidential and gubernatorial elections, as well as presenting case studies of
two gubernatorial elections. It also evaluates Simon’s claim that off-year gubernatorial
elections have failed to isolate gubernatorial elections from presidential politics, by
comparing electoral outcomes and voting patterns in simultaneous versus separated
elections.
Improving on Campbell’s Analysis of Presidential Coattail Effects in State Level
Elections
Campbell studies presidential coattail effects in state level elections by focusing
on state legislative elections. He explains the influence of presidential coattails in these
elections in part by stating that “candidates for state legislative seats are a good deal less

well known to voters than the congressional candidates who ride presidential coattails.”
While this may be true of state legislative candidates, it is unclear whether it applies to
gubernatorial candidates. Sabato, in a comment above, contends that presidential
elections obscure simultaneous gubernatorial elections. His description of a more
independent and consequential governor, as well as Tomkins’ finding that voters
distinguish between gubernatorial and presidential elections, suggest that gubernatorial
candidates are in fact well known to voters and therefore capable of defying presidential
voting trends. A finding that presidential coattail effects do not significantly influence
simultaneous gubernatorial elections would indicate that coattails are limited to certain
types of state elections, instead of applying generally.
Applying Gimpel’s Findings to Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential
Elections
Gimpel’s analysis of differences in voting behavior and party activity between the
state and national levels is among the most relevant to this study. More than the other
works highlighted here, Gimpel’s is based on relatively recent data. Therefore, it does not
require a significant updating. However, like Tomkins’, it is not specifically focused on
the study of simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. Gimpel briefly refers
to this phenomenon when discussing the election of Democratic governors in western
states that tend to vote for Republican presidential candidates.21 Yet he does not use this
analysis of differing state and national political cleavages and state party autonomy to
explain how voting behavior and state party activity contributed to such outcomes. A
contribution of this study is its application of Gimpel’s findings to the analysis of
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections.
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Focusing Herrnson’s Analysis on State Political Parties
This study focuses Herrnson’s analysis of the electoral contributions of political
parties by examining the role of state party organizations in gubernatorial elections. It
exposes their functions primarily through case studies of gubernatorial elections. These
case studies give specific insights into the contributions and limitations of state party
organizations. They also reveal the different ways in which state party organizations
work with gubernatorial campaigns. As a result, this study provides a concrete basis for
assessing the electoral contributions of political parties beyond what is offered in
Herrnson’s analysis.
Challenging Howell’s Dismissal of Campaigns
Howell quite boldly dismisses campaigns as a “waste of time.” Yet her analysis is
too limited to justify discounting all campaigns. Howell’s analysis focuses on state
legislative elections, which, as noted in the above discussion of Campbell’s work, enjoy a
much lower profile than elections to other offices including governor. This study further
tests the significance of campaigns. It does so by focusing on the contributions of
campaign strategies in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections that produce
mixed partisan outcomes. In particular, it presents case studies of gubernatorial
campaigns that detail campaign strategies and evaluate their effectiveness.
How This Study is Designed to Test Its Thesis

In order to test the thesis that campaign strategies of
gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the
primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and

presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year,
this study is organized into five chapters covering the development and
significance of the State Reorganization Movement, case studies, and
conclusions.
Chapter II traces the historical development of the State
Reorganization Movement during the twentieth century, and measures
the effects of that movement on today’s gubernatorial elections.
Specifically, Chapter II considers the frequency of, and possible
explanations for, mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections over the last four decades.
Chapters III and IV focus specifically on the campaign strategies
of gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations in
Vermont and Montana, respectively. In Vermont’s 2004 gubernatorial
election, Republican Governor Jim Douglas was reelected
overwhelmingly in a state that strongly supported Democratic
presidential candidate John Kerry. Gubernatorial campaign strategies
appear to have played a key role in Douglas’ success, but observers
have often cited voter independence, candidate organizations, and
incumbency as alternative primary explanations. The 2004 Montana

gubernatorial election further tests this study’s thesis by eliminating
some of the Vermont case study’s alternative primary explanations.
Democrat Brian Schweitzer was narrowly elected in Montana at the
same time that voters overwhelmingly supported Republican President
George W. Bush. Schweitzer had never held political office, and he
was running for an open gubernatorial seat. In this race gubernatorial
campaign strategies also seem to have been critical to Schweitzer’s
success.
Drawing on the preceding chapters, Chapter V presents
conclusions on the viability of this study’s thesis and makes
recommendations for further research.

Chapter II: The Development and Significance of the State
Reorganization Movement

The twentieth century State Reorganization Movement transformed the
governorship from a weak to a strong position across the United States. Gubernatorial
election timing was an important element of this movement. Many reformers believed
that presidential elections exerted undue national influence on simultaneous gubernatorial
elections. To highlight state issues and give governors the appearance of independence,

many states separated gubernatorial and presidential elections through constitutional
amendments.
This chapter begins by analyzing the historical development of the American
governorship through the colonial, early constitutional, Jacksonian Era, and post-Civil
War periods. It continues with analysis of the development of the State Reorganization
Movement and its implications for the modern governorship. It considers gubernatorial
election timing and existing theories about presidential coattail effects. The chapter
concludes by measuring the impact of these elections and considering arguments about
why and how frequently they produce mixed partisan outcomes. Election data show that
states are more likely to select gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different
parties in separated elections, but simultaneous elections are more likely to produce
mixed partisan outcomes than reformers have often suggested.
Historical Development of the American Governorship
Before the State Reorganization Movement began, the governorship had already
undergone several stages of development during its three centuries of existence in
America. The major stages of development have been colonial, early constitutional,
Jacksonian Era, and post-Civil War. Beginning as a position of strong colonial authority,
the governorship was weakened by state legislative control in the early constitutional
period. Governors increasingly became subject to direct election during the Jacksonian
Era and gained substantial administrative responsibility during the post-Civil War period.
Yet the governorship remained a weak position due to shared executive power and
insufficient administrative authority.

Colonial Governorships
Prior to the American Revolution, most governors were appointees of the British
Crown. Only Rhode Island and Connecticut elected their governors, annually through
their state legislatures. Governors in others colonies represented the monarch and
enforced his policies. During the Revolutionary period, many considered governors
tyrants for enforcing what were perceived to be the abusive policies of King George III.
From this came the stigmatization of gubernatorial power that discouraged a strong
governorship throughout early United States history.
Early Constitutional Governorships
After declaring their independence, American colonies drafted state constitutions.
To avoid the perceived tyrannical abuses of colonial governors, early constitutional
governors were subject to control by their state legislatures. State legislatures selected
governors in every state except Massachusetts and New York, and only Massachusetts
and South Carolina permitted their governors to veto legislation. Also, executive councils
were appointed by state legislatures to share executive power with most governors. The
weakness of the governor was well-known and widely celebrated as a deterrent to
government abuse. Asked about the amount of authority given to the state’s governor
under its new constitution, a returning delegate from the North Carolina convention said
approvingly, “Just enough to sign the receipt for his salary.”22
Jacksonian Era Governorships
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During Andrew Jackson’s two terms as president, from 1829 to 1837, suffrage
requirements were liberalized across the American electorate to make the political
process more representative of popular will. In every state except South Carolina (where
governors were appointed by the state legislature until 1865) constitutions were changed
to allow statewide plurality election of governors. The direct election of the governor in
most states enhanced his symbolic authority as a representative of the people’s will, at the
expense of the legislature. Nonetheless, state legislatures still exercised considerable
control over governors’ institutional authority. During this period, legislatures began
creating new executive positions to share power with the governor. The product is often
referred to as the “plural executive.” Furthermore, legislative committees continued to
conduct the bulk of administrative affairs rather than entrusting them to the executive
branch.
Post-Civil War Governorships
After the Civil War, the United States experienced massive urbanization and a
consequent expansion of government services. Yet while state government gained
substantial power in this process, most governors did not. State legislatures created
numerous agencies, boards, and commissions to share administrative authority with the
governor. Legislators believed that corruption and abuses of power were less likely to
occur under independent bodies than under a strengthened governor with increased
patronage opportunities.
The former Confederate states underwent a somewhat different process of
gubernatorial change following the Civil War than other states. At the behest of the
federal government, states reentering the Union during the Reconstruction period of 1866

to 1876 rewrote their constitutions to centralize power in the governor. Federal officials
feared that disloyal or rebellious members of state legislatures would dominate state
government and thwart Reconstruction efforts otherwise. After Reconstruction ended, exConfederate state officials wrested control back from the “carpetbaggers” who had ruled
for the previous decade. They immediately began diluting the strength of the
governorship through statutory constitutions and the “long ballot.” Statutory constitutions
are extremely specific constitutions mandating financial and administrative policies. (For
example, Oklahoma’s current constitution declares that all public schools must teach
home economics.) The “long ballot” refers to the legislature’s creation of new elected
executive offices, such as auditor or comptroller and superintendent of public instruction,
to absorb executive duties that would otherwise fall to the governor.
Professor John Fairlie referred to the post-Civil War governorship as “neither the
single executive, nor the collective executive, nor any intermediate type.”23 Most state
constitutions endowed the governor with “supreme executive power” to see that the laws
were faithfully executed, yet governors lacked administrative authority over the executive
branch because most of its power was distributed among appointed agencies, boards, and
commissions and elected executive officials. While governor of New Jersey, Woodrow
Wilson was a leader in the State Reorganization Movement. In 1889, he wrote: “Of state
officials associated with the Governor it may be said that both in law and in fact they are
colleagues of the Governor, in no sense his agents or subordinates, except perhaps in
mere formal procedure.”24 By the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, governors
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were widely regarded as figureheads incapable of initiating and administering significant
changes in state government. In his influential book on American government, The
American Commonwealth, British Ambassador to the United States James Bryce
concluded at this time, “State office carries little either of dignity or power.”25
The State Reorganization Movement Begins
Displeasure with state governments grew in the early twentieth century.
Reformers had been disappointed in their expectation that improvements in state
government efficiency and integrity would result from the creation of the plural
executive. Instead, the wide distribution of executive authority came to be regarded as an
obstacle to good governance. The solution, many believed, was to increase gubernatorial
authority in terms of leadership and administration.
Investigating State Government Inefficiency
Most states in the early twentieth century distributed executive authority across at
least fifty independent agencies, boards, and commissions. New York, for example, went
from having ten agencies in 1800, to twenty in 1850, to eighty-one in 1900. Within
another twenty-five years, the number doubled.26 Investigations into the efficiency of
various states’ agencies, boards, and commissions yielded dramatic results. Many days
were required just to record the names of all agency, board, and commission members in
some states; weeks were required to quantify the members and determine their functions.
According to A.E. Buck, “Those who surveyed the situation in these states were literally
amazed at the complexity of the administration; they found agencies that even the
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governor did not know existed.”27 Often these administrative bodies were duplicative and
wasteful. For example, New York Governor Alfred E. Smith lamented the creation of the
Soldiers’ Bonus Commission after World War I, when agencies and executives already
existed to identify deserving veterans and authorize payments.
Gubernatorial Inability to Promote State Efficiency
Governors were unable to improve state government efficiency because they
lacked necessary administrative authority. Agency, board, and commission members
usually served longer terms than the governor and were appointed by state legislatures or
previous governors. In Ohio before 1921, for example, some governors inherited nearly
all appointed administrators from their predecessors. Walter Dodd declared in his 1922
study of state government that the governor’s task, “from an administrative standpoint
[is] largely a hopeless one.”28 Many politicians and reformers concurred in this
assessment. William Anderson and Edward Weidner later described the genesis of the
State Reorganization Movement as follows:
Budgets and payrolls began to get out of hand. Waste and corruption were widely
suspected and occasionally found. Who could be made responsible for supervising and
controlling this enlarged administration?... The evidence suggests that no one but the
governor was seriously considered for the new managerial role.29

Early Events in the State Reorganization Movement
A confluence of initiatives provided the impetus for the State Reorganization
Movement. In 1910 the People’s Power League of Oregon published a plan to centralize
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state power in the governor. Also that year, New York Governor Charles Evans Hughes
became the first governor to advocate greater power for his office in hopes of improving
government efficiency. In a message to the state legislature, he called for administrative
centralization in the governor and his cabinet, the latter to be chosen by the former
instead of being elected. In a subsequent speech at Yale University, Hughes declared that
problems with state government efficiency required
the grouping of administrative powers, with the necessary divisions or departments,
under a chief administrative head; the enforcement of responsibility of the administrative
head through an election upon which the attention of the people can be centered with
respect to the importance of which they are fully convinced, - in these, I believe, will be
found important securities of efficient administration.30

One year later, President William Howard Taft asked Congress to appropriate $100,000
for the purpose of evaluating efficiency in national government, and for the authority to
carry out necessary changes previously unauthorized for the executive. The Taft
Economy and Efficiency Commission’s report was rejected by Congress the next year,
but it inspired similar investigations in many states. According to Leslie Lipson, “Those
who had intimate knowledge of the states knew well that, however bad the national
government, the organization of the state executive branches was far worse.”31 Wisconsin
became the first state to investigate government efficiency, in 1911; sixteen states
followed by 1917.
Constitutional Reforms Sought for State Government Reorganization
The achievement of a strengthened governorship and a more efficient state
government required constitutional changes. While the reorganization plans of various
states and reform groups differed, they shared many of the same goals. Most state
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reorganization plans advocated concentration of administrative authority in the governor;
gubernatorial budget-making authority; expanded gubernatorial terms; gubernatorial veto
power; consolidation of executive departments; reduction of agency, board, and
commission size and authority; coordination of staff services administration; provision
for an independent state auditor; recognition of the governor’s cabinet, as selected by the
governor. In 1921 the National Municipal League, one of the leading organizations in the
State Reorganization Movement, published an influential blueprint for reform called “A
Model State Constitution.” This work encompassed many of the goals just described, but
it also advocated direct gubernatorial participation in legislative agenda-setting; provision
of seats in state legislatures for the governor and his cabinet; quarterly reports from the
governor to the legislature; power for the legislature to remove the governor with a twothirds vote. Unlike later reform efforts, early state reorganization plans did not mention
the timing of gubernatorial elections.

Objections to the State Reorganization Movement
Many objected to state reorganization plans because they feared the creation of
“autocratic government.” A strengthened governor, they contended, would use his new
power to abuse the patronage system and serve his political interests, at the expense of his
constituents. Even some governors condemned the reforms as unnecessary and
dangerous. “The governor has no need for further power,” argued Maryland Governor
Albert C. Ritchie in 1921.

[In] large measure, the things done in other states thus to centralize power in the
governor, do not centralize any powers in him at all, but simply remove the checks and
balances which now exist, and which certainly for the most part, ought to be retained.32

Even those advocating reform conceded that most governorships had gained power in
recent years. Dodd, a strong proponent of state government reorganization, wrote in
1922: “With the rapid increase in the number of things that the state government
undertakes to do, there has thus been an increase in the power vested in the office of the
governor, and at the same time an increase in the importance of the office.”33 Unlike
Ritchie, though, Dodd and other reformers believed that recent increases in gubernatorial
power still fell short of providing governors the administrative authority necessary to
promote state government efficiency.
The State Reorganization Movement Leads to a Strong Modern Governorship
The state reorganization initiatives of the 1910s led to decades of constitutional
change, resulting in strong modern governorships. While the State Reorganization
Movement has impacted every state’s system of government, its progress has not been
linear or uniform across the states. Lipson writes,
The reorganization movement proceeded independently from state to state at various
times and was modified to suit local exigencies. One must expect to find not a logically
coherent scheme perfectly applied but a patchwork threaded with compromise and
conflict.34

The movement’s early strength dissipated in the 1930s, before blossoming in the 1960s.
It has had a major impact on the conduct, character, prestige, and election of governors.
The 1910s and 1920s: Governors Advance Reform Efforts
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Ambitious governors eager to improve state government efficiency championed
the initial state reorganization plans. Among the most prominent of these governors were
Woodrow Wilson (New Jersey), Charles Evans Hughes (New York), Frank Lowden
(Illinois), Robert La Follette (Wisconsin), and Hiram Johnson (California).35 Hughes was
the first to propose state constitutional amendments to achieve a strengthened
governorship. New York voters rejected his plan in November 1915. Two years later,
Lowden was successful in pursuing government reforms that led to the reduction of
independent state agencies from fifty to fourteen. By the mid-1930s, twenty-six states had
strengthened their governorships through major revisions to their state laws and
constitutions. Often this was the result of governors’ leadership in emphasizing state
government reorganization. For example, Virginia’s Governor Harry Byrd, Sr., used it as
a major campaign issue in his 1926 bid for reelection. His success in the election gave
him a mandate to achieve state government reorganization.

The 1930s Through 1960s: The State Reorganization Movement Stalls
The State Reorganization Movement lost its momentum in the 1930s, and for the
most part lay dormant until the 1960s. The shift toward centralization of federal power
during the Great Depression and later World War II diminished enthusiasm for strong
state government, to the point that New Dealers briefly flirted with the idea of replacing
states with “regional commonwealths.” Also, state government revenues and services
decreased during this period, for two reasons. First, taxable income dropped sharply
35
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during the Great Depression and did not recover until after the war. Second, increased
urbanization without corresponding reapportionment by state legislatures in many states
created malapportionment in favor of rural voters. Rural voters tended to prefer lower
taxes and fewer government services than urban voters. Revenue losses and decreased
demand for services lessened the need for a strong administrative governor.
Consequently, the State Reorganization Movement experienced a lull in the 1930s that
lasted for three decades.
The 1960s and 1970s: The State Reorganization Movement Blossoms
In 1962 the Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Carr that malapportionment of state
legislatures violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. In accordance
with Baker v. Carr and other relevant court decisions, many state legislatures were
reapportioned to give urban voters proportional, and therefore much greater,
representation. Taxes and government services subsequently increased, renewing the
need for strong and efficient administration of state government. Then, during the late
1960s, President Richard Nixon’s New Federalism program increased revenue sharing
with the states by delivering large sums of money, often in block grants. (Block grants
are funds provided for a general interest, such as education, to be spent at the state
government’s discretion.) As a result of increased administrative demands, state
reorganization and strengthened governorships became a major priority of state
governments once again.
The Achievement of a Strengthened Governorship

The renewal of the State Reorganization Movement had swift and dramatic
consequences. Whereas five states rewrote their constitutions from 1902 to 1963, ten
approved new constitutions and ten others restructured theirs significantly from 1964 to
1976; the average number of elected executives per state decreased from thirteen in 1950
to ten in 1975;36 constitutional restrictions against consecutive gubernatorial terms were
eliminated in every state except Virginia; the number of governors serving four-year
terms swelled from twenty-nine in 1955 to forty-seven in the mid-1980s.
The modern governor, as a result of the State Reorganization Movement and other
changes, is a much more consequential actor in state politics than a century ago.
Governors typically play a central role in the agenda-setting process, submit budgets,
veto legislation, send messages to the legislature, set out clear objectives in high-profile
campaigns, and communicate directly to constituents through the media, particularly
television. The enhanced prestige of the governorship has attracted a new breed of
governors over the last several decades. They now tend to be younger, better educated,
and more ambitious in their agendas than in previous eras. Governors are also prime
contenders for national office, as indicated by the fact that all but one of the presidents
elected since 1976 served previously as governors.
The Electoral Significance of a Strengthened Governorship
The achievement of a strengthened governorship through the State Reorganization
Movement has had important implications for gubernatorial elections. Most gubernatorial
elections are now, like other elections for prominent offices, candidate-centered. This is
due in part to other changes independent of the State Reorganization Movement,
including decreased partisan identification, increased split-ticket voting, and the influence
36
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of television. Yet, according to Barbara Salmore and Stephen Salmore, candidatecentered elections were slower to develop for governorships than were candidatecentered elections for other offices, because they were not considered as important or
worthy of close attention. As the office gained in power and prestige, however,
gubernatorial elections became more prominent. “There is more at stake in state level
elections, more political players are interested in their outcomes, and more resources are
available to wage campaigns,” wrote Salmore and Salmore.37
The Role of Election Timing in the State Reorganization Movement
Simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections were slow to emerge as an
essential element in the State Reorganization Movement. Ignored by early reformers, it
became a common notion in the mid-twentieth century that such elections negatively
affected gubernatorial selection by elevating partisan affiliation above competence and
policy matters. As a result, many states amended their constitutions to schedule
gubernatorial elections in non-presidential years.

Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections a Non-Factor in the Early
State Reorganization Movement
Election timing, particularly in terms of simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections, was simply not an issue in the early years of the State
Reorganization Movement. Such elections were not mentioned in early works on state
government, such as Dodd’s (1922) and Buck’s (1938). They were not mentioned in the
National Municipal League’s 1921 “A Model State Constitution.” Furthermore, they do
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not seem to have concerned state governments in the early movement years. In 1911, as
efficiency and government reorganization were first attracting attention on the state and
national levels, Arizona and New Mexico were admitted into the Union. That year, the
two states held their first gubernatorial elections. Instead of scheduling their next
gubernatorial elections two years later, also in a non-presidential year, Arizona and New
Mexico temporarily extended their first governors’ terms to three years so that the next
gubernatorial election would be held in 1914, and then every two years henceforth. By
going out of their way to hold gubernatorial elections in even-numbered years, the new
states showed no concern for the potential pitfalls of simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections. Similarly, the revised New York constitution proposed in 1927
would have expanded the governor’s term from two to four years, starting in 1928. The
fact that all subsequent gubernatorial elections would occur at the same time as
presidential elections apparently did not alarm state reformers advocating the new
constitutional provisions.

Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections Are Deemed Significant by
Some Politicians of the Early Movement Years
Among the first to recognize the potential significance of simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections were the people affected by them most, the
gubernatorial candidates. New York Democratic Governor Al Smith objected in part to
the revised 1927 state constitution on the basis that it established simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections. Scarred by his gubernatorial defeat in the
Republican landslide of 1920, “He wanted a state election to be concerned with state

affairs” and believed that simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections inhibited
that ideal.38 Smith later attempted to use simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
elections to his advantage. Running for the presidency in 1928, Smith recruited fellow
Democrat Franklin Roosevelt to seek the New York governorship because he believed
that Roosevelt’s popularity would boost his chances of winning the state’s electoral
votes. Similarly, Roosevelt in 1936 urged incumbent New York Democratic Governor
Herbert Lehman to seek reelection, in order to help him gain New York’s vote for a
second term as president.
Scholars Begin to Recognize the Potential Significance of Simultaneous
Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections in the 1950s and 1960s
Starting in the 1950s, many scholars began to consider the potential influence of
presidential elections on simultaneous gubernatorial elections. Anderson and Weidner
speculated in 1951 that “partisan issues important on one level may also affect the results
on another.”39 V.O. Key elaborated on the potential of coattail effects in American State
Politics (1956):
The presidential candidate who leads his party to a landslide victory carries into office
with him large numbers of gubernatorial candidates of his party, who win without much
regard to their role or place in the state, but because they float along with national
movement of sentiment.40

Joseph E. Kallenbach, in a section of The American Chief Executive (1966) entitled
“Election Reform Issues,” highlighted simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
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elections as “warrant[ing] special significance in connection with the choosing of
executives.”41
Many scholars who acknowledged the potential significance of simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections were skeptical about its actual impact. Anderson
and Weidner said “The argument [that presidential elections obscure state issues in
simultaneously held gubernatorial elections] is plausible, but it is hard to adduce evidence
to prove the point.”42 Kallenbach noted that nearly four out of ten gubernatorial
candidates were chosen at the same time that state voters selected a presidential candidate
of a different party from 1956 to 1964. On this basis, he wrote
The conclusion seems warranted that coincidental presidential and gubernatorial
elections, even when coupled with voting procedures that tend to encourage straightticket voting, are by no means an insurmountable obstacle to a discriminating choice by
voters.43

Kallenbach also detailed the potential benefits of simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections. He said they decreased the burden on voters by electing both
positions at one time rather than at two separate times; decreased state and municipality
expenses by holding one rather than two elections; increased voter turnout for
gubernatorial elections, since presidential elections tend to draw more voters than other
elections. He also indicated that they
induce greater harmony and identification of interest between the state party organization and its
candidates and the national party and its leadership, thus making for a somewhat clearer fixing of
party responsibility and a strengthening of party ties generally between national and state
interests.44
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Election Timing Becomes an Essential Aspect of the State Reorganization
Movement
By the end of the 1960s, the separation of gubernatorial elections from
presidential elections became a major element in the State Reorganization Movement.
Between 1964 and 1996, the number of states holding simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections dropped from twenty-five to eleven, while only North Dakota
moved its gubernatorial election to coincide with the presidential cycle. The pattern of
change over the past century is striking. At the beginning of the twentieth century, thirtyfour out of forty-five states held simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections.
Today, as a result of the State Reorganization Movement, only eleven out of fifty states
hold them simultaneously. (See Graph 1, which tracks the number of simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections held, 1900-2004.)

Graph 1: The Number of States Holding Simultaneous
1900 - 2004
Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections, 1900-1924
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More changes in election timing are still possible. The National Municipal League
and the National Governors Association recommend holding gubernatorial elections in
odd-numbered years, to avoid the potential national influences of presidential and
congressional elections. Currently, only Virginia, New Jersey, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Kentucky, elect their governors in odd-numbered years
Assessing the Impact of Election Timing in Recent Gubernatorial Elections
Many reformers have claimed that states with separated gubernatorial and
presidential elections are more likely to produce mixed partisan outcomes than those with
simultaneous elections. Since many states began separating gubernatorial and presidential
elections as part of the State Reorganization Movement, election data from the last forty
years provide the optimal available basis for assessing these claims. The data indicate that
states with separated gubernatorial and presidential elections are more likely to produce

mixed partisan outcomes than those with simultaneous elections. However, states with
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections are much more likely to produce
mixed partisan outcomes than state government reformers have often suggested.
Are Separated Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections More Likely to Produce
Mixed Partisan Outcomes than Simultaneous Elections?
Despite many state government reformers’ claims that national politics
dramatically overshadows state politics in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
elections, mixed partisan outcomes in these elections occur frequently. Since 1980,
twenty-nine out of eighty-three, or thirty-five percent, of simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections have produced mixed partisan outcomes. (See Graph 2, detailing
the historical trend toward increased occurrence of mixed partisan outcomes in
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections.)
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These data prove that voters are not only capable of separating presidential from
gubernatorial preferences, but they do so very often.
Analysis of recent election data also shows that separated gubernatorial and
presidential elections are significantly more likely to produce mixed partisan outcomes
than simultaneous elections. Since 1980, one hundred forty-two out of two hundred sixtyseven, or fifty-three percent, of separated gubernatorial and presidential elections have
produced mixed partisan outcomes. (See Graph 3, comparing mixed partisan outcomes in
simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential elections, since 1980.)

Graph 3: Rates of Mixed Partisan Outcomes in
Simultaneous Versus Separated Gubernatorial and
Presidential Elections, 1980-2004
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Recent election data thus reinforce the State Reorganization Movement claim that offyear gubernatorial elections are less likely to be influenced by national politics than
simultaneous elections.

Is There a Pattern of Voting for Change in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and
Presidential Elections?
Some scholars and other observers have proposed that there are patterns in voter
selections of gubernatorial and presidential candidates in the same election year. Recent
election data provide the basis for assessing their theories.
Kallenbach hypothesized that presidential coattail effects are particularly strong in
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections when state voters support a change
of presidential party. He wrote, “The influence exerted by the presidential election upon
the outcome of gubernatorial contests is most likely to be felt in those years when there is
a change in national party control of the presidency.”45 He based his theory on Angus
Campbell and Warren E. Miller’s 1957 study, “The Motivational Bases of Straight and
Split-Ticket Voting.” Yet Campbell and Miller’s analysis applied to all offices on the
ballot in presidential elections years, meaning that split-ticket voters may still have
supported the same party for governor and president.
Kallenbach’s hypothesis is not supported by recent election data. Since 1980,
twenty-nine out of thirty-nine states (seventy-four percent) voting for a change in
presidential party leadership during simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections
have also voted to maintain the party in gubernatorial power. Only ten out of eighty-three
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections since 1980 (twelve percent) have
produced state votes for changes in the party leadership of the presidency and the
governorship. In fact, since 1960, years in which a new party is elected to the presidency
have proven less likely to produce mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous
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gubernatorial and presidential elections than years in which the president’s party remains
in power (thirty-six versus forty percent).
Nor do election data support an assumption that Kallenbach’s theory is better
applied to landslide votes for change. For example, in 1980, the most recent case of a
landslide vote for change in presidential party leadership, Republican Ronald Reagan
defeated incumbent Democratic President Jimmy Carter with 489 out of 538 electoral
votes. Yet only four out of eleven states voting for a change in presidential party
leadership in 1980 (thirty-six percent) also voted for a change in gubernatorial party
leadership.
Does the Competitiveness of a Presidential Election Affect Rates of Mixed Partisan
Outcomes in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections?
It might also be suggested that the closeness of a presidential election affects the
rate of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections.
A close presidential race would perhaps lead to more split-ticket voting and more mixed
partisan outcomes between states’ choices of gubernatorial and presidential candidates, as
non-partisan or loosely partisan “swing” voters divide somewhat evenly between
unusually appealing candidates of different parties. Conversely, perhaps a dull
presidential election contest causes voters to focus their attention on the governor’s race,
inducing greater scrutiny and more mixed partisan outcomes. Again, recent election data
do not support a pattern in either case. Since 1960 there have been six highly competitive
presidential elections (1960, 1968, 1976, 1992, 2000, 2004), during which thirty-six out
of ninety-eight states (thirty-seven percent) have voted for gubernatorial and presidential
candidates of different parties. Also since 1960, there have been six largely

uncompetitive presidential elections (1964, 1972, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1996), during which
thirty-seven out of ninety-four states (thirty-nine percent) have voted for gubernatorial
and presidential candidates of different parties. Judging from the election data, whether a
presidential election is competitive or uncompetitive makes virtually no difference in the
national incidence of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections.
Assessing the Electoral Significance of Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential
Elections
Analysis of recent election data suggest that gubernatorial elections held at the
same time as presidential elections are, as State Reorganization Movement reformers
have argued since the 1950s and 1960s, more likely to be influenced by presidential
politics than are separated gubernatorial elections. Despite evidence of heightened
national political influence in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections,
however, many produce mixed partisan outcomes in which gubernatorial elections and
state politics are certainly not obscured by presidential politics. Thus, this evidence
indicates that State Reorganization Movement reformers have been correct to a certain
degree about the electoral significance of simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
elections. Chapter V, however, presents conflicting evidence of presidential coattail
effects.
Contrary to many existing theories, there does not seem to be a clear formula for
predicting patterns of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections. Other factors must be considered to explain this phenomenon. This
study proposes that campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state party

organizations are the primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and
presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year. To test this thesis,
the following two chapters present case studies of the 2004 gubernatorial elections in
Vermont and Montana, in which state voters selected gubernatorial and presidential
candidates of different parties in the same election year.

Chapter III: The 2004 Vermont Gubernatorial Election

“I always do what’s right for Vermont, regardless of party affiliation.” –
Governor Jim Douglas46
“If you support the candidacy of Jim Douglas, make no mistake: You support the
candidacy of George Bush.” –B.J. Rogers, spokesman for Peter Clavelle47
In 2004, Vermont’s Jim Douglas was the only Republican governor in the nation
elected by a state that voted for the Democratic presidential candidate, John Kerry.
Douglas’ reelection was especially noteworthy because it occurred in what was
widely considered the most liberal state in the nation. Moreover, Douglas (who was
initially elected governor by a narrow plurality in 2002) defeated Democratic
challenger Peter Clavelle in 2004 by a slightly greater landslide than Kerry’s margin
over Republican President George W. Bush in the state. Douglas won 59% of the vote
to Clavelle’s 38%, whereas Kerry won 59% to Bush’s 39%.
Governor Douglas’ victory has been attributed to a variety of factors, primarily voter
independence, candidate organization, and incumbency. Campaign strategies attracted
little attention in evaluations of the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial election. This chapter
analyzes the issues and factors influencing the Douglas-Clavelle race, with particular
attention to the campaign strategies used by the Douglas campaign and the Vermont
Republican Party to elect a Republican governor at the same time that Vermont
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overwhelmingly supported the Democratic presidential candidate. By specifically
analyzing the role of campaign strategies in the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial election,
this chapter tests the thesis that campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and
their state party organizations are the primary factors affecting state voter choice of
gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different parties in the same election
year.

Vermont’s Political Transformation
Governor Jim Douglas’ election as a Republican governor in Vermont was very
surprising to many, given Vermont’s reputation as an exceptionally liberal state. Yet
for most of the twentieth century, the election of a Vermont Republican would not
have been noteworthy. Before its recent political transformation, Vermont had long
been recognized as perhaps the most Republican state in the nation. In 1936 it was
one of only two states, along with Maine, to support Republican presidential nominee
Alf Landon over Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt. Before 1992, Vermont
had backed only one Democratic candidate for president since the creation of the
Republican Party, President Lyndon Johnson in 1964. In the early 1960s, however,
the state began a period of dramatic change that continues to impact its culture and
politics today.
In 1960, Vermont was still the small, agrarian state it had always been; the 390,000
people living in the state that year were outnumbered by cows. Within the next two

decades, Vermont’s population surged to 511,000, then to 609,000 by 2000.48 At the
same time, Vermont underwent an economic transition in which tourism, skiing,
summer resorts, computer technology, and Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream diversified and
enhanced a state economy long known primarily for its agriculture. Most important
for Vermont’s political environment, the immigrants of this period tended to be much
more liberal than the native population.
While next-door New Hampshire, trumpeting its low taxes and aversion to government,
attracted right-leaning migrants from Massachusetts and elsewhere who were happy to
live in spanking-new developments and ravenous for low taxes, Vermont, proclaiming its
desire to preserve the environment and the past, attracted left-leaning migrants from New
York and elsewhere who were willing to pay higher taxes and higher prices for the
privilege of living in a seemingly pristine setting.49

The younger and wealthier immigrants eventually redefined Vermont, so that by 2004
it had “become the leader of America’s left.”50 At that point, the state was well
known for its stringent environmental standards, homosexual civil unions, and its
regular reelection of Independent Congressman and self-described socialist Bernie
Sanders. In 2004, Vermont gave Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry his
third greatest vote percentage of any state, while distinguishing itself as the only state
in the nation to give President Bush a lower percentage of the vote than it had in 2000
(41% in 2000, 39% in 2004). Given these facts, Vermont did not seem a likely setting
for a Republican landslide in the 2004 gubernatorial election.

Governor Jim Douglas
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Governor Douglas possessed many important electoral advantages that helped
him to overcome the stigma of being a Republican candidate in Vermont. Most
notably, Douglas’ familiarity with Vermonters, moderate image, and first-term record
made him an unusually appealing gubernatorial candidate, even while the presidential
candidate of his party was headed for certain defeat the same year.

The Political Rise of Jim Douglas
Born in Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1951 and raised in neighboring Longmeadow,
Jim Douglas came to Vermont as a Middlebury College student in 1968. A lifelong
Republican, Douglas campaigned for Republican presidential candidate Barry
Goldwater in 1964 at age thirteen, and while in college led rallies in support of
Republican President Richard Nixon amid protests against the Vietnam war. Upon
graduation in 1972, Douglas ran successfully for Middlebury state representative, and
five years later he became majority leader of the Vermont House of Representatives.
In 1979, Douglas lost a bid for House speaker and subsequently became an aide to
Republican Governor Richard Snelling. He also worked as a radio announcer and
executive director of the United Way before being elected Vermont’s secretary of
state in 1980. After being reelected five times to that office, he attempted to enter
national politics by challenging popular three-term U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy in
1992. Douglas presented the greatest electoral threat of Leahy’s senatorial career, but
lost by a 54% to 43% margin. In 1994, Douglas returned to state politics when elected
treasurer, a post that he held for four consecutive terms.

In 2002, Douglas ran for the governor’s seat being vacated by Democratic
presidential aspirant Howard Dean. His opponents in this three-way race were
Democratic Lieutenant Governor Doug Racine and Con Hogan, an Independent
candidate who had initially sought the Republican nomination. Douglas’ campaign
focused on economic recovery for the state. He sought to “create a more businessfriendly environment in Vermont,” primarily by proposing tax cuts, spending cuts,
and major reforms of Acts 250 and 60.51 Act 250 was an environmental measure
passed in the early 1970s under liberal Republican Governor Deane Davis. The act set
ten stringent criteria for the construction of housing developments and ski resorts.
The authority for evaluating construction plans was distributed across five different
commissions, and an automatic right of appeal was granted to any citizen objecting to
commission decisions. Act 60, also called the Equal Education Opportunity Act, was
passed in 1997 in response to a Vermont Supreme Court ruling mandating equal
educational opportunities throughout the state. The act complied by equalizing
property tax rates statewide, so that wealthier districts could no longer use these taxes
to raise and spend disproportionate amounts of money on their public schools. Many
blamed Acts 250 and 60 with discouraging business activity in Vermont, causing job
cuts and slowing economic growth. (Lieutenant Governor Racine joined Douglas in
advocating revisions of the acts.) Additionally, Douglas ran on the theme of change.
He blamed many of the state’s problems on seventeen years of Democratic
governorship over the previous eighteen years.

51

Ibid., p. 1695.

In the November election, Douglas received 45% of the vote, to Racine’s 42% and
Hogan’s 10%. Douglas’ victory was especially noteworthy because Democrats
exceeded expectations in that year’s state legislative elections, maintaining their
Senate majority and taking control of the House of Representatives.

Governor Douglas’ Familiarity to Vermont Voters
By the time Jim Douglas was elected governor of Vermont in 2002 he had been
on a state ballot every other year since 1972, statewide since 1980. In that time, he
received more votes than any other candidate in Vermont’s history and, by the
estimate of Eric Davis, professor of political science at Middlebury College, Douglas
had personally met a quarter of Vermont’s 600,000-plus residents.52 Douglas’
familiarity to Vermonters provided a substantial electoral advantage. It was
particularly relevant because, according to Douglas, Vermont “is a small state where
politics is retail and local; meeting a candidate for a major office, regardless of
ideology or positions, certainly makes a difference.”53 Consequently, Douglas
maintained a strong presence across Vermont while holding each of his statewide
offices. Douglas’ 2004 campaign chairman Neale Lunderville described his
interaction with constituents as “essential to the success of Jim Douglas” because it
allowed him to establish personal connections and spread his messages.54 Douglas’
extensive travels as governor attracted criticism from many of his opponents, who
52

Professor Eric Davis, Telephone interview, December 6, 2005.

53

Governor Jim Douglas, Telephone interview, December 23, 2005.

54

Neale Lunderville, Telephone interview, December 23, 2005.

claimed that he could be performing more important functions than “ribbon-cutting.”
Some referred to him derisively as “Governor Scissorhands.”55 Douglas dismissed
these criticisms, responding:
If there’s a ribbon to be cut, it means something good is happening in our state. It means
a business is opening or expanding; it means a new school; it means a nonprofit
organization that is providing a new program or service; it means the state is moving
forward economically or socially in a positive way.56

Irrespective of opinion concerning the propriety of his travels, there can
be little doubt that Douglas’ familiarity to Vermont voters was a
valuable element in his political success.
Governor Douglas’ Personal Appeal
Governor Douglas’ familiarity with state voters allowed him to market what many
regarded as an attractive personality, in a state where personal appeal had great
resonance. “I think at least Vermont is more personal than it is party,” said Bill Grover,
professor of political science at St. Michael’s College.
Vermont, being a small state, a state where everybody pretty much knows everybody,
you can’t overemphasize how much face-to-face politics matters here. You can’t
overemphasize how much people thought of Douglas… as a ‘nice guy’ and an ‘honest
guy,’ and how much that mattered to them.57
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Indeed, Douglas’ reputation as an honorable and friendly person was widely recognized
and often cited as one of his greatest assets in wooing voters. It helped distinguish him
from other Republicans, particularly on the national level, whom Vermonters distrusted
or disliked. For example, Professor Davis said, “Douglas’ personal style – outgoing,
friendly, dry sense of humor – is very engaging, and voters like him personally. He’s not
a polarizing candidate, such as George [W.] Bush.”58 Lunderville described him as “very
genuine, very affable… the kind of guy you would want your sister to marry.”59 While
this view, to varying degrees, was widely shared and valued in Vermont, it was not
universally accepted. Professor Grover dismissed Douglas’ friendly image as “a fraud,”60
while the Brattleboro Reformer, in endorsing Peter Clavelle over Douglas in the 2004
election, wrote, “we share the view of many Vermonters that Governor Douglas… [is]
generally [a] nice [guy], [but] being amiable isn’t as important as being creative and
bold.”61
Governor Douglas’ Moderate Image
Governor Douglas’ lengthy political experience in Vermont and strong
relationship with voters gave him the opportunity to cultivate his image as a pragmatic
moderate Republican. Though fiscally conservative in many ways, Douglas was quite
socially liberal. He supported legalized abortion, accepted Vermont’s civil union law, and
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allowed a medicinal marijuana bill to become law, though without his signature.
“Governor Douglas isn’t a social conservative to begin with,” said Vermont Republican
Party Chairman Jim Barnett, “and he probably would not have made it as far in his career
if he were. He’s not a firebrand by any account.”62 This perception was reinforced by the
way Douglas spoke about himself and his policies. Shortly after the 2004 election, he
described his plans for a second gubernatorial term as “my agenda of moderate
mainstream bipartisanship.”63 Douglas also made efforts to distinguish himself from
national Republicans, by saying “I’ve never applied labels to myself. I’m a Vermont
Republican.”64
Douglas often shifted attention away from his ideology by emphasizing his
pragmatism and willingness to work with others, particularly Democrats. On the
campaign trail in 2004, he described his “approach to government” as “very
collaborative, bringing people together to solve problems and embrace opportunities.”65
Typical were Douglas’ comments on divisions over health care following the 2004
election:
When two points of view are different, I suppose compromise is likely. My most
important objective is to make progress to ensure we address the issues that are important
to Vermonters and that I talked about during the campaign.66
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This is hardly the type of rhetoric that would lead Vermonters to view
Douglas as an ideologue.
Governor Douglas was largely successful in convincing voters and other
observers of his moderate approach, thereby defusing concerns about his association with
conservative national Republicans. Professor Davis said of Douglas, “He’s not a far-right
conservative by any means.”67 Most major Vermont newspapers agreed. In fact, in their
endorsements of Douglas many newspapers indicated that his political differentiation
from national Republicans was a significant element in his attraction. The Valley News
claimed, “It’s clear to anyone paying attention that Douglas comes from a very different
Republican tradition”68 than George W. Bush. The Herald-Times Argus argued, “Douglas
is the kind of Republican who could help to pull the party back from the extreme
ideological direction in which Bush has taken it.”69 Such comments recurred in many
supporters’ discussions of Douglas. They suggest that one of the motivations for
supporting Douglas was to prove to national Republicans that the moderation of party
policy could widen their electoral appeal in states they typically lost. This logic may have
had particular potency in a state that was once the party’s most loyal supporter until,
many Vermonters believed, Republicans abandoned their founding principles.
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Were he not so successful in cultivating an image of political moderation, it is
doubtful that Governor Douglas would have experienced such success as a Republican
politician in Vermont. “The political graveyard here is littered with candidates,
Republicans, who tried to just dust off the party platform in Vermont and run on it,”
explained Lunderville. “That’s not going to win elections, because it generally flies
completely counter to the majority of the voters.”70 Yet a moderate image seemed useful
to Vermont candidates generally, not just Republicans. According to 2004 exit polling,
four in ten Vermonters described themselves as “moderates.”71 Being seen as a moderate
in Vermont was not always essential; as Professor Grover cautioned, “It depends on the
nature of the race.” However, in a statewide election where the constituency is larger and
more diverse, “Probably being seen as some kind of problem-solving, pragmatic
moderate would help.”72
Governor Douglas’ First-Term Record
The Douglas campaign believed that its greatest asset in the 2004 gubernatorial
election was Governor Douglas’ first-term record. Depending on commentary, polling,
and the election results, it appears that this was a wise strategy upon which to base the
campaign. Douglas’ first term included significant legislative accomplishments,
particularly on the central 2002 campaign issues of Act 250 reform and economic
improvement. In April 2004, the House and Senate approved the first major revisions of
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Act 250 in its 34-year existence. The revisions eliminated the five citizen approval boards
designed to evaluate construction plans, transferred their authority to a single
Environmental Court, and withdrew the automatic right of appeal the act had previously
accorded to objecting citizens. In terms of the economy, Douglas claimed that 7,000 new
jobs were created during his first term (although some economists, using different
definitions of job growth, revised that figure to 1,200), and Vermont’s unemployment
rate became the third lowest among all the states during his tenure.73 Corporate taxes for
Vermont businesses were cut 14%, while taxes were increased on out-of-state
corporations, and Douglas presided over two balanced budgets.
Despite Governor Douglas’ accomplishments, there was certainly room for more
action. He failed to inspire any major revisions of Act 60, and some criticized him for his
incremental approach. The Herald-Times Argus cautioned, “Douglas could be more
ambitious or bold in leading Vermont forward, and Douglas would do well to pay
attention.”74 The Bennington Banner instead portrayed Douglas’ incrementalism as one
of his strengths, commenting “He has worked methodically, tortoise-like, to move
Vermont forward.”75
Governor Douglas’ first-term performance was received well by Vermonters. In
the 2004 election, he earned the endorsement of every major state newspaper except the
Brattleboro Reformer. He also received the endorsement of ten prominent Democrats,
including legislators, businesspeople, and government officials. In an April 2004 poll
conducted by the polling firm Research 2000, 48% of respondents characterized Douglas’
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gubernatorial performance as good or excellent, while 36% rated it fair, 7% poor, and 9%
were unsure. In terms of favorability, 46% of respondents described themselves as
favorable towards Douglas, while 35% were unfavorable, and 19% were neutral.76
Unsurprisingly, on June 28, 2004, Douglas announced that he would seek reelection in
November.
Democratic Gubernatorial Candidate Peter Clavelle
Governor Douglas’ 2004 gubernatorial election opponent was 55-year-old
Democrat Peter Clavelle. Though an accomplished 30-year political veteran and seventerm Burlington mayor, Clavelle was not expected to present a serious challenge because
he lacked many of Douglas’ key political assets. Most significantly, Clavelle was
unfamiliar to most Vermonters. Also, his recent switch from the Progressive to the
Democratic Party led to divisions among Democrats and the perception that Clavelle was
outside the political mainstream.
The Political Rise of Peter Clavelle
Peter Clavelle entered Vermont politics in 1972, as town manager of Castleton
and later city manager of Winooski. In 1982, Burlington’s Socialist Party mayor, Bernie
Sanders, selected him to become the city’s personnel director. The next year Clavelle was
appointed Burlington’s first director of community and economic development. In 1989,
after Sanders moved on to become Vermont’s lone U.S. Representative, Clavelle was
elected to the first of seven terms as mayor of Burlington, running on the left-wing
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Progressive Party ticket. As mayor, Clavelle focused on housing programs, job creation
and training, community policing, and waterfront revitalization. Many later attributed
Burlington’s economic recovery to Clavelle’s leadership in these areas.
Shortly prior to the beginning of the 2004 campaign, Clavelle left the Progressive
Party to seek the Democratic nomination for governor. According to Professor Grover,
Clavelle switched in order to avoid a three-way gubernatorial race that would fragment
the liberal vote and ensure a Douglas victory. Clavelle won the Democratic nomination
without opposition, and then arranged for the Progressive Party to nominate a political
ally who declined to contest the election.77 “Clavelle was not a bad candidate,” conceded
Lunderville. “He was a good campaigner in the sense that he worked the crowds very
well, he was good with people, very blue-collar, down-to-Earth, people liked him as
much as they liked Douglas, and he articulated a lot of the ideological issues very well.”78
In terms of familiarity and a moderate image, however, Clavelle entered the election
against Douglas at a substantial disadvantage.
Clavelle’s Lack of Statewide Familiarity
As a career Burlington-area politician, Clavelle was virtually unknown outside of
Burlington’s Chittenden County. He was particularly unfamiliar in the Northeast
Kingdom and southwestern Vermont, where Governor Douglas was well-known. This
discrepancy between the two candidates was evident in a May 2004 poll conducted by
Research 2000, in which 24% of respondents did not recognize Clavelle’s name, and
38% had no opinion of him. In the same poll, all 400 respondents recognized Douglas’
77
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name.79 Garrison Nelson, professor of political science at the University of Vermont,
observed in October 2004, “Peter is running into the classic problem of a first-time
statewide candidate for major office without statewide experience, and that usually means
you lose.”80 Many cited Clavelle’s lack of statewide familiarity as his greatest obstacle
against Douglas, perhaps dooming him from the start of the campaign.
Clavelle Is Perceived as Being Outside the Political Mainstream
Clavelle’s policies, comments, and particularly his former membership in the
Progressive Party led many to believe that he was further outside of Vermont’s political
mainstream than Governor Douglas, although Douglas was a Republican in the very
liberal state. Clavelle attempted to overcome the perception that he was an ideologue;
“On the campaign trail, Clavelle seeks to portray himself as a liberal pragmatist,” said the
Boston Globe.81 However, his behavior sometimes jeopardized these efforts. Visiting a
small electronics firm during the 2004 campaign, he unexpectedly asked its owner: “So,
what’s your social mission?” The owner was caught off guard, unable to respond. The
Globe described the incident as “the sort of thing that makes the Republicans gleefully
certain that they will be able to cast Clavelle as a radical leftist.”82 Defining Clavelle as
an extremist was not a simple task for the Douglas campaign, however; according to
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Professor Davis, “[Clavelle’s] on the left, but clearly not radical.”83 Still, Clavelle
unnerved many of the moderate Democrats and Independents who might otherwise have
opposed a Republican gubernatorial candidate, particularly when roused by anti-Bush
sentiments. Professor Grover observed,
I think that many people saw him as a charlatan for leaving the Progressive Party….
Many Democrats never believed that he was a Democrat, and I kind of don’t blame
them…. He did appear more moderate, he did run as a Democrat, kind of a liberal
Democrat, a lefty Democrat. But I don’t think that helped him.84

Indeed, divisions were much stronger among Democrats than Republicans in the election.
One-third of identified Democrats said they voted for Douglas, whereas less than onetenth of identified Republicans supported Clavelle.85
The Gubernatorial Election Takes Shape
The early stages of the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial election revealed the issues
and strategies that the two campaigns hoped would lead them to victory. Governor
Douglas focused mainly on his first-term record, while Peter Clavelle highlighted his
universal health care plan and Douglas’ support of President Bush and the Iraq war. This
section analyzes the candidates’ campaign announcements, early advertisements, and
early tours, in order to assess their intentions and successes in defining the gubernatorial
election.
February 2004: Clavelle Enters the Gubernatorial Race
On February 6, 2004, Peter Clavelle officially announced that he would seek the
Democratic Party’s nomination for governor of Vermont. Clavelle began by emphasizing
83
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his accomplishments as mayor of Burlington, namely waterfront revitalization, affordable
housing, and energy conservation efforts. He said, “What I have done in my thirty years
of public service is committed myself to building stronger communities, stronger
communities where everyone has the chance to build a better life for them and their
families.”86 Among the issues highlighted for the gubernatorial campaign were health
care, energy, education, and economic development. Clavelle linked Douglas to the
Republican presidential ticket when discussing the Governor’s energy policy, speculating
that it “may have been written by Dick Cheney and his cronies.”87 Clavelle twice referred
to President Bush and Vice President Cheney disapprovingly during his opening speech,
receiving loud reactions from the crowd both times.
Clavelle’s announcement for the gubernatorial race was first among Democrats.
Senate President Peter Shumlin had considered entering, but immediately after Clavelle’s
announcement he declared that he would not seek his party’s nomination. Subsequently,
no Democrats challenged Clavelle in the party primary. It is likely that Democrats were
reluctant to challenge Governor Douglas because they did not believe that he could be
defeated. In addition to the previously cited polling that showed Douglas’ high job
performance and favorability ratings, a late April 2004 poll conducted by Research 2000
had Douglas beating Clavelle in a head-to-head race, 48% to 34%.88 Campaign insiders
believed from the beginning that Douglas was bound for reelection; according to
Lunderville, “Our polls never showed that race close. I’m sure [the Clavelle campaign’s]
86
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polls never showed that race close.”89 Barnett said that the question in the campaign was
never whether Clavelle could defeat Douglas, but “is there anything [Clavelle] could
have done to close that margin up, make it a more competitive race?”90
June 2004: Governor Douglas Announces He Will Seek Reelection
Months after Clavelle began his gubernatorial campaign, on June 28, 2004,
Governor Douglas officially announced that he would seek reelection in November.
Indicating the strategy that would define his campaign, Douglas focused on his first-term
record as governor, particularly in terms of economic growth. To highlight this theme,
Douglas’ announcement was held at SBE, Inc., an electronics manufacturer in Barre,
Vermont, that had doubled its workforce since the beginning of Douglas’ governorship.
Douglas boasted, “SBE electronics is an example of success because of the policies we
put in place over the last seventeen months.”91 SBE Sales Manager Stuart Deliduka
supported this claim, asserting “It is not coincidental that SBE has seen dramatic
growth… at the same time Jim Douglas has been governor…. Jim equals jobs!”92
Douglas went on to discuss his record of attempting major reforms of Acts 250
and 60, increasing drug trafficking prosecutions, and procuring agricultural benefits.
Somewhat surprisingly, he also highlighted party differences when criticizing Democrats
in the state legislature for rejecting his proposed health care reforms. “I know the voters
will remember that we had the opportunity to make these reforms, but Senate Democrats
89
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blocked our efforts,” remarked Douglas. “They offered no alternative, and no regret, just
obstruction and an unbending adherence to hand-me-down ideas.”93 This provocative jab
at Democrats showed them that Douglas was not about to cede health care reform to his
opponent, although Clavelle planned on making it his central campaign issue.
Health Care Emerges as a Central Issue in the Gubernatorial Campaign
For most of the gubernatorial campaign, Clavelle attempted to overcome
Governor Douglas’ popularity by focusing narrowly on providing Vermonters with
universal healthcare. Douglas’ plan for health care reform was a rather conventional,
market-based approach. His primary objective was to heighten competition by attracting
private insurers to Vermont. Douglas claimed that competition would lead to lower
insurance premiums and reductions in the Medicaid rolls as private coverage became
more affordable for Vermonters. His plan stressed faith in the capability of the free
market. He said, “I’m not in favor of a large, government-run, taxpayer-funded program.
I believe the private sector can and will play a key role.”94 Douglas also advocated health
savings accounts, initiatives to address chronic illness, and the promotion of healthy
lifestyles, particularly among children. As the emphasis on children’s health indicated,
Douglas’ plan focused on the long-term health care picture. “While Vermonters need
temporary relief from health care costs,” he explained, “the only real long-term solution
is to make sure people are taking care of themselves. Costs won’t shrink until people start
taking better care of themselves.”95 Many agreed with the long-term perspective of his
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approach; the Bennington Banner, for one, said Douglas’ plan provided the best hope for
decreasing health care costs in the long term.
Clavelle dismissed Governor Douglas’ health care plan as timid, unimaginative,
and overly reliant on the free market. He cited it as evidence of Douglas’ alliance with
national Republicans, claiming his opponent “supports the standard GOP position that the
public sector should not be involved in solving the health care problem.”96 In contrast,
Clavelle proposed “Vermonters First,” a state-run program requiring all Vermonters to
possess health insurance. According to Clavelle, the elimination of insurance premiums
would yield $90 million to provide coverage for the poor. After controlling
administrative costs, importing prescription drugs from Canada, and allowing small
businesses to provide their own insurance, Clavelle would use the money saved from
these adjustments to provide health insurance for low- to moderate-income Vermonters.
The plan was intended as something more than a pragmatic solution to a Vermont
problem, it was to be a national model for revolutionizing the health care system. “I
believe Vermont can lead the country,” Clavelle declared proudly. “We can provide
health care to all citizens at a price they can afford.”97
The Douglas campaign tried aggressively to discredit Clavelle’s Vermonters First
program. Governor Douglas charged that a state-run health care program would be
bureaucratic and unaffordable. His campaign also raised persistent questions about how
Vermonters First would be funded. “That money is going to come from somewhere,” said
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Lunderville, skeptically. “It’s going to be a tax increase in the end.”98 Indeed, the
Brattleboro Reformer, in its endorsement of Clavelle, conceded that his health care plan
might lead to additional taxes.99 It is worth noting that even the Democratic leadership
was not enthusiastic about Clavelle’s plan. After Douglas’ victory in November, the
Democratic House majority leader declined to advance Clavelle’s health care proposals
in the state legislature, although he was unsatisfied with Douglas’ plan as well.

Prominent Issues in the Gubernatorial Campaign
Education, energy policy, environment, taxes, and prescription drug reimportation
emerged as other prominent issues in the gubernatorial campaign. Most of these issues
followed a consistent pattern in which Governor Douglas touted his first-term record
while Clavelle criticized it and accused him of being beholden to President Bush and
national Republicans. For example, on education Douglas boasted about the passage of
Act 68, which lowered tax rates in most Vermont communities while increasing them in
towns and cities with greater property wealth. These costs were covered by raising the
sales tax one percent, thereby helping to wean the state off its reliance on property taxes
for revenue, according to Douglas. Douglas claimed that 83% of school districts saw a
reduction in their tax rates as a result of this measure.100 Clavelle’s criticisms focused on
98
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issues of national prominence. He attacked Douglas for not opposing the federal No
Child Left Behind Act, over which other states had initiated lawsuits. Clavelle also
claimed that Douglas’ “support of unfettered school choice would threaten small schools
and widen the educational gaps between those Vermonters with ample financial resources
and those struggling to make ends meet.”101
In terms of energy policy, Governor Douglas’ stated goal was to “promote
development and use of renewable energy by facilitating collaboration and market-based
incentives that encourage employees and residents to install these alternatives.”102 To that
end he noted that his administration had provided $1 million to 200 renewable energy
systems in Vermont.103 Clavelle condemned Douglas’ energy policy as ineffective, often
repeating the suggestion that Vice President Cheney and national oil magnates had
written it. For his part, Clavelle recommended that Vermont acquire and operate
hydroelectric facilities in the state to provide cheaper, cleaner sources of energy.
The environment is always an issue of great importance in Vermont. Conscious of
the strong displeasure with President Bush’s environmental policy, even among state
Republicans, the Douglas campaign often touted a lawsuit the state had filed against the
Bush Administration to address pollution from coal-fired power plants in the Midwestern
United States. Governor Douglas also frequently pointed to efforts to reduce phosphorus
levels in Lake Champlain, whereas Clavelle advocated total removal of phosphorus from
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the lake. Clavelle claimed that Douglas lacked a clear long-term vision for Vermont’s
environmental status. Clavelle also alleged that Douglas’ attachment to business interests
obstructed his commitment to environmental safety.
On tax policy, Clavelle proposed using more taxes to fund education by lowering
property taxes and relying more on income taxes. Governor Douglas claimed that
Clavelle’s plans would lead to significant tax increases. “To pay for all public education
with the income tax would require a tripling of the income tax rates that you now pay,”
Douglas said at an election debate.104 Acknowledging the fact that Act 68 raised the sales
tax, Douglas compared his one tax hike to the forty such proposals he claimed that
Clavelle had made. “I think forty [tax increase proposals] versus one is a major message
that the people of Vermont will weigh when they decide who’s best prepared to provide
fiscal leadership and responsibility to the state over the next two years,” Douglas
contended.105 Moreover, anticipating the election contest ahead, Douglas had made tax
cuts the focus of his second State of the State address, in January 2004. In his speech,
Douglas proposed substantial personal and corporate income tax reductions and
advocated the elimination of tax loopholes and exemptions to help balance the state
budget.
Prescription drug reimportation was another prominent topic in the campaign. In
August 2004 the federal Food and Drug Administration denied authorization for the
reimportation of prescription drugs to the United States from Canada, and Vermont
became the first state to sue the federal government over this ruling. Governor Douglas
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used this lawsuit prominently as evidence that he was willing to oppose the Bush
Administration when it served Vermont’s interests. Clavelle rebutted this claim on the
grounds that Douglas was too cautious in opposing the federal policy. Clavelle cited a
program he had started in Burlington, whereby city employees and families could buy
prescription drugs from Canadian pharmacies. During the campaign, Clavelle even
posted a link on his website to this service so that all Vermonters could obtain
prescription drugs from Canada. He believed that the governor should pursue such
methods to ensure affordable prescription drugs for Vermonters, regardless of federal
policy.

Early Campaign Advertisements
Early campaign advertisements help to identify the campaign strategies being
used by both sides to draw voters’ attention and define the election. Early advertisements
in the Douglas-Clavelle race were designed to weaken the opponent through negative
attacks. In late July, Clavelle released the first television ad of the campaign, focusing on
prescription drugs and Governor Douglas’ ties to President Bush. In the ad, Clavelle
lamented that “Jim” was “dragging his feet, preventing Vermont from buying safe, lowercost prescription drugs from Canada, waiting until George Bush says it’s okay.” As
Clavelle concluded, “We don’t need to wait around for Jim and George,” the camera

zoomed in on a car with two bumper stickers, one for Douglas and the other for BushCheney.106
Within days of the Clavelle ad’s airing, the Douglas campaign released an
Internet ad targeting Clavelle’s tax policies. In the ad, a driver pulls his car up to
“Clavelle’s Restaurant,” hoping to order fast food. To his surprise, he is instead
bombarded by a list of tax increases made or considered by Clavelle as mayor of
Burlington, including property, small business, and gasoline taxes. Finally, the customer
drives away disgustedly, to the jingle: “Higher taxes at Pete Clavelle’s!”107 The Douglas
campaign e-mailed the ad, which it claimed to be the first Internet ad in Vermont’s
political history, to its supporters and made it available on its campaign website.

Early Campaign Tours
While Clavelle began his campaign tours early to overcome his lack of statewide
familiarity, Governor Douglas began campaigning aggressively in August 2004. That
month his campaign began airing television advertisements statewide, focusing on his
first-term accomplishments and second-term goals. The advertisements were designed to
coincide with his statewide “Promise of Vermont” tour, which visited fifty communities
and each county. The tour allowed Douglas to promote his administration’s record on job
growth, education spending, tax cuts, health care, illegal drug prosecution, environmental
protection, and farming benefits. The confident, optimistic tenor of the tour was captured
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in its slogan: “We have. We can. We will.” The contrast to Clavelle’s campaigning struck
many observers. According to Associated Press reporter Ross Sneyd,
The launch of Douglas’ campaign illustrated the very different approaches the two men
[Douglas and Clavelle] are taking. Douglas spends his time talking about a long list of
accomplishments from his first two years in office, listing additional challenges the state
faces and promising to tackle them if re-elected… Unlike Douglas, though, [Clavelle]
focused on a single issue in [his recent] tour, talking about the shortcomings in the state’s
health care system, especially the lack of affordable, prescription drugs.108

The Clavelle campaign was defensive about the perception that it was running on a single
issue. Spokesman B.J. Rogers said, “It’s not that we’ve only been talking about health
care,” stressing Clavelle’s discussion of energy, environment, farming, and education
policies. Yet Sneyd maintained, “Up to now, voters primarily have heard from Clavelle
on two topics… escalating health care costs and [Douglas’] ties to President Bush.”109 As
the campaign progressed, the latter assumed a more prominent role.
National Politics Gain Prominence in the Late Campaign Period
As the gubernatorial campaign entered its later phases, the issues turned
increasingly toward national politics. Clavelle had discussed the links between Governor
Douglas and the Bush Administration through the early part of the campaign, but as his
universal health care plan failed to generate momentum, Clavelle began relying on the
Bush-Douglas connection to rescue his candidacy. The evidence suggests that Clavelle
was largely unsuccessful in establishing a meaningful connection between the Republican
gubernatorial and presidential candidates, in voters’ minds. This failure must be
understood in part as a product of the Douglas campaign’s successful counterstrategies.
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Clavelle’s Attempts to Tie Governor Douglas to President Bush
The Clavelle campaign believed that President Bush’s unpopularity in Vermont
could damage Governor Douglas’ popularity, if the two were effectively linked in the
public’s perception. Indeed, Sneyd wrote, “A major part of Clavelle’s campaign strategy
is built on the assumption that the president is among the most unpopular figures in the
state.”110 Convinced that the strategy of invoking national politics in a state election
would influence the campaign in his favor, Clavelle began “speaking of the two [Bush
and Douglas] whenever possible.”111 His campaign produced and distributed bumper
stickers reading “Jim = George,” and in late August the Clavelle campaign released an
Internet advertisement attacking Douglas’ chairmanship of the Vermont Bush-Cheney
campaign. In the ad, a photo of Douglas is superimposed on a cartoon character dressed
in a business suit covered by chaps and donning a cowboy hat. In a thick Texas accent,
Douglas’ character drawls, “I’m the head honcho of the Bush-Cheney campaign. Don’t
you all go telling Vermonters, now.”112 The ad goes on to list Bush Administration
policies against which it contends that Douglas should have voiced opposition, including
Medicare reforms, which allegedly cost 13,000 Vermonters their state pharmaceutical
assistance; prescription drug reimportation, which he should have opposed beyond the
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state lawsuit; the Bush tax cuts, which allegedly cost Vermont $92 million otherwise
destined for education, housing, and environment funding. In fact, throughout the
campaign, Clavelle chastised Douglas for failing to oppose a number of federal policies,
including the three mentioned above, the Iraq war, the No Child Left Behind Act, and the
Bush Administration’s environmental policy in general. At one debate, Clavelle
demanded in vain that Douglas resign as the Vermont Bush-Cheney campaign chairman
in order to express his opposition to federal environmental policies.
The Douglas campaign countered Clavelle’s efforts to link Governor Douglas
with President Bush by emphasizing the Republicans’ differences and questioning the
relevance of national politics to a gubernatorial campaign. Douglas distinguished himself
from Bush and other Republicans, arguing “No two people agree with their political
colleagues or spouses all the time. The Republican Party is bigger than any one
individual and I look forward to continuing to play a role in it.”113 Lunderville dismissed
national political discussions as a distraction from state issues that a governor can affect.
He said, “I don’t think Vermonters like these playground tactics of who’s friends with
whom. Vermonters are looking for a leader who will create jobs, bring about real health
care reforms, bring down taxes and combat illegal drugs.”114 It is interesting to note that
in responding to criticisms of Douglas for being too close to Bush, Douglas and his
campaign did not attempt to defend Bush and his policies. Instead they dismissed
discussions of national issues as irrelevant. Since they were unlikely to redeem Bush in
the opinion of most Vermonters, it was probably the best decision to challenge anti-Bush
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criticisms on the basis of their relevance to the gubernatorial campaign rather than
debating the merits of Bush’s policies.
The Douglas campaign found it necessary to distance itself from President Bush
on only one issue. In Spring 2004, the campaign conducted polls to determine whether
Bush’s unpopularity among Vermonters in any policy areas impacted Governor Douglas’
popularity in the state. It found this to be the case only in terms of environmental policy.
Accordingly, Douglas and his campaign made deliberate efforts to inoculate him against
negative associations with Bush Administration environmental policy, particularly by
highlighting Vermont’s lawsuit against the federal government over Midwest coal
pollution. On the campaign trail, Douglas boasted of his administration, “We protected
our environment and backed legal action against the Bush Administration when they
wouldn’t protect our air and water.”115 One of Douglas’ earliest advertisements focused
on this lawsuit. Hence, the Douglas campaign clearly recognized the potential negative
effects of association with an unpopular president, but it did not condemn Bush or
attempt to divorce Douglas from support for Bush and his policies, in most cases. In
terms of putting distance between the Republican gubernatorial and presidential
candidates, Lunderville said, “We might have been putting yards, but where the
conventional wisdom would say put football fields in-between you and the unpopular
candidate.”116
The Douglas Campaign’s Strategy to Discredit Clavelle
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Cognizant that Governor Douglas’ reputation as a moderate Republican was key
to his electoral success, a major aspect of the Douglas campaign strategy was to discredit
his opponent as an ideological extremist. In early August 2004, the Douglas campaign
released news accounts of Clavelle’s participation in a 1989 march commemorating the
tenth anniversary of the overthrow of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza by Daniel
Ortega’s communist Sandinistas. “This is clearly a reflection of [Clavelle’s] ideological
commitments,” Barnett commented at the time. “He’s not moderate…. Make no mistake:
Peter Clavelle is trying to portray himself as something very different than he is. He’s a
left-wing extremist.”117 He went on to justify the story’s release as an appropriate
response to Clavelle’s injection of national politics into the gubernatorial race.
From day one, Peter Clavelle has engineered a negative campaign based on political
affiliations…. If that’s the campaign he wants to run, then it’s only fair that he should
have to account for his own highly objectionable affiliations that show him to be out of
the mainstream of Vermont for Republicans and Democrats alike.118

The Douglas campaign was sharply criticized among Vermont media for using the story
to discredit Clavelle, and Douglas quickly backed off of the tactic, claiming that he had
not officially “signed off” on it. He also reiterated his intention to run on his first-term
record. Observers cited this episode as evidence of state party organizations’ usefulness
in communicating their candidates’ messages. “That’s smart,” said Professor Grover.
“Your attack dog is the guy who’s not going to be elected, which is Barnett.”119 The
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advantage of having state political parties and their operatives involved in the campaign,
Barnett echoed, is that there are
things that we’re able to do because we’re not the candidate. We’re able to push
messages that the candidate might otherwise be uncomfortable doing personally, but that
are important to help educate the voters with regard to your opponent’s own record. So
candidates like to stay above the fray and take the high ground, and political parties can
sometimes be useful in delivering a message of contrast with the opponent.120

Releasing the Sandinista story might be seen as a dangerous
move on the part of the Douglas campaign, inviting a battle over
candidate ideology that would seem to favor liberal Clavelle among
Vermonters. It also distracted from Governor Douglas’ otherwise
steady focus on pragmatic governance. Yet the strategy was useful,
according to several campaign participants and observers. They said it
helped to discredit Clavelle among moderate Democrats and
Independents who might have preferred a candidate whom they
perceived to be a moderate Republican to a liberal radical. Professor
Grover described the release of the Sandinista story as a “dirty… but
brilliant” tactic by the Douglas campaign. He explained, “The target
audience for a statement like that is probably going to be uncertain
Democrats who wonder whether Clavelle is the real McCoy or not….
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[A] statement like that… stoke[s] the fires of doubt among potential
Clavelle supporters.”121 Barnett affirmed this assessment, noting:
Even in the Democratic Party there were divisions over whether or not Clavelle was a
real Democrat or he was too far left, and things like his marching with pro-Communist
Sandinistas is a message that, even though the press did not receive it well, I think there
were plenty of Vermonters [for whom] it solidified in their minds that this guy is not a
mainstream politician.122

Barnett conceded that ideological battles were risky for the Douglas campaign, but he
maintained that exploiting an opponent’s vulnerabilities, ideological or otherwise, is “just
pragmatic politics.”123 The strategy had its limits, though. Lunderville cautioned that
ideology was never meant by the Douglas campaign to be its centerpiece and should only
be discussed to a limited extent by a candidate in Douglas’ partisan circumstances.
In late September, the Douglas campaign made perhaps its most effective move to
discredit Clavelle when it released a television commercial focusing on his universal
health care plan. The ad was a sixty-second excerpt from Clavelle’s September 15, 2004,
press conference introducing his Vermonters First program. He struggled to clearly
explain his program at that press conference, often stuttering and fumbling for words. In
the third week of September, the Douglas campaign released its ad. After witnessing its
initial effectiveness, the campaign pulled all other ads to run the health care spot
exclusively. Barnett and Lunderville cited the release of this advertisement as the
strategic maneuver that finished the Clavelle campaign. According to Lunderville, after
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assuming the campaign chairmanship in June he received at least one phone call from
media representatives every day, except on holidays, to discuss the campaign. After
running the health care ad, he claimed that he received no more than three phone calls
from media representatives until Election Day. “Suddenly, the environment changed,”
Lunderville recalled, “everybody was like ‘The bubble’s burst, there’s really no race
here…. The ad had eviscerated the opponent, there’s really no chance for recovery.’”124
Barnett believed that the health care ad was effective because it convinced voters
with reservations about Governor Douglas that his opponent was nonetheless unqualified
to take over as governor. “[Clavelle] was not perceived to be an articulate or even
particularly competent manager once Vermonters got a look at his performance during
that particular press conference that we put on the air…. [Voters] didn’t view him as a
compelling alternative,” Barnett explained.125 The ad’s release marked the turning point
in a campaign that Clavelle had previously waged mainly on health care. “[The Clavelle
campaign] had a winning issue in health care,” according to Lunderville.
Health care really was the number one issue in the campaign – they made it the number
one issue in the campaign. They did a good job with that.… [But] because [Clavelle]
couldn’t explain his own healthcare plan, he stopped talking about the only issue where
he was doing better than the Governor, and started talking about an issue that was
completely disconnected from the governor’s race, which was the Iraq war.126

Clavelle Focuses Narrowly on the Iraq War in the Campaign’s Last Month
After failing to gain traction against Governor Douglas over health care and other
issues contested during the campaign, Clavelle focused almost exclusively in the last
month on Douglas’ unwillingness to oppose the Iraq war. Although governors do not
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make foreign policy or declare or execute war, Clavelle argued that governors’ alignment
with their constituents on major issues such as war were symbolically important. “I think
you have a rightful expectation that a chief elected official of the state of Vermont on this
critical issue of war will be with the people of the state of Vermont, not blindly following
the Bush Administration,” Clavelle declaimed.127 He contended that the Iraq war was
relevant to the governor’s race because 1,100 to 1,200 Vermont National Guardsmen
were placed on alert and, according to the Massachusetts-based think tank National
Priorities Project, the war had cost Vermont $23 million that otherwise would have been
available to spend on health care, housing, and education.
Governor Douglas rejected Clavelle’s invocation of the Iraq war in the
gubernatorial election. During a radio debate, he responded to Clavelle’s arguments, with
“an edge of anger in his voice,” saying “What I hear Vermonters want us to talk about is
what we can do, what things the governor of the state can do…. That’s what I’m talking
about; that’s not what you’re talking about, Pete. You don’t have anything to offer.”
Lunderville amplified Douglas’ objection, telling media, “It seems that Peter Clavelle has
abandoned his race for governor and is now focusing solely on national policy and
national politics. It’s a last-ditch strategic move to turn the debate off of the issues that a
governor can affect right here in Vermont.”128 Perhaps Clavelle pressed the Iraq war
hoping that Douglas would run afoul of Vermonters with a vigorous defense of the
President and the war. Douglas and his campaign, however, continued to respond by
dismissing discussions of national politics as irrelevant, while they remained focused on
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state issues. This is one instance in which different gubernatorial campaign strategies,
demonstrating less focus and restraint, might have jeopardized Douglas’ candidacy.
Assessing the Relevance of the 2004 Presidential Election to the Vermont
Gubernatorial Election
On November 2, 2004, Governor Douglas was reelected over Peter Clavelle by a
landslide margin of 59% to 38%. Analysis of polling and election data provide a
fascinating opportunity to evaluate the impact of the presidential election on the
simultaneous Vermont gubernatorial election. Certainly, if presidential politics had the
capacity to influence any gubernatorial election, this was the one; Vermonters turned out
in record numbers to support Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry by a 20-point
landslide, and Peter Clavelle made Douglas’ support of President Bush and the Iraq war
one of the central issues of the campaign, particularly in its last month. Yet data and
observations suggest that the 2004 presidential election did not significantly influence
voters’ decisions in that year’s Vermont gubernatorial election, although it clearly had an
impact on mobilizing voters.
Data Suggest that the 2004 Presidential Election Did Not Significantly Influence the
Vermont Gubernatorial Election

A Research 2000 poll conducted from October 10-12, 2004, found 51% of likely
voters supporting Governor Douglas in the gubernatorial race and 37% supporting Peter
Clavelle.129 It was precisely around these dates, and particularly in the following week,
that Clavelle shifted his campaign focus from health care and other state issues to the Iraq
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war. If national issues had potency, data should have indicated a movement toward
Clavelle over the last month of the campaign, since he was running in a state where the
war was extremely unpopular. Instead, Clavelle gained only one percentage point by the
November 2nd election over the October poll, whereas Douglas gained eight. Moreover,
the same October poll had Senator Kerry leading President Bush 53% to 40% in
Vermont, but Kerry gained six points over the next month and Bush lost one. Voters did
not move consistently toward Republican or Democratic candidates, or toward
challengers or incumbents. These facts demonstrate that Vermont voters distinguished
among elections and candidates, thereby discounting categorical coattail explanations of
the gubernatorial election and defying the expectations of the Clavelle campaign. Despite
the Clavelle campaign’s attempts to tie Douglas to Bush and the Iraq war, four in ten
Vermont voters supported Douglas at the same time that they supported Kerry, and onequarter of voters identifying themselves as “strongly opposed” to the Iraq war supported
Douglas.130
Campaign Observers and Participants Suggest that the 2004 Presidential Election Did
Not Significantly Influence the Vermont Gubernatorial Election

At the outset of the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial race, the Douglas campaign
conducted a poll to test whether Governor Douglas’ relationship with President Bush
made respondents more or less likely to vote for the former. According to Lunderville,
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the poll indicated “It really had no effect.”131 The subsequent campaign reinforced this
finding. “The strategy of tying a gubernatorial race to a presidential campaign didn’t fly,”
said Professor Davis. “Vermont voters realize that the state government does not make
decisions affecting foreign policy, the federal deficit, and other national issues.”132
Lunderville echoed Professor Davis’ sentiments, stressing the voters’ ability to
distinguish between state and national issues and offices. “Don’t underestimate the
voter,” Lunderville warned.
Voters understand the governor cannot call the troops back [from war]. Voters
understand the governor can wear a black armband around the state house but that is not
going to effectively change what the president’s doing on the Iraq war, it doesn’t matter.
People want to know, how are you going to fix health care? How are you going to lower
my property taxes? They don’t want to know what you’re going to do to protest the Iraq
war.133

Douglas acknowledged that gubernatorial involvement in national
decisions was sometimes warranted when it affected his state, but not
in all cases.
If [an issue] affects Vermont I’d certainly speak up, like the budget priorities in
Washington or other decisions that have a direct impact on what we do here. But just this
whole notion of, ‘The governor’s got to get us out of Iraq,’ or ‘The governor’s got to do
something that’s clearly in the national or international arena,’ voters just don’t buy
that.134

In some ways the presidential race indeed seemed to impact the gubernatorial
race. Some voters explained their vote for Clavelle in terms of opposition to President
Bush and national Republicans. For example, David Worthley, of Waitsfield, said he was
voting for Kerry and Clavelle because “I think we need change all over.” Greg Haynes,
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of Duxbury, explained, “I am disillusioned and disappointed with Republicans.” As a
result, he said he would be voting the straight Democratic ticket.135 Moreover, state
Democratic officials used voter enthusiasm for Kerry’s candidacy to highlight other
Democratic candidacies. Democratic spokesman Mark Michaud recalled supporters
visiting party headquarters to pick up a Kerry lawn sign, only to leave with several other
Democratic candidates’ lawn signs as well. “We’ve been able to generate a lot of
volunteer energy from a lot of people,” he said.136 Yet this enthusiasm for Kerry’s
candidacy and antipathy towards Bush’s was not reflected in the results of the
gubernatorial election.
The Presidential Election’s Effect on Turnout

How is a presidential election supposed to impact a simultaneous
gubernatorial election? Typically, its impact is discussed in terms of
prejudicing voters for or against a gubernatorial candidate based on
whether he shares the political affiliation of their preferred presidential
candidate.137 Barnett believed this was the Clavelle strategy, to
persuade anti-Bush moderate Democrats and Independents that
Governor Douglas was very closely aligned with Bush and therefore
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undeserving of their votes. The Douglas campaign, for the most part,
was unconcerned that this strategy would work; instead, said Barnett,
Our concern was that with the presidential race, not that voters would necessarily
associate Douglas with Bush, per the Clavelle strategy, but that turnout may be so high
among Democrats, partisan Democrats eager to vote Bush out, that that could have the
effect of swallowing the governor’s campaign as well. So it wouldn’t be that middle-ofthe-road voters were being convinced that Jim Douglas was George Bush incarnate, but
rather that heavy turnout amongst extreme partisans would engulf the governor’s
campaign, to a degree.138

Yet even with record turnout in the state and a groundswell of support for Kerry’s
candidacy, turnout driven by the presidential election did not have the effect of
“swallowing” the gubernatorial election.139
Why Did Vermont Voters Reelect Governor Douglas?
The above analysis provides the basis for determining the primary factors for
Governor Douglas’ overwhelming reelection at the same time that his party’s presidential
candidate lost in Vermont by a landslide defeat. Many theories already exist as to the
primary, or even the exclusive, explanation for Douglas’ victory, namely voter
independence, candidate organization, and incumbency. While these factors appear to
have played important roles in Douglas’ reelection, they cannot provide a comprehensive
explanation for it.
Voter Independence
Vermont had perhaps the most independent electorate in the United States at the
time of Governor Douglas’ reelection. Though justly regarded as a politically liberal
state, it was certainly not beholden to the Democratic Party. Indeed, it was served by the
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only two Independents in the U.S. Congress, Senator Jim Jeffords and Representative
Bernie Sanders. Vermont also elected Republicans to three of its six statewide offices. To
some observers, Vermont’s independent voting habits were indicative of a preference for
divided government; Professor Davis attributed Douglas’ reelection to this. Douglas
suggested that Vermonters’ independent voting habits were linked to its history of
independent attitudes, going back to its fourteen-year existence as an independent
republic before joining the United States after the Revolutionary War. He also noted that
many Vermonters historically had lived in the relative seclusion of countryside, hillsides,
and farms, so that they had been independent in many of their habits.140 His is an
inadequate explanation, though, since the most politically influential Vermonters in 2004
were the left-leaning immigrants who typically did not share the history he described.
Candidate Organization
Vermont’s party system is notoriously weak. Party staffs are small, only 1,000
signatures are required for candidates to get on state ballots, and there is no party
registration, meaning voters can participate in whatever party primary they prefer.
Consequently, “Candidate organizations are more important than party organizations,”
said Professor Davis.141 Professor Nelson, who has written extensively on the subject of
personal political followings in Vermont, described the state Republican Party as “far
better organized” and “coherent” in its messages than the state Democratic Party, yet still
weaker and less financially reliable than other states’ parties. This weakness is largely
attributable to Vermont’s stringent campaign finance laws. By 2004, Governor Douglas
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had built a strong political following based largely on his moderate image, familiarity
with voters, and personal likeability. His entrenched position in Vermont politics
presented Clavelle with a substantial challenge as he attempted to change Vermonters’
minds about Douglas and cut into his high approval ratings. Barnett argued,
The bottom line is, it’s very difficult to demonize someone whose constituents know him
so well. So when you run into a situation like we had here with an unpopular president,
it’s a natural strategy for Democrats to link a Republican candidate to that unpopular
figure, but because of Governor Douglas’ long history here and his familiarity to the
people, that was exceedingly difficult for them to do and it ultimately failed badly.142

Perhaps if Clavelle had established a loyal statewide following prior to the gubernatorial
election he could have more seriously challenged Douglas.
Incumbency
Incumbency was certainly an important, and some believe the crucial, factor
influencing Governor Douglas’ reelection. Since the introduction of the two-year
gubernatorial term in Vermont in 1870, only Governor Ray Keyser, Jr., in 1962, was
defeated for reelection. The two-year term forces governors to campaign constantly,
using their high profile to communicate achievements and goals. Douglas deliberately
took advantage of this opportunity in the way he conducted his first term. Barnett said,
“Governor Douglas is a firm believer that good policy makes good politics. [Campaign]
strategy obviously plays an important role, but part of that strategy is to be a good
governor. And that’s first and foremost.”143 Observers and voters seem to have shared
Douglas’ opinion of his first-term record as a sound basis for reelection; newspapers
endorsing his candidacy attributed their support primarily to his gubernatorial
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performance, and three-quarters of voters who considered themselves “better off” than
four years before voted for Douglas.144
While incumbency undoubtedly was an important factor in the 2004 Vermont
gubernatorial election, there is a tendency to overstate its value so as to make Governor
Douglas’ reelection appear to have been a fait accompli. The notion that Douglas’
incumbency was sufficient to explain his reelection does not withstand scrutiny. The
power of incumbency in Vermont does not explain the fact that incumbent State Auditor
Elizabeth Reedy was defeated for reelection on the same ballot in which Vermonters
reelected Douglas. Moreover, the two-year term frequently cited to explain Vermont’s
penchant for reelecting governors provided no protection for New Hampshire Republican
Governor Craig Benson, who was defeated for reelection in 2004 by Democratic
candidate John Lynch, after two years in the governorship. It is also counterintuitive to
claim that Vermont’s electorate, the only one in the nation to elect Independent
congressmen, would be so adverse to change and deferential to the political establishment
as to return to office governors who would be unacceptable if not for their incumbent
status.
Do These Factors Explain Governor Douglas’ Reelection?
Attributing Governor Douglas’ reelection to any of the above factors appears to
be unwarranted. “It’s not just… that people think [Douglas] should have a four-year term
versus a two-year term,” argued Lunderville. Moreover, because of his personal appeal,
“Jim Douglas started from a higher platform than a no-name Republican would…. But
that platform alone didn’t give him the margin of victory, it just enabled him to start from
144
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a higher level.”145 It is difficult to determine exactly what value these factors had in
determining Douglas’ reelection. Certainly, each one was important and one may indeed
have been decisive. There is no conclusive way to measure this. Given the facts that
Douglas attracted near-majority support before the campaign even began, according to
above cited job performance and favorability ratings, and his opponent was virtually
unknown throughout much of Vermont, it appears that Douglas’ reelection was very
likely from the outset. Yet did this make the gubernatorial campaign irrelevant?
The Role of Gubernatorial Campaign Strategies in Determining the 2004 Vermont
Gubernatorial Election
The 2004 Vermont gubernatorial campaign does not appear to have been
irrelevant. It was entirely possible, after all, for the Douglas campaign to misuse
Governor Douglas’ electoral advantages; most observers believed that the Clavelle
campaign squandered its advantages by inadequately discussing Clavelle’s mayoral
record and de-emphasizing health care and other state issues in order to debate national
politics. The Douglas campaign, on the other hand, presented what many regarded as an
effective, coherent strategy essential to explaining Douglas’ reelection. The decisive
break towards Douglas at the end of the campaign suggests that the election results were
shaped well after the campaign began, thanks in large part to the Douglas campaign’s
strategies.
Coordination Between the Douglas Campaign and the Vermont Republican Party
Governor Douglas had an effective, well-coordinated campaign operation.
Heeding the widespread notion that Vermont party organizations are weak and less
consequential than candidate organizations, the Douglas campaign essentially combined
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the two into a single organization. The Douglas campaign operated out of the Vermont
Republican Party headquarters, with Party Chairman Barnett and Campaign Chairman
Lunderville sharing an office. According to Lunderville, “The Governor’s campaign and
the party worked very closely together. They worked hand-in-glove through the 2004
campaign.”146

Contributions of the Vermont Republican Party
Barnett described political parties as “serv[ing] a good complementary role for the
candidate” in gubernatorial elections.147 This was certainly the case with the Sandinista
episode, when Barnett, who in an above quote cited the unique role of the state party in
“push[ing] messages that the candidate might otherwise be uncomfortable doing
personally,” took the lead in attacking Clavelle’s ideology. The integration of Douglas’
party and campaign organizations also alleviated significant financial burdens. In a state
with some of the most stringent campaign finance laws in the nation, where candidates
could receive no more than $400 from any single source for each two-year election cycle,
the Vermont Republican Party covered many of the Douglas campaign’s overhead
expenses, including rent, supplies, and telephone services. Governor Douglas was also
able to receive funds through the state party that could not be raised legally by his
campaign.148
The Douglas Campaign’s Monetary Advantage
146

Ibid.

147

Barnett, op cit.

148

Ibid.

The Douglas campaign’s coordination helped give it a substantial monetary
advantage over its opponent. Governor Douglas consistently topped Clavelle in campaign
funds, and outspent him on advertisements. Entering the last week of the election,
Douglas had $83,115 on-hand, to Clavelle’s $60,935.149 After the election, the Douglas
campaign still held $56,655 while the Clavelle campaign ended $30,697 in debt.150 The
financial disparity between the campaigns was especially apparent in terms of
advertising; two weeks before the election, the Douglas campaign had spent nearly
$200,000 on advertisements while the Clavelle campaign had spent only $126,533.151
Clavelle’s inability to spend $20,000 to $30,000 per week on advertisements, particularly
as a relatively unknown challenger to a popular governor, made it very difficult to run a
“credible campaign,” according to Professor Davis.152 Professor Nelson described
Clavelle’s fundraising challenges as general to his party, rather than specific to Clavelle’s
campaign. He explained,
The Democratic Party organization in Vermont is extraordinarily weak and statewide
candidates have generally ignored it when conducting their campaigns. That is why so
many Democrats operate their personal campaigns – fundraising and campaign
advertising – separate from the state party organization.
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On the other hand, said Professor Nelson, “The Republicans are far better organized and
try to maintain a coherent message.”153 Professor Nelson’s analysis is certainly supported
by evidence from the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial election.
Evaluating the Significance of Douglas Campaign Strategies
Although campaign strategies of the gubernatorial candidate and his state party
organization are often ignored as primary factors in Governor Douglas’ reelection, there
is good reason to regard them as essential contributors to his victory. The preceding
discussion highlights the structural advantages presented by the coordination of the
Vermont Republican Party and the Douglas campaign. Their coordination helped to raise
campaign funds, advertise the candidate, and maintain a consistent, coherent message, all
of which exceeded the performance of the Clavelle campaign. In terms of actual strategy,
the Douglas campaign was effective in maximizing its candidate’s strengths and
exploiting its opponent’s vulnerabilities. The Douglas campaign understood from the
outset that Douglas’ first-term record was his most potent electoral asset, particularly
because it highlighted his pragmatism over his ideology in a state where Republican
ideology was unpopular. Douglas’ announcement at the electronics manufacturer site, his
initial campaign advertisements, and his statewide tour in August immediately
demonstrated his campaign’s intention to focus on state issues and, with few exceptions,
his first-term record. The Douglas campaign also compensated for President Bush’s
impending loss in Vermont in the simultaneous presidential election. It polled
Vermonters to assess the significance of the Governor’s relationship with the President,
and whether unpopular federal policies might taint the former’s popularity. Finding only
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that the Bush Administration’s environmental policies were likely to damage Douglas’
popularity, Douglas noticeably distanced himself from these policies; he discussed
Vermont’s lawsuit over coal pollution in campaign speeches, and his campaign aired
advertisements highlighting the lawsuit.
The Douglas campaign only shifted its focus from Governor Douglas’ first-term
record when seeking to discredit its opponent, Peter Clavelle. The first significant effort
to discredit Clavelle was the release of the Sandinista story in early August, which the
Douglas campaign believed was necessary to expose Clavelle as a radical ideologue
rather than a center-left pragmatist. Even observers who regarded this as an unfair attack,
such as Professor Grover, affirmed its usefulness in discrediting Clavelle, particularly
given many Democrats’ skepticism about his party credentials.
In addition to discrediting Clavelle over ideology, the Douglas campaign
discredited Clavelle’s central policy proposal for universal health care coverage. The
Douglas campaign’s exclusive airing of its health care advertisement beginning in late
September and Lunderville’s recollection of an immediate and dramatic decrease in
media interest in the gubernatorial race afterwards, suggest that the campaign was
successful in discrediting Clavelle on the basis of his proposals as well as his ideology.
Indeed, Professor Davis said Clavelle realized at this time that he would not win the
election and, with nothing else to lose, shifted his focus to criticizing Governor Douglas’
unwillingness to oppose the Iraq war.154
Finally, the Douglas campaign effectively countered many of Clavelle’s attacks
on Governor Douglas, particularly regarding Douglas’ support of President Bush and the
Iraq war. Instead of engaging these issues, on which Vermonters heavily sided with
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Clavelle over Douglas, the Douglas campaign dismissed them as irrelevant to the
functions of a governor. Data and observations indicate that voters did not perceive
national issues as relevant to the gubernatorial campaign. Consequently, it appears that
the Douglas campaign responded wisely to Clavelle’s efforts, by emphasizing state issues
and declining to vigorously defend President Bush and his policies.

To What Extent Did Gubernatorial Campaign Strategies Influence the Election
Results?
In terms of structure and strategies, the Douglas campaign and the Vermont
Republican Party seem to have devised an effective, well-coordinated gubernatorial
campaign. Were gubernatorial campaign strategies, then, the primary factors affecting
state voter choice of a Republican gubernatorial candidate at the same time that they
selected a Democratic presidential candidate? The available election data make this
impossible to determine conclusively. Exit polls taken in Vermont in 2004 did not ask
voters whether gubernatorial campaign strategies influenced their votes. Exit polls also
did not ask voters the extent to which other factors, such as divided government,
familiarity with the candidates, and incumbency, influenced their votes. Thus, there is no
concrete statistical basis for testing this study’s thesis to be found in the 2004 Vermont
gubernatorial election. There are, however, other important bases available for judging
the thesis viable.
Analysis of the Vermont gubernatorial election strongly indicates that campaign
strategies were primary factors in voters’ reelection of Republican governor Jim Douglas.
Although Spring 2004 polls showed Douglas with near-majority support from
Vermonters before his campaign began, he received much greater support, 59% of the

vote, in November 2004. Moreover, above cited polling indicates a decisive movement
toward Douglas in the last month of the campaign and negligible gains for Clavelle, at the
same time that Kerry gained significantly on Bush in the state’s presidential race.
Clearly, many voters decided to reelect Douglas during the campaign process.
This fact diminishes the importance of candidate organizations as a primary explanation
for Douglas’ landslide victory, because the argument supposes that voters are so familiar
with a candidate that they decide to support him well in advance of the election. Voters
surely knew Douglas well before the close of the campaign, yet the decisive break toward
his candidacy occurred at the end. Some might also claim that voters chose Douglas
based on their personal conditions during his tenure, rather than being swayed by the
campaigns. For a large segment of voters, however, this was not the case. While threequarters of voters who considered themselves “better off” than four years before
supported Douglas, one-third of voters who considered themselves “worse off” still
supported him.155
The decisive break toward Governor Douglas at the end of the gubernatorial
campaign indicates that, although many Vermonters formed their opinions before the
campaign began, Douglas’ landslide was shaped by later events. The effectiveness with
which the Douglas campaign promoted his first-term record, discredited his opponent,
and countered Clavelle’s criticisms, provide a reasonable explanation for this occurrence.
Yet it seems unwise to dismiss other factors as important contributors to Douglas’
reelection, including voter independence, candidate organization, and incumbency.
To further test the extent to which campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates
and their state party organizations produce mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous
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gubernatorial and presidential elections, it is necessary to analyze a different election
in which some of the key factors complicating the 2004 Vermont gubernatorial
election are eliminated. The 2004 Montana gubernatorial election, in which Democrat
Brian Schweitzer was elected governor at the same time that Montana
overwhelmingly voted to reelect Republican President George W. Bush, provides
such a case. Schweitzer was neither an incumbent nor the leader of an established
candidate organization; he had never held political office, and he was running for an
open gubernatorial seat. Therefore, the next chapter presents a case study of the 2004
Montana gubernatorial election, to further test the thesis that campaign strategies of
gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the primary factors
affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different
parties in the same election year.

Chapter IV: The 2004 Montana Gubernatorial Election

“[Bob Brown] is a product of the system. He is a candidate for governor because
he has been in government for thirty years. I come from a different direction. I’m not
beholden to any political party or power-brokers.” – Governor Brian Schweitzer156
“The people in Montana basically repudiated the Republican leadership in the
legislature and the incumbent Republican governor, and I happened to be standing in the
wrong place at the wrong time. That’s the simple long and short of it.” –
2004 Republican gubernatorial candidate Bob Brown157
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In 2004, Democrat Brian Schweitzer was elected governor of Montana by a 51%
to 47% margin, defeating Republican Secretary of State and gubernatorial candidate Bob
Brown. In that same year, Montanans supported Republican President George W. Bush
over Democratic Senator and presidential candidate John Kerry, by a much wider 59% to
39% margin. The 2004 Montana gubernatorial election differed from that year’s Vermont
gubernatorial election (analyzed in the preceding chapter) in many important ways;
Schweitzer was a political novice elected to an open seat in an election dominated by
state issues. National issues, particularly the simultaneous presidential election, played a
negligible role in the rhetoric and outcome of the Montana gubernatorial campaign.
Although Montana is typically regarded as one of America’s “reddest” states,
Governor Schweitzer attracted wide support by portraying himself convincingly as an
effective agent for change in state government. Gubernatorial campaign strategies appear
to have significantly contributed to Schweitzer’s victory. These strategies included
projecting an authentic Montanan image (called the “Brawny Rancher” image by some
observers), highlighting hunting and fishing issues, linking Republican nominee Bob
Brown to the unpopular Montana political establishment, and conveying Schweitzer’s
unconventional, bipartisan approach to governance. To be sure, Schweitzer benefited
from weak opposition. Brown was widely viewed as an uninspiring candidate. His
candidacy was also inhibited by a divided Republican Party, voter dissatisfaction with
Republican governance, and poor fundraising. While the Schweitzer campaign very much
benefited from the major weaknesses of its opponent, it also developed effective
strategies to capitalize on those weaknesses and maximize Schweitzer’s strengths.

This chapter analyzes the strategies of the Schweitzer campaign and the Montana
Democratic Party, and the extent to which they influenced the outcome of the
gubernatorial election. By eliminating variables of incumbency and familiarity to voters
that were prominent in the Vermont case study, this analysis further tests the thesis that
campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the
primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and presidential candidates
of different parties in the same election year.
Montana: A Solidly ‘Red’ State?
Montana has experienced many stages of political development. Once a hotbed of
left-wing labor movements, the state has been transformed by dramatic economic and
population changes. In recent decades, Montanans have voted rather consistently for
Republican presidential and congressional candidates, earning widespread recognition as
a solidly “red” state. Yet closer analysis reveals a more complex political environment
characterized by a competitive two-party system.
Left-Wing Politics Dominate Early State History
In spite of its reputation, Montana is not a political monolith. As Barone and
Cohen noted in 2006,
There are two lively political traditions in Montana today. One draws on its heritage of
class warfare politics, radical miners, and angry labor unions, which made Montana for
many years the most Democratic of the Rocky Mountain States…. The other, more recent
political tradition is in line with conservative activist Grover Norquist’s ‘Leave-Us-Alone
Coalition’ – a fierce opposition to high taxes and federal government dictates.158

In the early left-wing period, Montana sent many notable progressive representatives to
the United States Congress. These representatives included Senator Thomas Walsh, who
uncovered the Teapot Dome scandal of the Warren Harding Administration. At the
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municipal level, Butte, a major Montana city, elected a Socialist mayor in the early
twentieth century. As the century progressed, Montanans established a clear preference
for Democratic representation. From 1911 to 1989, for example, state voters elected only
one Republican to the U.S. Senate.
Economic and Demographic Changes Disturb the Political Order
The recent political transformation of Montana can largely be attributed to
economic and demographic changes of the mid- to late-twentieth century. During this
period, ore depletion in cities such as Butte led to mine closures across the state and the
end of Montana’s mining era. From there, the state transitioned into a primarily
agricultural economy characterized by wheat and cattle grazing. As labor unions and
class tensions became less prominent features of Montana’s political environment, the
left-wing politics that had defined most of the state’s history gave way to a conservative
preference for smaller, less intrusive government.
Further altering Montana’s political characteristics were the significant
demographic shifts it experienced during the late twentieth century, as wealthy
individuals in search of privacy and solitude bought land and built second homes there.
Montana’s population grew by thirteen percent during the 1990s, and by 2006 native
Montanans constituted only 56% of the population.159
Republicans Gain Strength
By 2004, Republicans had gained unprecedented strength in Montana. For sixteen
years, Republicans controlled Montana’s governorship and state legislature. Moreover,
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Republican Conrad Burns represented Montana in the U.S. Senate from 1988, and
Republican At-Large Congressman Danny Rehberg was elected to his sixth term, with
two-thirds of the vote. Only two times since 1952 had Montanans voted for a Democratic
presidential candidate (1964 and 1992). In 2000 it chose George W. Bush over
Democratic candidate Al Gore by an overwhelming 58% to 33% margin. “There aren’t
too many states in the union redder than Montana,” declared Schweitzer campaign
consultant David Sirota.160
Not Quite ‘Red’
Conclusions such as Sirota’s, although widespread, are deceptively simplistic.
Bob Brown, who referred to Montanans as “chronic ticket-splitters,” disputed this
popular notion.161 “Montana’s typically characterized as a ‘red state,’” he noted. “But,
boy, if you look very far below the surface, it’s not very red.”162 He pointed out that
Democrats, after the 2004 elections, held nearly every statewide office, including
governor, attorney general, state auditor, and superintendent of public instruction.
Democrats also controlled the state legislature and the State Service Commission, and
claimed one of Montana’s two U.S. Senators, Max Baucus. Jim Lopach, professor of
political science at the University of Montana-Missoula, agreed that popular conceptions
of Montana as a solidly Republican state were misleading. “The Montana political culture
is individualistic and populist. It’s bipartisan,” Professor Lopach argued.163 He cited a
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study by University of Vermont professor of political science Frank Bryan, who declared
Montana the only truly competitive two-party state in America.
Montana is also receptive to third-party candidacies; in 1992 Montanans gave
Independent presidential candidate H. Ross Perot one of his largest vote percentages in
any state, 26%. Moreover, in 2000 Montanans gave Independent presidential candidate
Ralph Nader one of his largest vote percentages, with 6%.
Dissatisfaction with Republican Governance Entering the 2004 Elections
Entering the 2004 elections, Montanans exhibited widespread dissatisfaction with
the performance of Republican legislators and governors over the previous sixteen years.
Frustration over the state’s weak economy, electricity industry deregulation, and the
seeming incompetence of Republican Governor Judy Martz’s administration permeated
the political atmosphere.

The Discredited Republican Legislature
After sixteen years of controlling the Montana legislature, Republicans had failed
many voters’ expectations. The state economy remained weak, with wages the lowest in
the United States. Most importantly, the legislature faced a tremendous backlash from its
1997 deregulation of the electricity industry. In the wake of deregulation, Montana
Power, the largest corporation in Montana, sold its power facilities in 2000 for $2.1
billion. Montana Power invested the profits of its sale in a fiber optics firm, only to have
that firm go bankrupt. When the purchaser of the power facilities also went bankrupt,
Montanans experienced substantial job cuts, increased utility rates, heavy investment
losses, and high-profile lawsuits. Meanwhile, corporate executives involved in these

dealings received large severance packages, at the same time that corporate scandals such
as the Enron debacle were commanding national attention. As a result of this catastrophic
confluence of events, “Republican business-friendly policies were discredited.”164 More
specifically, the Republican-controlled Montana legislature that had engineered
electricity industry deregulation was discredited.
The Unpopular Judy Martz Governorship
Judy Martz, “darling of the right wing of the [Montana] Republican Party,” was
elected governor in 2000, with 51% of the vote to Democratic candidate Mark O’Keefe’s
47%.165 During Governor Martz’s tenure, she delivered on important campaign promises,
including an income tax reduction and the establishment of automatic state funding
increases for public schools to keep pace with inflation. Yet her administration became
one of the most unpopular in the nation due to a series of missteps and apparent ethical
lapses.
The reasons for Governor Martz’s unpopularity were manifold. Perhaps most
seriously, in August 2001 Martz’s chief policy advisor, Shane Hedges, was involved in a
motor vehicle accident while under the influence of alcohol. Montana House Majority
Leader Paul Sliter, a passenger in Hedge’s vehicle, was killed in the accident. Martz
nearly earned an obstruction of justice charge by taking Hedges from the hospital to the
governor’s mansion at four A.M. and washing his bloodstained clothes. The next year it
was revealed that state employees were using the Governor’s office to raise funds for her
political action committee, and soon after Martz underwent investigation for a suspicious

164

Barone and Cohen, op cit., p. 994.

165

Lopach, op cit.

land purchase. The latter controversy arose when Martz purchased land from a company
named Arco, at a lower price than Arco had offered to other purchasers. Arco operated
mining sites previously owned by the powerful Anaconda Mining Company, and Martz
was responsible for making recommendations regarding environmental cleanup at these
sites. Democrats filed an ethics complaint alleging that Martz had obtained a lower land
price in exchange for her leniency on the environmental recommendations. The Montana
political practices commissioner eventually cleared Martz of any wrongdoing in this
matter, but the investigation was lengthy and it further tarnished her already damaged
reputation.
Adding to Martz’s unpopularity was her penchant for off-putting comments. At
one point in her administration, a reporter asked for her reaction to critics’ charges that
she was a “lapdog for big business.” Martz responded that she would happily be a lapdog
for business if doing so would bring jobs to Montana. Also, Lee Newspaper Statehouse
Bureau Chief Chuck Johnson related a story, denied by Martz, about her introduction of
husband Harry at a Butte Chamber of Commerce event. Supposedly, she remarked at the
time that he had never beaten her because she had not yet given him a reason to do so.166
After attracting over forty percent approval from Montanans early in her tenure,
Governor Martz’s poll numbers soon plummeted into the low twenties. Martz’s extreme
unpopularity persisted throughout her tenure, making her one of the most unpopular
governors in the United States. Yet Martz gave every indication that she was planning to
seek reelection, until announcing otherwise in August 2003. By that time, three other
Republicans had already announced their candidacies for the party’s gubernatorial
nomination. First were Montana Republican Party Chairman Ken Miller and oilman Tom
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Keating. However, Miller and Keating were widely considered exceptionally
conservative and unelectable. Realizing this, many Republicans began pressuring Bob
Brown to enter the race. Secretary of State Brown, the only Republican holding statewide
office other than Martz and her lieutenant governor Karl Ohs (who had already decided
not to run), seemed to be the Republicans’ only viable gubernatorial candidate. Brown
recalled, “There were people who came to me, oh gosh, for a while there practically on a
daily basis… saying, ‘There’s no possible way Judy’s going to be reelected. Bob, you
have to step forward and do this.’”167 Reluctantly, Brown acquiesced.
Republican Gubernatorial Candidate Bob Brown
Bob Brown entered the 2004 Montana gubernatorial campaign with strong
government credentials and a sense of duty to the Republican Party. Born in Missoula,
Montana, in December 1947 and raised on a small grain and cattle ranch near Kalispell,
Brown came from a humble background. His father was a heavy machine operator and a
member of the AFL-CIO, as his father had been. Bob Brown also joined the AFL-CIO
later in life. Despite his strong union background, Brown identified as a Republican from
an early age, signing up for the Teenage Republicans and campaigning for 1964
Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater.
In 1970, Brown earned his B.A. in history from the University of MontanaBozeman. After serving in the U.S. Navy from 1971 to 1972, Brown added a B.A. in
political science before obtaining a masters degree in education in 1988. After five years
as a farmer-rancher, Brown became a teacher in 1979, the profession with which he
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identified even after an extensive career in Montana politics. In addition to high school
education, Brown became a University of Montana administrator in the early 1990s.
Throughout these endeavors, Brown served three months out of every year in the
Montana legislature. At just 23 years old he was elected to the Montana House of
Representatives in 1970, and in 1974 he was elected to the State Senate. He spent two
years as senate president before being forced out by term limits in 1996. As a legislator,
Brown was well-respected on both sides of the aisle and by observers. Johnson described
him as “one of the most ethical and classy legislators I’ve ever covered.”168 Brown was
widely recognized as a moderate Republican who got along unusually well with
traditionally left-wing groups such as teachers’ unions and environmentalists. In fact, his
proudest legislative achievement was an environmental measure he sponsored, the 1970s
Lakeshore Protection Act. This act protected Flathead Lake by allowing for the creation
of local committees to set standards for preventing lake pollution. “He was a moderate
Republican,” Johnson commented, “in a state where there aren’t too many moderate
Republicans.”169
After retiring from the legislature, Brown spent four years as a lobbyist for U.S.
West and the Columbia Falls Aluminum Company (a role that would be used against him
in the gubernatorial campaign). Additionally, in 1998 Brown headed a campaign to renew
the statewide property tax in order to better fund the Montana university system. This
role enabled Brown to meet community leaders from across the state and build a network
of working relationships that surely aided him in future statewide candidacies. Brown’s
first statewide race took place in 2000, when he defeated Democrat Hal Harper 51% to
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44% for secretary of state. It is unlikely that Brown intended at the time to run for
governor four years later. “I’d never aspired to [the governorship],” he later explained,
because “that’s a bonecruncher of a job…. It isn’t anything I’d ever had on my radar
screen.”170 Yet Brown felt pressured to seek the position when encouraged to do so by
desperate members of his party. “Eventually, you think, ‘Well, duty beckons,’” he said,
revealingly. “Sometimes you step forward when it seems that your service is called for,
and you do what you need to do.”171
Brown Wins a Divisive Republican Primary
Bob Brown’s gubernatorial candidacy was handicapped by a bitterly contested
and divisive Republican primary. Brown ultimately won the Republican nomination over
his three more-conservative opponents, but he entered the general election campaign in a
weakened position; the Republican Party was not united behind Brown and he had spent
nearly all his money attaining the nomination. These factors seriously hindered Brown’s
candidacy, costing him crucial support in terms of votes, organization, and campaign
funds.
Maneuvering Around Governor Martz
Bob Brown’s decision to enter the gubernatorial race in July 2003 greatly upset
Governor Martz, who had not yet announced her intentions. Brown and Martz did not
have an especially comfortable relationship; according to Johnson, “She saw Bob as
someone who was going to take her out… [although] Bob is not that kind of person.”172
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While she declined to challenge Brown for the nomination, Martz made it clear that she
did not support his candidacy. The day after Martz announced her intention not to seek
reelection, wealthy Billings business consultant Pat Davison entered the race, “from the
blind side and late on” as Brown put it, with the Governor’s endorsement.173 One of
Davison’s greatest assets as a candidate was his ability to self-finance his campaign.
Davison injected $250,000 of his own money into his campaign, which ultimately totaled
35% of his campaign funds. Brown, as a career educator, had nowhere near this financial
capability.
Brown Emerges as the Lone Moderate
Brown quickly distinguished himself as the only moderate Republican vying for
the party’s gubernatorial nomination, within a state party known for its decidedly
conservative inclinations. “It is my intention to appeal to voters across the Republican
spectrum and beyond,” he explained at his campaign announcement.174 This declaration
indicated his strategy for the primary campaign to cast himself as the party’s only serious
hope in a general election, due to his bipartisan appeal. As part of this strategy, Brown
selected for his running mate state representative and House Appropriations Committee
chairman Dave Lewis. Lewis also had strong bipartisan credentials, having served as
budget director under four previous governors, including two Republicans and two
Democrats. Brown further distinguished himself as the lone moderate in the Republican
primary by refusing to sign a pledge never to raise taxes as governor. He was the only
primary candidate not to sign the pledge. “You can’t adequately predict what will happen
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four years in the future,” Brown said in his defense. “No businessman would ever
promise that he would never raise the price of anything he sells for the next four
years.”175
While Brown’s moderate campaign stances were consistent with the political
instincts exhibited throughout his career, they also indicated an unmistakable electoral
advantage; Brown had a solid grasp on the Republican Party’s moderate minority while
his three opponents were certain to split the party’s conservative majority among
themselves.

Brown and Davison Spar
Although four candidates competed for the Republican gubernatorial nomination,
the only viable contenders were Brown and Davison. Brown touted his government
experience and bipartisan appeal while Davison stressed his business experience and
conservative credentials. The contest ultimately degenerated into a very negative
exchange, in which both major candidates cast their opponent as untrustworthy,
dishonest, unethical, and irresponsible. At one point, a complaint was filed on behalf of
the Brown campaign that Davison’s running mate, who had spent considerable time
outside of Montana as superintendent of Glacier National Park, did not meet state
residency requirements. Davison supporters regarded this as a particularly petty
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maneuver, and they did not soon forget it after the campaign. For its part, the Davison
campaign charged that Brown unethically appeared as secretary of state in a public
service announcement concerning voting law alternatives.
The Republican Party Fails to Unite Behind Nominee Brown
In the Republican gubernatorial primary held on June 8, 2004, Bob Brown
defeated his three opponents with 39% of the vote. In second place, Davison finished
with 23% of the vote, ahead of Miller with 22% and Keating with 16%. After the
primary, Brown and Davison perfunctorily predicted a unified Republican Party entering
the general election. Yet due to the bitter nature of the primary and many conservatives’
skepticism about Brown’s moderate politics, Brown’s “defeated rivals never ‘buried the
hatchet’ and supported him.”176 Brown believed that backers of his opponents eventually
withheld critical support in the general election. “I think a fair number of the real, solid
movement conservatives left us [the Republican gubernatorial ticket] blank, they just
didn’t vote for us,” said Brown. Consequently, “I didn’t have the full strength of my own
side behind me, because of that divisive primary.”177 Brown’s assessment is supported by
polling data; an October 7-10 poll showed that a staggering 57% of identified
Republicans were still undecided about whom to support in the gubernatorial election.178
Monetary Consequences of the Primary Battle
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Beyond electoral support, the divisive Republican gubernatorial primary cost Bob
Brown dearly in terms of campaign funds. As Johnson commented, “[Brown] basically
came out of the primary broke, he had to start fundraising all over.”179 Indeed, Brown
spent 90% of his campaign funds to win the Republican nomination, leaving him with
$44,000. This sum was only one-tenth of the war chest retained by general election
opponent Brian Schweitzer after his token Democratic primary.180 Again, money was
difficult for Brown to come by as a career educator and part-time legislator.
Consequently, he spent most of his time between the primary and the general election
fundraising. “In the situation I was in,” he explained, “I had to somehow or other get
enough money to put on a decent poor boy act against [Schweitzer] in the general
election.”181 One source of needed funds was political action committee contributions. As
of September 5, Brown had received $40,000 from PACs, a fact for which Schweitzer
later attacked Brown as a conventional, insider politician. Schweitzer, of course, did not
need to accept PAC money because he held such an enormous monetary advantage
without it. This was only one of many ways in which Schweitzer cleverly exploited his
opponent’s disadvantages, while utilizing his own advantages to convince voters that he
was a more credible agent for needed changes in state leadership.
Governor Brian Schweitzer
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Although he had never held political office before seeking the governorship in
2004, Brian Schweitzer had already established himself as a formidable presence in
Montana politics. Born in September 1955 in Havre, Montana, and raised on a ranch near
Great Falls, Schweitzer earned his B.S. in soil science at Colorado State University in
1978 before returning to earn his masters degree at Montana State University-Bozeman in
1980. Shortly after graduating from MSU, Schweitzer undertook the ambitious task of
running a 15,000-acre farm in the Libyan Sahara. A year later, in 1981, Schweitzer
helped build the world’s largest dairy farm, in Saudi Arabia. The farm held 10,000
milking cows, and it also featured grain and vegetable crops. In 1987, Schweitzer
returned to Montana, where he bought two farms spanning 27,000 acres near his
hometown of Whitefish (coincidentally, also the hometown of Bob Brown). In 1993, the
Clinton Administration appointed Schweitzer to his first government position,
distributing federal funds to farmers through the Farm Service Agency. Although this
was only a part-time position, it was important to Schweitzer’s political ambitions
because it allowed him to develop name recognition in the state and make useful
contacts.
Schweitzer Runs for U.S. Senator in 2000
In 2000, Brian Schweitzer began an improbable campaign for U.S. Senator
against incumbent Republican Conrad Burns. Despite spending twice as much as
Schweitzer, Burns won only by the narrow margin of 51% to 47%. Schweitzer made an
immediate impression on Montanans with his frank and unorthodox approach to politics.
Standing 6’2” and typically clad in jeans with a gilded silver belt buckle, Schweitzer was
also, in the words of David Sirota, “gregarious, tough-talking, and utterly without self-

doubt.”182 His candidacy was about more than image, though; Schweitzer inflamed
populist sentiment against the two-term incumbent through a variety of clever and
provocative maneuvers. For example, Schweitzer attracted national media attention when
he became the first political candidate (in what would soon become a popular trend) to
lead a bus full of senior citizens across the Canadian border to purchase prescription
drugs. The trip was intended to highlight his proposal to reimport prescription drugs from
Canada, contrary to federal policy. Schweitzer also focused on campaign financing issues
by lambasting Senator Burns for accepting large PAC contributions. At one point,
Schweitzer had armed guards dump a suitcase filled with $47,000, the amount of money
given to Burns by tobacco lobbyists, on the floor of the state capitol’s rotunda as
reporters watched.
Schweitzer Enters the 2004 Gubernatorial Election
Although Brian Schweitzer lost his bid for the Senate in 2000, he used his
formidable showing in that race to propel him toward the governorship in 2004. Johnson
recalled,
When [Schweitzer] lost to Burns [in 2000], he never really stopped running. We [Lee
Newspaper Bureau reporters] went through clippings from local newspapers, and there’d
be six people out at some small town in Montana at a Democratic Club meeting, and –
‘speaker Brian Schweitzer,’ ‘speaker Brian Schweitzer.’ He just kept running.183

Early in his campaign, Schweitzer acknowledged the unlikelihood of his 2000 candidacy
and the role that played in preparing for his 2004 candidacy:
Probably [the 2000 Senate race] was a mountain too high for me to climb… me starting
so far in the valley with so little equipment. But I’ve got a little more rope this time, I’m
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starting a little higher up the mountain and I think we know a little more about
climbing.184

Indeed, Schweitzer would prove his enhanced political skills in the election ahead.
Schweitzer Easily Wins the Democratic Primary
It was an impressive sign of Brian Schweitzer’s strength as a candidate that,
despite his governmental inexperience and the strong likelihood that a Democratic
gubernatorial candidate could finally retake the governorship in 2004, he received only
token opposition in the Democratic primary. Gallatin County Commissioner and former
state legislator John Vincent entered the primary very late, in February 2004. Schweitzer
handily defeated Vincent, 73% to 27%, although he faced stinging criticism in the
process. Vincent attacked Schweitzer with more vigor than Brown later did, mainly for
his governmental inexperience. Yet, according to Johnson, “Schweitzer would just look
down at his shoes and say, ‘John Vincent’s a really nice guy and I’m glad he’s running.
He’s a great man.’”185 Schweitzer was probably wise not to engage in bitter disputes with
Vincent when it was clear that Schweitzer was headed toward victory. Schweitzer also
wanted to emphasize his constructive approach to governance at this time. He declared,
“The days of political bickering, name-calling, and finger-pointing are over. We’ve heard
from people in every corner of the state who were disgusted with the way candidates
were conducting themselves.”186 Entering the 2004 gubernatorial campaign, there was
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little reason to doubt that Schweitzer would put forth a credible campaign, and quite
possibly be elected the first Democratic governor of Montana in sixteen years.
Leadership Emerges as the Central Issue of the Gubernatorial Campaign
Given widespread voter dissatisfaction with the Republican legislature and
governor, it was clear from the outset of the 2004 gubernatorial campaign that leadership
would be a central issue. Therefore, capitalizing on his status as a political outsider, Brian
Schweitzer tried ardently to focus the campaign on leadership and to cast himself as the
most credible agent for change in state government. Professor Lopach explained,
My understanding is that [Schweitzer] set out in a very intentional, calculated way to be
the candidate of change, which people wanted. They had had enough of Judy Martz, they
wanted change. So he did things in his style of campaigning, his style of dress, his mode
of speaking to communicate this…. He projected the image of being an engaged,
vigorous candidate committed to making change on behalf of the state. And Bob [Brown]
did not do it.187

Schweitzer conveyed his credibility as an agent for change primarily through “Brawny
Rancher” imagery, energetic campaigning, effectively tying Brown to the unpopular
political establishment, and promoting himself as a government outsider.

Schweitzer’s “Brawny Rancher” Image
The Schweitzer campaign effectively portrayed its candidate as an authentic,
average Montanan, or what many have referred to as the archetypical “Brawny Rancher.”
This image reinforced Schweitzer’s populist message and assured voters that he was a
different kind of politician than any they had elected to state leadership in recent years. In
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contrast to what voters expected from their politicians, Schweitzer regularly dressed in
jeans, a flannel shirt, and a Bolo tie. At one point he took a two-week campaign tour in
his pickup truck, tossing his clothes in the backseat and filling the bed with notepads for
volunteers and additional bags of clothes. Television commercials featured Schweitzer
working on his farm and herding cattle, because the Schweitzer campaign believed that
imagery was essential to gaining voters’ trust and affinity. “Visual images are very
important,” explained Schweitzer’s 2004 campaign manager, Eric Stern.
The reality is, some voters turn the sound down [on their televisions or radios]. Some
voters go to vote and they may not have followed the race very closely…. They follow
the presidential election, they know what they’re doing there. But the governor’s race,
they may not have focused on. And so they have one image of one guy [Schweitzer] in a
flannel shirt cutting hay, another image of another guy [Brown] in a button-down suit
with a big plush office at the capitol. And they say, ‘Well, I like the first guy.’188

Making this impression among the less-engaged voters might have been especially
important in a presidential year. Instead of applying presidential preferences to their
gubernatorial votes for lack of any other voting basis, voters motivated by the presidential
election were also equipped with a reassuring “Brawny Rancher” image of Schweitzer
that may have figured prominently in their decisions.

Schweitzer’s Energetic Approach to Campaigning
Brian Schweitzer’s energetic campaign style made a strong impression on voters
and campaign observers. Johnson said, “I’ve never seen a harder campaigner” than
Schweitzer.189 As a candidate, he was skilled at maximizing his time and resources, using
spare minutes to fundraise via telephone, conduct interviews, and greet voters.
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Schweitzer described meeting voters as valuable job preparation, not just an attempt to
secure votes. “I want to meet as many people as possible,” he said.
A good governor needs to know personally all the people that pull the rope in Montana.
It’s about building personal relationships. The more people you know, the more contacts
that you make, the more likely that you’re going to be able to pick up the phone and ask
someone a question or find out something about what government should or shouldn’t be
doing.190

Schweitzer’s energetic campaigning helped make up for his government inexperience by
familiarizing him with voters’ concerns and expectations. In terms of leadership, it also
conveyed to voters that he had the enthusiasm and vigor necessary to take on the
imposing task of reforming state government. There was no doubt that Schweitzer
wanted the job, which was more than voters could confidently say about his opponent.
Brian Schweitzer’s energetic campaign style was especially striking because it
differed dramatically from that of Bob Brown. Indeed, “Schweitzer’s gregarious, almost
bubbly campaign style is in contrast to Brown’s admittedly more low-key demeanor,”
said Associated Press reporter Bob Anez.191 Professor Lopach recalled one incident from
a debate late in the campaign, illustrating the contrast between the candidates.
Bob was sitting down on the stage studying notes, and Schweitzer, with his typical jeans
and boots, kind of a tweed sportcoat, a western shirt, and Bolo tie, he was working the
crowd vigorously – row to row to row to row, shaking hands and smiling.192

Brown’s comparative lack of energy was not just a function of personality
differences; according to observers, and judging by Brown’s reflections on the race, he
was not fully committed to the gubernatorial campaign. “In reality, I don’t think that
Brown much cared if he won or lost,” said Craig Wilson, professor of political science at
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Montana State University-Billings.193 Johnson agreed, speculating that Brown had only
gotten involved in the race because “others were twisting his arm.”194 Brown’s earlier
cited comments on getting into the race as a matter of duty certainly reinforce this
assessment. Moreover, Brown had difficulty handling unsavory aspects of politics that
are typically considered part of the business, such as fundraising and negative campaign
advertisements. He referred to fundraising as “the most unpleasant feeling. Oh! It’s just
the most sickening aspect of politics.”195 In terms of negative ads, “Those things, they
bother you, they bother your wife, they bother your kids. You see this ugly photograph of
yourself on television, and the ominous background music.”196 The gubernatorial
campaign, unsurprisingly in light of these comments, took its toll on Brown. “I think that
towards the end of the campaign Bob was very tired, maybe even somewhat ill,” said
Professor Lopach. “He didn’t look good. And Schweitzer was just building momentum
and rolling along, and I think that really hurt Bob.”197 Indeed, voters must have gotten the
impression that Schweitzer was up for the challenge of governor more than Brown. This
was undoubtedly an important impression for him to make.
Schweitzer Effectively Ties Brown to the Unpopular Political Establishment
Associating Bob Brown with the unpopular Republican legislature and Martz
Administration was a central goal of the Schweitzer campaign’s overall strategy. Stern

193

Wilson, op cit.

194

Johnson, op cit., February 7, 2006.

195

Brown, op cit.

196

Ibid.

197

Lopach, op cit.

said proudly, “We tied our opponent to the Governor and the current regime, to make it
look like it was one big circle.”198
Tying Brown to the legislature was somewhat difficult because Brown was retired
when the legislature’s great sin, electricity industry deregulation, took place in 1997. The
Schweitzer campaign managed to implicate Brown in similar activities, though, with an
ad released in mid-October by the Montana Democratic Party attacking Brown for his
role as a Columbia Falls Aluminum Company lobbyist. The ad, echoing a similar attack
posted on the Schweitzer campaign’s website since September, claimed that Columbia
had “stole[n] millions from workers’ profit-sharing and laid off hundreds of employees to
make millions selling power out of the state.”199 The ad also criticized Brown for
supporting a 1987 tax cut that benefited Columbia, albeit eleven years before he joined
the company as a lobbyist. In Brown’s defense, his campaign manager Jason Thielman
pointed out that the alleged abuses by Columbia occurred in 1992 and were settled in
1998, all before Brown began lobbying for the company. Montana Democratic Party
Executive Director Brad Martin maintained, “You’re judged by the company you keep.
After this company had all this press about all of its poor dealing with its employees, and
hiding money from profit-sharing, Bob Brown still felt quite comfortable going to work
for them.”200 As for the tax cut, the Brown campaign argued that it reduced the Columbia
plant’s property taxes at a time when it appeared on the verge of closure. Aluminum
Workers Trade Council President Terry Smith said of Brown’s activities, “He did a lot to
198
199

Stern, op cit.

Anez, “Democrats Run First Ad Attacking Brown,” Associated Press, October 13, 2004.
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=36fa18f06d2888f7b80746ab39110de2&_docnum=1&
wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=d24627ac8420f680847bf468d07004c7.
200
Ibid.

help the workers and the plant survive and preserve those good-paying jobs with good
benefits.”201 Yet the Schweitzer campaign’s efforts were useful in stigmatizing Brown in
the absence of a direct tie to the legislature’s unpopular electricity industry deregulation.
Perhaps most importantly, Schweitzer (“cleverly and effectively” according to
Bob Brown) tied his opponent to the Martz Administration.202 Schweitzer typically spoke
of Brown as part of the Martz Administration, although he was elected separately from
the Governor, as were Democrats elected to other statewide offices. These associations
were difficult for Brown to rebut because he did not want to further destabilize the
already fragile Republican coalition by offending Martz supporters. At his campaign
announcement in July 2003, Brown said approvingly, “Governor Martz has been a
courageous governor. She’s stood by her convictions and her principles and I admire
her.”203 Indeed, said Johnson, Brown “never really came out and criticized [Martz]. He
sort of suggested he might do some things differently [than her], but he never really took
her on as an issue.” Due to Republican divisions, though, “He probably had to play it that
way.”204 Still, for those familiar with their private tensions, it was clear that Brown was
not closely allied with Martz. “There had been a falling out between Bob Brown and Judy
Martz,” noted Professor Lopach, “and I think he had established that distance between
them that he couldn’t be viewed as any kind of successor.”205 The Schweitzer campaign
attempted to make the connection between Brown and Martz, however, and by most
accounts it was quite effective in doing so.
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Beyond Bob Brown’s ties to the Republican legislature and Governor Martz, the
Schweitzer campaign tried to portray Brown more generally as an entrenched member of
the Montana political establishment. This was partly enabled by Brown’s discussion,
more pronounced early in the campaign, of his ticket’s government experience. For
example, the Brown-Lewis ticket’s initial campaign slogan was “Sixty-Six Years of
Government Experience.” Once the campaign recognized the liability of being identified
with the Montana political establishment, it promptly retired this slogan. Brown also
liked to refer to himself as a “workhorse” and to Brian Schweitzer as a “showhorse,”
describing the gubernatorial election as “a pretty clear contest between a flamboyant
showman with a gift for finding the political hot buttons and a public servant who’s been
involved positively, constructively, and effectively in our state for many years, and has a
record to prove it.”206 Brown’s emphasis on experience worked in some quarters; several
newspapers endorsed Brown for governor largely on the basis of his governmental
experience, noting that Governor Martz lacked government experience before being
elected. Brown should have known early in the campaign, however, that government
experience was an inadequate selling point. A poll conducted in late May 2004, before
the Republican primary took place, showed Schweitzer beating Brown by a 45% to 35%
margin, and Pat Davison losing to Schweitzer by a slightly larger margin of 47% to
31%.207 Judging by this poll, it made little difference to voters whether Schweitzer was
matched against a Republican candidate with abundant government experience or none
whatsoever.

206

Anez, “Resumes.”
“Poll: Davison, Brown in Dead Heat: Schweitzer Would Beat Both,” Associated Press, May 28, 2004.
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=b13f6eda1ebbbea00beb705a78b1dca5&_docnum=1&
wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=bc61318f49950a0610e3fd99c0417e82. [Hereafter cited as “Poll.”]

207

Bob Brown’s governmental experience was cleverly used against him by the
Schweitzer campaign. Brian Schweitzer blamed Montana’s problems on Republican
domination of state government, and he therefore held Brown responsible as a leading
Republican legislator. At one debate he asked, “Mr. Brown, you’ve been a part of this
group that have been running this government now for thirty years. Why should we stay
the course with you?”208 In a later debate, Schweitzer analogized Brown to a contractor
hired to fix a leaking roof for twenty-six consecutive years, with no success. He said
Brown was now asking to be hired for four more years, but “After twenty-six years, I’d
probably find a new contractor.”209 He suspected that voters wanted a change also.

Schweitzer Promotes Himself as a Government Outsider
In contrast to Bob Brown’s image as a career politician, Brian Schweitzer
“portrayed himself as a government outsider promising change and bipartisan rule.”210
Schweitzer actually claimed that his lack of government experience was an asset, rather
than a liability as Brown and John Vincent had alleged. Schweitzer said his lack of

208

Sarah R. Craig, “Candidates Debate Prescription Drugs, Coal Tax,” Associated Press, October 2, 2004.
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=9630ae55740558dfe897e05c32abfb79&_docnum=1&
wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=ea9d6e330401ce44be15f54423d49ccf.

209

Sirota, op cit.
Anez, “Schweitzer Claims Governor’s Race,” Associated Press, November 3, 2004. http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/document?_m=ba11da68a7e47b2e95065e093deec984&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVtzzSkVb&_md5=08ffc7a664326c6e86524dafa30845a2. [Hereafter cited as Anez, “Claims.”]

210

experience allowed him to transcend traditional partisan loyalties and do what was best
for the state, regardless of entrenched interests. He shrewdly pointed out that Republican
icons Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Arnold Schwarzenegger had never held
elective office before assuming their governorships. Besides, Schweitzer said, business
experience was what Montana needed at the time.
I understand this business. I’m not talking about this is in an abstract way. I’ve been an
innovator in business. I’ve done things, gone places, built things that people hadn’t done
before. And that’s what it’s going to take to move Montana forward.211

As a symbol of his government outsider status, Schweitzer declared early in his
campaign an open audition for a running mate. Over several weeks, he interviewed a
wide variety of Montanans interested in the position, including small-time politicians and
a part-time grocery store employee. While most observers regarded the audition as a
symbolic gimmick, Schweitzer cited it as evidence that “This isn’t going to be an
administration that is going to be an inside-Helena, back-door deal.”212 Whether voters
believed that Schweitzer was sincere or not in his search, they certainly got the message
that he was willing to defy political conventions.
Schweitzer’s Bipartisan Appeal
Although Montana was not exactly a “red state,” as many considered it in 2004,
elected Republicans and Democrats tended to be conservative. Consequently, Brian
Schweitzer, who “ran as a middle-of-the-road populist Democratic candidate,” knew he
had to cast himself as a much different type of Democrat than presidential candidate John
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Kerry and other national Democrats unpopular in Montana at the time.213 Schweitzer
recognized that Republican and Independent support was essential to electoral victory,
and to his prospects for success once elected. Upon election in November, Schweitzer
announced, “I’m the governor of the state, not just those who supported us.”214 Indeed,
Schweitzer had a keen understanding of conservative opinion. Often he would listen to
conservative radio talk shows and call in to challenge local hosts. “Though he despised
the hosts’ messages,” recalled Sirota, “he admired the way they stirred the listeners’
grievances about government and liberal elites.”215 The Schweitzer campaign appealed to
these voters, and others across a wide political spectrum, mainly through two brilliant
campaign tactics: heavy identification with hunting and fishing issues, and the selection
of a Republican running mate in John Bohlinger.
The Importance of Hunting and Fishing Issues to Montana Voters
Hunting and fishing issues were profoundly important to Montana voters in 2004,
perhaps more than to voters in any other state. Brian Schweitzer referred to these issues
as “The one[s] that [get] people’s blood pumping,” pointing to polls that showed this to
be the case for both men and women.216 Montana in 2004 was home to the highest
percentage of hunters in the United States, and 70% of its residents reported owning a
firearm.217 According to a 2001 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Survey, 723,000 of
Montana’s 971,000 residents hunted, fished, or watched wildlife. Schweitzer had long
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regretted underestimating the importance of hunting and fishing issues in his 2000 Senate
race, and in 2004 he was determined to make them central to his gubernatorial campaign.
Schweitzer and Brown’s Similar Positions on Gun Rights
Whereas gun rights versus gun control is often a volatile fault line between
national Republicans and Democrats, Brian Schweitzer and Bob Brown differed little on
the matter in their gubernatorial contest. Brown earned a slight advantage over
Schweitzer by obtaining the endorsement of the National Rifle Association in 2004.
Based on his voting record, public statements, and responses to NRA questionnaires,
Brown received a grade of “A” from the NRA’s Political Victory Fund. Schweitzer did
little to excite NRA opposition, though; he received a grade of “A-” only because he
lacked a voting record to demonstrate his commitment to gun rights. It probably did not
help Schweitzer that his running mate, John Bohlinger, received a “C” while Brown’s
running mate, Dave Lewis, received an “A-.” Yet, quite probably as a result of the efforts
discussed below, Schweitzer fared very well among Montanans on hunting and fishing
issues. According to an internal Schweitzer campaign poll from August 2003, voters
believed that Schweitzer, more than Brown, “shared their values” when it came to
hunting and fishing issues. Schweitzer assiduously cultivated this impression and utilized
it to create bipartisan appeal.
Schweitzer Campaign Advertisements Highlight Hunting and Fishing Issues
Typically, Republican candidates take the offensive on hunting and fishing issues,
while Democrats emphasize gun control and environmental protection. In the case of the
Montana gubernatorial election, it was the Democratic Schweitzer campaign that took the

offensive on hunting and fishing issues. Its first task was to visually identify Schweitzer
with gamesman culture. To that end, the campaign released a television advertisement
entitled “Lifestyle.” It featured Schweitzer and his brother Walt carrying rifles through
the forest, clad in full hunting gear. The ad also proudly announced Schweitzer’s “A-”
rating from the NRA.
Schweitzer regarded “Lifestyle” as an essential message to voters about his
populist identity, and he wanted it to be broadcast statewide. To illustrate its importance,
Sirota recounted a telephone call he received from Schweitzer early one morning during
the campaign, demanding to know why the “Lifestyle” ad was not already running
statewide. After receiving an unsatisfactory response, Schweitzer accosted him.
Listen to me very carefully, and get your head in the game. No matter what our major ad
of the week is, I want that damn gun ad running under everything! I want it in every
media market, and I want it on TV and radio. The next time I call, I want to know it’s
happening.218

The Great Falls Tribune speculated that this ad would allow Schweitzer to “manage to
hold his own in many rural counties and Republican urban areas,” indicating that it was
an effective contributor to Schweitzer’s bipartisan appeal.219 Still, the Schweitzer
campaign realized that in order to gain an advantage on hunting and fishing issues, rather
than merely inoculating its candidate, it had to go further. According to Sirota,
[If] we had simply tried to argue that Schweitzer was as hawkish on guns as any
Republican, we would’ve won magazine covers but lost the election; in absence of
indisputable proof, voters will believe that Republicans are more likely to protect gun
rights. We needed to open another front with an issue that showed voters the clear
difference.220

The Schweitzer campaign discovered that issue in hunting and fishing land access.

218

Sirota, op cit.

219

Ibid.
Ibid.

220

The Schweitzer Campaign Outflanks Brown with Hunting and Fishing Land Access
Issues
For years before the 2004 gubernatorial election, Republicans had been leading
efforts to privatize land and strengthen private property rights throughout the Mountain
West region. While these efforts followed Republican convictions about private
ownership, they also had the effect of restricting access for gamesmen, who were an
important element of the Republicans’ traditional electoral coalition. Brian Schweitzer
seized on the potential vulnerability this created. He criticized Republicans, particularly
Bob Brown, for a recent party platform that had recommended turning over all federal
lands in Montana to the state. Many believed that the state was incapable of managing
these vast tracts of land, meaning they would have to sell them to private buyers.
Consequently, said Sirota, “Some outdoorsmen became worried that the state’s deficit
woes would be used as a Republican rationale to reduce spending on public land
management and sell off even more valuable hunting real estate.”221
The Schweitzer campaign’s efforts to discredit Bob Brown on hunting and fishing
issues focused mainly on the Stream Access Law. This law, originally passed in 1985 due
in large part, ironically, to Brown’s initiative, required private land owners to permit noncommercial fishermen to fish in streams that traversed their properties. In the late 1990s,
the Montana Republican Party’s platform, with Dave Lewis’ support, called for revisions
of the Stream Access Law that would have strengthened private property owners’ rights.
Brian Schweitzer cited this as evidence that a Republican administration would
dramatically curtail access for Montana gamesmen. Schweitzer also criticized Brown for
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failing to oppose a 2003 measure designed to give landowners an allotment of big game
licenses that they could then sell to the highest bidder, if they chose to do so.
Brian Schweitzer went to great lengths to identify with gamesmen and highlight
hunting and fishing land access issues. At one point he met with a Gallatin County
gamesman group, for the purpose of developing a plan to protect public and private land
access rights. The completed plan focused on maintaining state control of public lands,
increasing funding for state land upkeep, and improving access to fields and streams
through private property easements funded by hunting license fees. The plan was
announced at a Bozeman town hall meeting of hunters and fishermen, most of them
political conservatives, who reacted favorably to it and pledged their support.
The Political Value of Land Access Issues
The Schweitzer campaign believed land access issues were politically potent for
several reasons. First, they appealed to gamesmen, such as those at the Bozeman town
hall meeting, who tended to vote Republican. Second, they appealed to environmentalists
who wanted to prevent public land from passing to private owners. Schweitzer typically
did not discuss protecting the environment, as such; “You won’t hear him say
‘environment’ much,” Johnson noted. “He’ll talk about [how] he wants to preserve places
where people can hunt and fish and hike and camp.”222 Land access issues allowed him to
placate environmentalists without arousing suspicion among conservatives. “This was
especially important because we [in the Schweitzer campaign] did not want to alienate
the environmentalists who would be out in force on Election Day to vote against an
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initiative to permit cyanide leach mining,” explained Sirota.223 Thirdly, land access had
important demographic appeal. Gallatin County was one of the fastest growing counties
in the United States, and many of the new residents were migrants attracted to the area by
its trademark outdoors opportunities. “Targeting these new residents and making them
Democratic voters were key not only to the election at hand,” said Sirota, “but also for
building a majority for the long haul.”224 Lastly, “One key reason the access issue had
such resonance for Schweitzer was that its propulsive, little-guy-versus-big-guy force
was in perfect sync with much of the rest of his message and campaign.”225 Hence, the
Schweitzer campaign’s focus on land access issues was a masterful tactic, useful in
broadening Schweitzer’s appeal and reinforcing the populist approach to governance
touted by his campaign.
Schweitzer Selects Republican John Bohlinger as His Running Mate
Perhaps the Schweitzer campaign’s greatest strategic coup was its selection of
Republican John Bohlinger as its candidate for lieutenant governor. His selection marked
the first time that a Democrat and Republican ran on the same gubernatorial ticket in
Montana history. It was an unmistakable signal to voters of Brian Schweitzer’s
dedication to unconventional, bipartisan governance.
John Bohlinger was a 68-year-old, three-term state senator from Billings. Like
Brian Schweitzer he had made his living as a businessman, running an upscale women’s
clothing store with his wife. Politically, Bohlinger was widely regarded as a very liberal
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Republican; Bob Brown referred to him quite candidly as “The only guy in Montana
solidly to the left of me in the Republican Party. In fact,” said Brown, “he would
probably better be a Democrat.”226 The Brown campaign certainly tried to make this
argument. Thielman asserted at the time of Bohlinger’s selection, “It is clear to any
Montanan who has reviewed John Bohlinger’s voting record that he is a strong
Democrat.”227 While in the Montana legislature, Bohlinger was known for his
independence and willingness to stand up to the Republican leadership. Brown explained
Bohlinger’s decision to join the Democratic ticket in terms of ambition, describing him as
“frustrated, a little bit angry” that he had not ascended the Republican Party’s legislative
leadership.228 Schweitzer’s offer appeared to be Bohlinger’s long awaited opportunity,
and he accepted it.
Republican Objections to Bohlinger’s Candidacy
Bohlinger’s decision to run for lieutenant governor on Schweitzer’s ticket ignited
fury among Republicans. Bob Brown, for one, felt betrayed by the decision. The two had
known each other for many years and swapped political favors. Bohlinger had been
Brown’s “sign captain” in Billings during the 2000 secretary of state campaign, ensuring
that signs promoting Brown’s candidacy were posted throughout the city. When
Bohlinger was challenged in a primary for his Senate seat, Brown “was one of just a
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handful of Republican legislators who stuck their necks out to support John.”229
According to Brown, Bohlinger had even contributed money to Brown’s gubernatorial
campaign and pledged his support, just a few months before joining the Schweitzer
ticket. Bohlinger’s decision therefore struck a particular nerve in Brown; “It really
wounded me because I regarded him as a personal friend and ally.”230
Many Republicans refused to accept Bohlinger as a member of their party after
his decision to join the Schweitzer ticket. For example, in mid-October 2004, Lewis and
Clark County Republican Central Committee chairman Bill Snoddy and vice chairwoman
Jane Nofsinger filed a complaint with State Political Practices Commissioner Linda
Vaughey, objecting to Bohlinger’s being called a Republican after filing on the
Democratic ticket. Snoddy and Nofsinger asked Vaughey to order the Schweitzer
campaign to halt all advertisements referring to Bohlinger as a member of the Republican
Party, and to force the Schweitzer campaign to release new advertisements “correcting
intentional misstatement.”231 Snoddy portrayed the issue as part of a larger pattern of
deception and misrepresentation by the Schweitzer campaign. “It’s part of the smokeand-mirrors campaign that Brian Schweitzer has been giving the people of Montana for
months,” lamented Snoddy.232 Nothing came of the complaint, however; Vaughey
announced that she did not have enough time to rule on the matter before the impending
November 2 elections, and eventually she concluded that the Schweitzer campaign had
done nothing wrong.
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For his part, John Bohlinger maintained that he was still a member of the
Republican Party. “I’ve not left the Republican Party,” he announced shortly after joining
the Schweitzer ticket. “I’m going to stay here until they kick me out.”233 He reaffirmed
his political identity after the election, explaining, “I am a Republican. I’m remaining in
the Republican Party. I feel that it would be disingenuous of us [the incoming
administration] to suddenly announce to people that now that we are elected I’m
becoming a Democrat.”234
Before leaving the subject it should be noted that some Democrats were just as
displeased by the Bohlinger selection as were Republicans. According to Stern, “A lot of
the Democratic Party insiders were furious about it at first. They thought this was some
sort of betrayal.”235 The Bohlinger selection caused no lasting rifts in the Democratic
Party, however; members quickly apprehended the important electoral advantage it
provided their nominee and supported the ticket.

The Impact of the Bohlinger Selection on Schweitzer and Brown’s Bipartisan
Appeal
The Schweitzer campaign’s selection of John Bohlinger provided significant
strategic advantages in terms of bipartisan appeal, neutralizing the Brown campaign, and
attracting support in Billings. The first and most obvious advantage of the Bohlinger
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selection is that it reinforced the Schweitzer campaign’s emphases on bipartisan
governance and unconventional politics. At his press conference to announce Bohlinger’s
selection, Brian Schweitzer cited it as indisputable evidence of his commitment to
bipartisan governance. “People have talked about coming to Helena to build bridges to
bring the parties together,” he said proudly. “Guess what? We’ve poured the concrete,
we’ve bolted together the planks, we’ve put the steel over the top. The bridge is built.”236
To some it was “an empty gesture” because Bohlinger was only nominally a Republican.
According to Schweitzer, voters appreciated it nonetheless. He said,
We hear from the people that it’s a breath of fresh air [to have a Democrat and
Republican running together]. We will win this election, and the day after we will be
uniquely qualified to bring Montana together to end this polarization, this finger-pointing,
this partisan gamesmanship.237

To make the bipartisan appeal of the Schweitzer-Bohlinger ticket clear to voters,
the Schweitzer campaign prominently featured party affiliations in its advertisements.
One such advertisement began with Bohlinger standing in his clothing store and
introducing himself as a Republican businessman from Billings. The video then cut to
Schweitzer riding a horse and herding cattle. He introduced himself as a Democrat and a
rancher from Flathead County. Bipartisan symbolism endured as a focus of the
Schweitzer campaign beyond the 2004 election. As of early 2006, the Governor’s
updated campaign website led with a photograph of Schweitzer and Bohlinger together,
and the headline: “A Democrat and a Republican, working together for Montana.”238
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In addition to strengthening Brian Schweitzer’s candidacy, the selection of John
Bohlinger neutralized Bob Brown’s bipartisan appeal, which Brown referred to as
“maybe the most important part of my political identity.”239 Brown’s bipartisan appeal
was an essential aspect of his campaign from its outset. At his July 2003 announcement,
he proudly claimed that he and Lewis “know how to forge majorities and build bridges.
We have forged them and built them.”240 The Bohlinger selection nullified this
advantage. Said Brown,
What [the selection of Bohlinger] made possible to do was… [when] anyone would say,
‘Bob Brown’s pretty skilled as a bridge builder, he’s reached out to groups and
organizations and people that most Republicans can’t reach out to,’ Schweitzer would
look at them and say: ‘What do you mean Bob Brown’s a bridge builder? Heck, my
running mate’s a Republican.’ He trumped that.241

The Geographic Significance of the Bohlinger Selection
Brian Schweitzer’s selection of John Bohlinger as his running mate was not
merely significant in terms of bipartisan appeal; Johnson described the selection as being
“as much about geographics as demographics.”242 This was a crucial point that is often
overlooked in discussions of the 2004 Montana gubernatorial election.
Bohlinger hailed from Billings, located in Yellowstone County. Electorally, this
area was regarded as the most consequential, competitive region of Montana. “It is
Yellowstone County,” explained Sirota, “that is Montana’s own Ohio, and Billings the
state’s Columbus.”243 Since 1948, only one successful gubernatorial candidate had lost
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Yellowstone County. (Schweitzer won it in 2004, 51% to 45%.) Billings was
Yellowstone’s most competitive city; according to Stern, “Billings is where 25% of the
persuadable vote is.”244 Schweitzer ended up winning Billings, 52% to 48%, although it
had typically voted Republican. Brown believed that Schweitzer’s victory there, and the
selection of Bohlinger, proved decisive. “In a statewide election,” he explained, Billings’
vote “would probably amount to close to half of [Schweitzer’s] victory margin. I think
[Schweitzer’s election] was attributable to that crude maneuver of going in and recruiting
John Bohlinger to be his lieutenant governor.”245
Many observers believed that residents of Billings, Montana’s largest city, were
desperate to elect one of their own as Montana’s governor or lieutenant governor, after
many years without doing so. During the Republican primary, in which all three
candidates besides Brown lived in Billings, there seemed to be a good chance that the
Republican gubernatorial nominee would come from Billings. However, as Brown
recalled, “When I defeated all three of them in the primary, there was still this lingering
feeling that Billings was being kind of left out.”246 Bohlinger filled this gap, and perhaps
influenced the votes of many Billings residents as a result.
Assessing the Impact of the Bohlinger Selection
Opinions and data conflict on the significance of Brian Schweitzer’s selection of
John Bohlinger as his running mate. Schweitzer downplayed its importance as purely
symbolic, asserting
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I don’t think that brought me a single Republican voter. And the Independent voters don’t
like Democrats or Republicans, that’s why they haven’t picked a party. But what it said
to Independent voters and to a small extent Republicans, is ‘This guy really is different.
He looks and talks different, his profile is different. But already the first decision he’s
made about being governor of Montana is different.’247

A May 2004 poll of Montana voters also suggested that the Bohlinger selection did not
make a crucial difference in the gubernatorial election. Sixteen percent of respondents
said that Bohlinger’s presence on the Democratic ticket made them more likely to support
Schweitzer, 12% said it made them less likely, 4% were unsure, and the vast majority,
68%, said it would have no impact on their vote.248 Other observers believed
Schweitzer’s selection of Bohlinger was quite significant. In Johnson’s opinion, “I
thought it was a very, very successful pairing of two people with different backgrounds
and different parties, in a state where people get real tired of partisan politics.”249
Moreover, Brown regarded the Bohlinger selection as a decisive element in the
Schweitzer victory. He argued, “If you could point to one shrewd political move during
the campaign that importantly influenced the outcome, I would say that was it.”250
Determining the significance of Schweitzer’s selection of Bohlinger as his
gubernatorial running mate is very difficult. At the least, it was a notable symbol of
Schweitzer’s commitment to bipartisan governance and a new style of political
leadership; at most, it was the decisive campaign strategy that attracted enough support
among Republicans and Independents, particularly Billings residents, to deliver
Schweitzer the election.
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Prominent Issues in the Gubernatorial Campaign
It would be difficult to describe the 2004 Montana gubernatorial election as
issues-based. Due to the overwhelming atmosphere of antipathy toward state leadership,
it would more accurately be described as a referendum on leadership. Yet there were a
number of issues addressed in the campaign that highlighted important differences
between Schweitzer and Brown. Of these issues, the economy was the most prominent.
Prescription drugs and state ballot initiatives also generated significant discussion in the
campaign. Nonetheless, the campaign focused more on general themes of leadership and
character, in no small part because Schweitzer’s moderate stance on typically divisive
partisan issues, such as gun ownership and gay marriage, removed them from contention.
Desperate for compelling issues, the Brown campaign resorted to petty controversies that
did not advance Brown’s candidacy in any detectable way. Schweitzer ultimately shaped
the election as a referendum on leadership, and this worked to his advantage.
Economy
Of any issue discussed seriously in the gubernatorial campaign, the economy was
by far the most prominent. Montana’s economy had been stagnant for several years.
Wages were the lowest in the United States, and a large budget deficit loomed in the
public mind. Brian Schweitzer and Bob Brown disagreed about the size of the impending
budget deficit, but the governor’s office estimated it at $100 million and Schweitzer said
that it would soon become $250 million. Schweitzer blamed Republican leadership for
the ballooning deficit, claiming that the legislature had relied too heavily on one-time
taxes and business property tax breaks to balance the budget for the time being. Despite
their disagreements about the nature and causes of Montana’s economic trials, both

candidates made the economy the top substantive issue of their respective campaigns.
Their similar focus was indicated by nearly identical slogans; Schweitzer sought to
“Grow Montana,” while the Brown campaign sought to “Advance Montana.” According
to polling done shortly before the election, economic distress was also the foremost issue
in voters’ minds. A late September 2004 poll had 29% of voters ranking the economy and
unemployment as the most important issues facing them that November, with state
budget, taxes, and government spending coming in second at 17%.251
Brian Schweitzer blamed the poor Montana economy on an era of Republican
dominance that allegedly favored large out-of-state corporations over small in-state
businesses. Therefore, Schweitzer’s strategy for reviving Montana’s economy centered
on aiding small businesses. Schweitzer sought to shift the tax burden from in-state to outof-state businesses, particularly “big-box” stores, such as WalMart, that avoided paying
income taxes by registering as limited liability corporations. Schweitzer’s close
association with small business interests suited the populist tenor of his campaign. In his
first television advertisement, Schweitzer discussed his business experience and his
intention to make small businesses the centerpiece of his economic recovery plan. He
noted that 85% of Montanans owned or worked for a small business, and that Montana’s
wages were the lowest in the country. As a result, he believed that small businesses
merited substantial attention in order to reenergize the state’s dormant economy.
Besides small business development, Schweitzer presented many other proposals
for economic development. He proposed creating an office for encouraging business in
Montana, convening a task force of state businessmen to cut $60 million in government
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waste without cutting services, and encouraging youth to attend college and work in
Montana. Schweitzer referred to Montana as a “salmon economy” in which “all our
young leave the state and then they come home to die.”252 Montana’s trade school tuition
was the highest in the nation while, again, state wages were the lowest. Therefore, it was
no surprise that so many young Montanans pursued their aspirations elsewhere. To help
address this problem, Schweitzer proposed forgiving up to $12,000 of student debt for
students who agreed to teach in Montana for four years or more. He also proposed
training workers at two-year colleges of technology and Montana State University’s
engineering school.
Bob Brown took a much different perspective on the economy than Schweitzer.
Brown claimed that Montana’s economy had been disrupted in the 1980s by poor
Democratic leadership, and that it was improving by 2004 thanks to traditional
Republican policies of reducing taxes and government regulations. He acknowledged that
further steps had to be taken to advance the economy. Brown believed that Montana’s
future economic security depended on the development of natural resources such as coal,
oil, gas, wind energy, and biofuels. Newer and cleaner technologies, he predicted, would
allow for dramatically increased production of these resources, particularly coal, so as to
create jobs (13,000 jobs, he boldly estimated at one point) and increase energy
independence. Schweitzer did not oppose natural resource development, but he tended to
focus more on developing incentives to encourage ethanol plants, hydrogen power
projects, and wind power. Schweitzer did, however, object to the aspect of Brown’s plan
that would divert money from the state’s coal tax trust fund in order to upgrade
infrastructure and develop natural resources. While Brown foreswore any intention of
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raiding the trust fund to balance the budget or serve other purposes besides natural
resource development, the issue provided a rare point of clear, substantive disagreement
between the candidates.
Another essential aspect of Brown’s economic development plan was to rein in
taxing and spending policies. Brown advocated a cap on state spending and a new vote in
the legislature on a statewide sales tax that would reduce the state’s dependence on
income taxes. While he refused to rule out tax increases, Brown made it clear that they
would be a last resort; “rather than looking for more taxes, I would look for more
taxpayers,” he explained.253 Schweitzer countered that Brown and other Montana
Republicans lacked credibility on tax issues because the Martz Administration oversaw
tax increases on cigarettes, lodging, and rental cars. Schweitzer also claimed that Brown
had supported tax increases on 73 occasions, although that figure included multiple votes
on the statewide sales taxes (intended by its supporters to decrease overall taxes) and
similarly complicated votes.

Prescription Drug Reimportation
Brian Schweitzer continued to emphasize prescription drug reimportation in the
2004 gubernatorial campaign, as he had in the 2000 Senate campaign. In the intervening
four years, he lamented, “All we have gotten from state government is excuses,
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obstruction, and inaction” on the issue.254 To emphasize the need for a drug reimportation
plan, Schweitzer set up a press conference in October featuring Pfizer Vice President
Peter Rost. At the press conference, Rost dismissed claims that reimported drugs are
unsafe; “The thrust is that reimportation had been done safely within Europe for over
twenty years and can be done safely here right now.”255
Bob Brown responded to the Schweitzer campaign’s drug reimportation plan by
stating that he was in favor of finding ways to obtain affordable prescription drugs for
Montanans, but that it was irresponsible for gubernatorial candidates to advocate
violating federal law. “Lawlessness is not leadership,” he was fond of saying. Instead
Brown vowed that as governor he would petition Congress to change laws prohibiting
prescription drug reimportation. Yet he damaged his credibility on the prescription drug
issue when, at a debate late in the campaign, he referred to it as “really not a relevant
issue now.”256 He meant that the issue had been more relevant four years prior when
Schweitzer was pursuing a Senate seat from which he could reshape federal policy, but
Brown’s comment gave voters the impression that he cared less than Schweitzer about
providing affordable prescription drugs.
State Ballot Initiatives
In addition to choosing a president, governor, and other public officials, Montana
voters were faced in 2004 with decisions on several controversial state ballot initiatives.
One of these initiatives was an attempt to end the state’s ban on cyanide mining. Montana
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was the only state in the nation to enforce such a ban. Brown supported ending it because
he believed that this would help the mining industry to grow and revitalize southwestern
Montana. This position was in line with his stated approach to environmental issues,
which was that he would not “want to protect the environment to the extent that we
foreclose on any job opportunities.”257 Schweitzer did not take a position on the cyanide
mining issue.
Another important state ballot initiative proposed an amendment to the state
constitution, defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman. The amendment
passed with 67% of the vote. Schweitzer and Brown supported the amendment, although
Schweitzer opposed a similar amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Agreement on Divisive Partisan Issues Focuses the Gubernatorial Election on
Leadership
“I don’t think there were really great areas of disagreement” between the two
major gubernatorial candidates, said Bob Brown. He added, “I don’t think [Schweitzer]
wanted any big policy differences.… [His] powerful theme was, ‘It’s time for new
leadership.’”258 Indeed, Schweitzer agreed with Brown on many of the major issues that
divided Republicans and Democrats on the national level, including gun rights and samesex marriage. His conservative positions on these critical issues, which aligned with the
majority of Montana voters, deprived Republicans of traditional attack lines at a time
when national partisan sentiments were most pronounced due to the simultaneous
presidential election. Moreover, by removing divisive partisan issues from the campaign
debate, Schweitzer was able to focus the election on the more general and advantageous
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theme of leadership. Montana voters, Schweitzer explained, “were looking for a chief
executive of the state. And if you take some things off the table that make them nervous
about your values, now they’re looking for the most competent guy.”259 It is impossible
to know to what extent Schweitzer adapted or enunciated his conservative views on
divisive partisan issues in order to remove them from debate. It is clear, however, that his
approach helped Schweitzer to cultivate bipartisan appeal and keep the campaign focused
on leadership.
Lack of Contentious Issues Leads the Brown Campaign to Focus on Trivialities
Brian Schweitzer and Bob Brown’s agreement on divisive partisan issues led the
Brown campaign, in desperation, to seize on several issues that appeared petty and
irrelevant to voters. The most prominent example involved Schweitzer’s purchase of a
truck in Idaho. In June 2004, Kalispell auto dealer Greg Scarff faxed to other Montana
auto dealers receipts from Schweitzer’s purchase of a truck in Idaho earlier that year. The
Idaho dealership, Dave Smith Motors, was notorious among Northwestern dealers for
attracting regional customers with exceptionally low prices. In 1998, the dealers’
resentment led them to threaten a boycott of Chrysler unless the company began
providing fewer cars to Dave Smith Motors.
After hearing about Schweitzer’s out-of-state purchase, the Brown campaign
adopted it as an example of Schweitzer’s alleged hypocrisy. Brown, who vowed that he
had never bought a vehicle out of state, ridiculed Schweitzer for promoting the growth of
Montana small businesses at the same time that he bypassed them for major purchases.
As a result, said Brown, “There is a question of Brian Schweitzer’s credibility. People
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need to trust their governor as well as agree with him. This incident casts doubt on our
ability to trust Brian.”260 Dave Lewis went so far as to hold a press event at the Helena
car dealership where he purchased his new pickup truck. “I’m proud I could buy locally,”
Lewis announced. “As a candidate for lieutenant governor, I know I can’t sell Montana
and Montana products if I sell out by spending my money out of state.”261
The Schweitzer campaign dismissed the controversy as trivial. The campaign
even converted it to Schweitzer’s advantage by portraying his purchase as an act of
admirable fiscal responsibility. Schweitzer produced documents showing that he had
saved between $5,000 and $13,000 by purchasing his truck in Idaho, insisting that he had
acted as any other Montanan would in seeking the best deal available. When urged to
apologize for the purchase,
I said, ‘Like hell I’m going to do that. It was a good business decision to do that, and as
my job in running a business is to buy for the lowest price and sell for the highest price,
that’s my job. And as governor of Montana I’ll run Montana the same way.’262

The Schweitzer campaign also questioned the relevance of this controversy to the
gubernatorial campaign; why not instead discuss important policy issues such as health
care, prescription drugs, education, and the economy? Many observers agreed that the
campaign needed to focus on more important matters of governance,263 leading
Schweitzer to conclude that the truck purchase issue “hurt [supporters of the Brown
campaign], not helped them.”264
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Likewise, in early October Brown released his tax records and challenged
Schweitzer to do the same. When Schweitzer refused on grounds that, until elected, his
taxes were matters of private record, the Brown campaign ran advertisements suggesting
Schweitzer had something to hide. Then, in the last weeks of the campaign, the
Republican Governors Association released television and radio advertisements alleging
that Schweitzer was unethical in his business practices. The ads featured three people
whom allegedly had been sold wet bales of hay by Schweitzer, leading them to describe
him as “unethical.” It later turned out that one of the persons featured in the ad was a
cousin of Brown’s. For his part, Brown disapproved of the ads. The Brown campaign,
however, had no say in the matter because campaign finance laws forbid it from
coordinating with the RGA, as a so-called 527 organization.265 Brown preferred focusing
on state issues and maintaining a positive message. “If I was putting political ads together
myself,” he said, “that’s not how I’d go about them.”266
Controversies such as the ones just described created a bitter campaign. Both
candidates initially attempted to preclude a negative campaign when they drafted and
signed pledges in Summer 2004 to refrain from negative attacks on their opponent, unless
the other candidate first broke his pledge. The Brown campaign believed that the
Schweitzer campaign broke this pledge with its website attacks on Brown’s lobbying
activities for the Columbia Falls Aluminum Company. Schweitzer, on the other hand,
said Brown broke his pledge by focusing on the car and ethics controversies described
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above. Angrily, Schweitzer characterized a negative ad late in the campaign as “a
desperate act from a desperate career politician who, after 26 years in Helena, has
absolutely no record to run on and no ideas for the future of our state.”267 Schweitzer’s
bitterness lasted well beyond the gubernatorial campaign, when he described the Brown
campaign in early 2006 as follows:
Their campaign was negative, from beginning to end. All negative about me.… [Instead]
of trying to sum up the case, ‘Vote for our candidate,’ they summed up the case, ‘Vote
against the other guy’…. They ran 90% of their points negative on me…. They just
claimed that I was a bad guy and [voters] should not trust me. It wasn’t even issues that
they came after me for.268

Frankly, though, Schweitzer’s characterization of the Brown campaign does not comport
with newspaper and observer accounts. Johnson, for one, called Schweitzer’s
characterization an “overstatement,” and noted that the Brown campaign had produced
positive policy statements on many issues.269
The Presidential Election Minimally Impacts the 2004 Montana Gubernatorial
Election
As was the case in Vermont, there was very little evidence to suggest that the
2004 presidential election significantly impacted that year’s Montana gubernatorial
election. Unlike Vermont’s gubernatorial election, however, the candidate whose
presidential election counterpart was expected to win Montana’s vote, Republican Bob
Brown, made no effort to link his opponent to unpopular Democratic presidential
candidate John Kerry.
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Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections in Recent Montana History
Recent Montana electoral history suggested that the presidential election would
not play an important role in the simultaneous 2004 gubernatorial election. According to
Bob Brown, Montana’s “history shows no consistency between the candidate who carries
the state for president and the candidate who carries the state for governor.”270 Indeed,
since 1964 Montanans have chosen gubernatorial and presidential candidates of the same
party on only three occasions. More recent elections, however, indicate that a new trend
might be emerging; Republican gubernatorial and presidential candidates were both
chosen in three of the past five election cycles, 1988, 1996, and 2000.
2004: Montana’s Gubernatorial Election Overshadows the Presidential Election
It was clear from the outset that 2004 presidential politics would be muted in
Montana. According to Professor Wilson, “Democrats basically conceded the state well
in advance of the election” because they knew that President George W. Bush would
easily win its three electoral votes.271 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry was
widely perceived as too liberal for Montana’s tastes. “People in Montana, the only way
they would like someone like John Kerry would be for breakfast,” said Bob Brown. “He
just doesn’t fit here.”272 Consequently, there was minimal presidential campaign presence
from either side. Kerry’s sister was the only representative of either campaign to visit
Montana, and the only time Montanans saw ads for the presidential race was when the
ads were featured on national cable channels such as Fox News, MSNBC, and CNN. It
was hardly surprising that the presidential election failed to swallow the simultaneous
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gubernatorial election, given the subdued nature of the state presidential campaign. “The
coattails of Bush were negated by the state issues that were more important,” according
to Brown.273 The available evidence supports this assessment.
The Gubernatorial Candidates Choose Not to Emphasize National Politics
Some participants in the gubernatorial election expected national politics to play a
very prominent role. Sirota typified this expectation by writing, “With gay marriage,
medical marijuana, and environmental initiatives on the ballot, the Republicans would be
relentless in calling Schweitzer a Kerry clone.”274 Yet in striking contrast to Peter
Clavelle’s campaign for the Vermont governorship, the Brown campaign chose not to
“nationalize” the gubernatorial election or attempt to tie its opponent to Democratic
presidential candidate John Kerry. “I can’t remember that national issues, even including
the Iraq situation, were important in this campaign at all,” said Brown, as if it were the
first time the thought had crossed his mind.275 Besides featuring Kerry’s name in perhaps
a campaign press release or two, Brown recalled, “I didn’t attempt to tie Schweitzer to
John Kerry.”276 Nor was there strong pressure to do so, according to Brown.
We had people, old friends and political advisers and that sort of thing, and we had more
than one bull session, and I’m sure it probably came up. But it never emerged as an
important part of our campaign strategy.277

Surely, the Brown campaign resisted temptations to link Schweitzer to Kerry in part
because it strongly doubted the efficacy of such a strategy. Brown was quite aware of
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Montana’s history of electing gubernatorial and presidential candidates of different
parties in the same election year. He also realized that Schweitzer was too clever to align
closely with Kerry and his policies. Brown speculated, “I think Schweitzer smelled that
[Kerry was very unpopular in Montana] and he probably deliberately tried to make it as
difficult as possible to tie him in any way to the Democratic national ticket.”278
The Schweitzer campaign, for its part, also believed that national politics had little
relevance to the gubernatorial election. “Voters tend to look at state issues separately
from national issues,” noted Stern.279 Schweitzer also believed strongly in the need to
focus on state issues. He said,
A governor doesn’t need to talk about national issues. The governor doesn’t have any
juicy national issues. There’s no reason for you to even proffer an opinion about defense
issues, and national taxation policies, and things like [abortion] choice or not, because
those are all national issues.280

Thus, the 2004 presidential election figured minimally in that year’s gubernatorial
campaign because both candidates believed that it was irrelevant to the state issues that
were most important to voters.
Assessing Schweitzer’s Gubernatorial Election Victory
On November 2, 2004, Brian Schweitzer defeated Bob Brown in the Montana
gubernatorial election by a margin of 51% to 47%. (A small percentage of the vote went
to the Green and Libertarian candidates.) Despite Schweitzer’s rather narrow margin of
victory, he had been the favorite throughout virtually the entire campaign. Yet this hardly
indicates that campaign strategies of the Schweitzer campaign and the Montana
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Democratic Party were irrelevant. In fact, it is reasonable to conclude that campaign
strategies were essential to preserving Schweitzer’s lead and ultimately providing his
narrow margin of victory.
Polling Shows Schweitzer Leading Brown During the Gubernatorial Campaign
Every significant poll conducted during the gubernatorial campaign showed Brian
Schweitzer leading Bob Brown, by varying margins. The earliest poll, conducted in
December 2003 by Mason-Dixon Polling & Research, had Schweitzer leading Brown
42% to 39%, with 19% of respondents undecided. Mason-Dixon Managing Director Brad
Coker attributed Schweitzer’s early lead to his status as the best-known candidate in the
race at the time. Indeed, the Mason-Dixon poll showed Schweitzer with 35% favorable
name recognition, 14% unfavorable, 43% neutral, and only 8% of respondents failing to
recognize his name. Brown, on the other hand, was known favorably to 28% of
respondents and unfavorably to only 6%, while 43% were neutral and 23% did not
recognize his name.281 It is a testament to Schweitzer’s hard-fought 2000 Senate race and
constant activity around Montana in the years afterward that he was familiar to more
voters entering 2004 than a twenty-six-year state legislator and sitting secretary of state.
Later polling continued to show Schweitzer with a healthy lead over Brown,
although sometimes by widely varying margins. A Mason-Dixon poll released in late
October gave Schweitzer a 48% to 43% advantage, while 8% of respondents were
undecided.282 Just days before that poll’s release, a Montana State University-Billings
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poll presented quite different results. The MSU poll showed Schweitzer leading Brown
43% to 28%, with 27% of respondents undecided.283 Given the wide discrepancy between
this poll and others conducted throughout the campaign, Thielman dismissed it as
inaccurate. “I don’t want to disparage the students and their polling,” he said, “but this is
not a professional poll and doesn’t match with any of the other polling, public or private,
that we’ve seen.”284
Schweitzer’s Decisive Monetary Advantage
One of Brian Schweitzer’s most important advantages throughout the
gubernatorial campaign was his superior campaign funding. In total, Schweitzer raised
nearly $1.5 million, spending all but $95,000, while Brown collected $1.2 million and
spent all but $3,000. These figures were skewed by a late surge on Brown’s part; in the
last twenty-five days of the campaign, Brown raised $83,248 to Schweitzer’s $40,545.285
By that point, though, it was difficult for Brown to compete with Schweitzer, as
Schweitzer outspent him by an almost two to one margin in the critical months of
September and October.
Complicating the fundraising activities of Schweitzer and Brown was the fact that
the candidates were often competing for a very similar pool of donors. According to the
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Great Falls Tribune, both received most of their contributions from business owners,
retirees, lawyers, teachers, and farmers.286 Moreover, most of their contributions came
from the same six cities: Billings, Missoula, Bozeman, Helena, Great Falls, and
Whitefish.287 There were important differences in their fundraising patterns, though. As
of early September, Schweitzer had attracted 8,500 donors to Brown’s 3,700. Out-of-state
contributors, many of them donors to his 2000 Senate race, provided Schweitzer with
$214,000, or 19% of his total campaign funds. Meanwhile, Brown was able to attract
only 8.5% of his contributions from outside Montana.288 Schweitzer boasted of his
fundraising successes as evidence of broad and diverse support for his candidacy. “I’ve
got a wide band of support,” he said. “I have Republicans and Democrats and
Independents. We have hundreds of people, maybe thousands of people, who have never
contributed to a campaign before.”289
Contributions of the Montana Democratic Party
As a candidate intent on distancing himself from partisan politics and portraying
himself as a government outsider with broad bipartisan support, Brian Schweitzer did not
rely heavily on the Montana Democratic Party to deliver his electoral victory. The party
helped with many basic aspects of the campaign, including organization, leaflets,
canvassing, and get-out-the-vote efforts. Moreover, it had the ability to raise money
indirectly for Schweitzer’s campaign and attack his opponent without reflecting directly
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on Schweitzer. For the most part, however, Schweitzer “distanced himself from the
formal [Democratic] Party in Helena.”290 This was indicated by Schweitzer’s decision to
establish campaign headquarters in his hometown of Whitefish, two hundred miles
outside of Helena. It was a very unusual move for a statewide candidate to run his
campaign out of anywhere but the state capitol. Yet this decision was an important
symbol of Schweitzer’s intention to run as an individual not bound by partisan
constraints. “We didn’t call on them,” Schweitzer said dismissively of the Montana
Democratic Party’s role in his gubernatorial campaign.
We had our own volunteers. We built a base of Brian supporters, not a base of Democrats
who were showing up for Brian…. It looked a lot different than the traditional
Democratic supporters. We went out and mined new people to get excited about politics.
A great part of the people who worked for us had never been involved in politics in their
lives.291

While the Montana Democratic Party provided logistical assistance to the
Schweitzer campaign, the above evidence indicates that it was not an essential strategic
partner in the Schweitzer gubernatorial campaign. This level of involvement differs from
the Vermont gubernatorial election, in which the Vermont Republican Party cooperated
intimately with the Douglas campaign. Thus, even if campaign strategies are to be
deemed primary factors in state voter choices of gubernatorial and presidential candidates
of different parties in the same election year, in some cases the strategies are not
attributable to the efforts of state party organizations. This study’s thesis therefore must
be qualified to reflect the varying contributions of state party organizations.
Evaluating the Significance of Schweitzer Campaign Strategies
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The Schweitzer campaign believed it had a strong chance of victory from the
outset of the campaign. “We were in about as good a position as you could possibly ask
for,” Stern reflected.292 Indeed, Brian Schweitzer was an excellent gubernatorial
candidate who far exceeded expectations in his only previous race, while his opponent
was a reluctant candidate hamstrung by party disunity and a backlash against Republican
state governance. Although the presidential election did not seem to have any coattail
effects in the gubernatorial election, Schweitzer was quite possibly the beneficiary of a
late surge toward Democratic candidates in Montana. An October poll showed that 49%
of respondents planned to vote for a Republican candidate in the upcoming legislative
elections, while 35% said they would vote for a Democrat and 13% were undecided.293
Given the fact that Democrats won control of the legislature in the November elections, it
would appear that voters broke heavily toward Democratic candidates at the end of the
campaign. Thus, the Schweitzer campaign had several independent factors pointing
toward victory, including voters’ strong preference for change in state leadership, an
excellent candidate, a weak opponent, and the minimal attention paid to the presidential
election by Montana’s largely pro-Bush electorate. Yet the foregoing analysis suggests
that it would be a mistake to discount the role of gubernatorial campaign strategies in
shaping the final election results.
As was the case in Vermont, Montana’s winning gubernatorial candidate never
polled at his eventual vote percentage before Election Day. In Brian Schweitzer’s case,
his 51% of the vote made for a much narrower margin of victory than Jim Douglas
enjoyed in Vermont. Schweitzer’s slim victory meant that campaign strategies had all the
292

Stern, op cit.

293

Anez, “Shows.”

more opportunity to influence the outcome of the election than Douglas’ did in his race.
As delineated above, the Schweitzer campaign introduced several brilliant tactics that
may have accounted for voters’ eventual decisions to support his candidacy. Projecting
the “Brawny Rancher” image was important in gaining voters’ trust while reinforcing the
populist, outsider theme of the Schweitzer campaign. The Schweitzer campaign also
succeeded in gaining voters’ trust by identifying him with hunting and fishing issues. (Its
success is indicated by the previously mentioned Schweitzer campaign poll in which
respondents stated that Schweitzer “shared their values” more than Brown.) Instead of
accepting a defensive stance on hunting and fishing issues, given Republicans’ traditional
advantages on them, Schweitzer masterfully outflanked his Republican opponent by
focusing on land access. While appealing strongly to conservative gamesmen as the most
aggressive protector of hunting and fishing rights in the race, Schweitzer also appealed to
his Democratic base through land access because his plan benefited the environment and
maintained state control of public lands. With hunting and fishing issues, as well as with
gay marriage, Schweitzer cleverly removed from the gubernatorial election debate some
of the most divisive partisan issues often used by Republicans to demonize Democratic
opponents. While it is difficult to catalogue these positions as campaign strategies
because they may simply represent honest enunciations of the candidate’s deeply held
convictions, it is fair to say that Schweitzer was forthright in advertising these views.
Quite likely, he did this to assure Montana voters that he shared their core values. Most
significantly, though, by taking these divisive issues off the table, Schweitzer ensured a
campaign focused less on contentious issues and more on the general theme of leadership
that was advantageous to his candidacy.

The Schweitzer campaign dominated the gubernatorial election’s core issue,
leadership, thanks in large part to its effective campaign strategies. Foremost among these
strategies were tying Bob Brown to the Republican political establishment, portraying
Schweitzer as a government outsider, and selecting Republican John Bohlinger to run on
the Democratic ticket for lieutenant governor. The Schweitzer campaign managed to
“cleverly and effectively” tie Brown to: the Republican legislature’s unpopular 1997
electricity industry deregulation, although he was not a member of the legislature at the
time; the Judy Martz Administration, although he was not a member of it and had little
affinity for Martz; and the Republican political establishment, although he was among its
most moderate, independent members. Given the strong antiestablishment current among
voters at this time, it was a tremendous coup for the Schweitzer campaign to
convincingly argue these tenuous ties, to the detriment of Brown’s candidacy.
Moreover, the Schweitzer campaign was able to further capitalize on
antiestablishment sentiment by effectively portraying Schweitzer as a government
outsider. Since Schweitzer had never held political office, this should not have been very
difficult. Yet he reinforced this perception cleverly, by distancing himself from the
formal Democratic Party apparatus, holding a lieutenant governor’s audition, and
campaigning differently from typical candidates in terms of dress, speech, and
enthusiasm. Lastly, and perhaps most important, was Schweitzer’s selection of John
Bohlinger as his running mate. This move unmistakably signaled to voters that
Schweitzer was serious about bipartisan governance and defying political conventions. It
also had other, less obvious consequences beneficial to the Schweitzer campaign. First,
creating a bipartisan ticket deprived Brown of his general election trump card, his

reputation and record of bipartisan cooperation. Second, Bohlinger’s selection helped
Schweitzer to gain support in Billings, the most electorally significant city in Montana
and typically a Republican stronghold.
Like the Vermont gubernatorial election, the Montana gubernatorial election did
not produce exit polling in which voters were asked to assess the importance of
gubernatorial campaign strategies and other factors behind their votes. While there is thus
no way to scientifically measure the impact of gubernatorial campaign strategies in the
2004 Montana gubernatorial election, there are substantial indications that they played
the decisive role in Brian Schweitzer’s bare-majority victory. Certainly, factors
independent of campaign strategies contributed to Schweitzer’s victory, including voter
dissatisfaction with Republican governance, Schweitzer’s attractive personality and
moderate political philosophy, Brown’s uninspired candidacy, and Republican disunity.
Voters were aware of these factors early in the campaign, or at least well before the very
end. Yet Schweitzer’s final share of the vote, 51%, was not reflected in any of the polling
done throughout the campaign; he peaked in October at 48%.
Why did the necessary amount of voters decide at the end of the gubernatorial
campaign to support Schweitzer? Might it have been that voters, as Stern suggested,
opted for the populist image of the “Brawny Rancher” for lack of any substantive voting
basis? Might they have been convinced by the Schweitzer campaign’s arguments that
Brown was an establishment politician incapable of bringing meaningful change to
Helena, or by the argument that Schweitzer was actually capable of bringing such a
change? Were they impressed by the symbolism of an unprecedented bipartisan ticket?
Were they convinced that Schweitzer was the more credible protector of hunting and

fishing rights? These, too, are all distinct possibilities, and it is hard to see how they
could be ruled out as contributors to the gubernatorial election outcome. They were also
products of a very focused, perceptive, adept gubernatorial campaign on behalf of Brian
Schweitzer.
Thus, the 2004 Montana gubernatorial election provides an important test of the
thesis that campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state party
organizations are the primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and
presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year. The evidence
shows that this study’s thesis must be qualified to reflect the varying contributions of
state party organizations to the development and implementation of gubernatorial
campaign strategies. More importantly, though, the evidence does not provide a
concrete basis for evaluating the essence of this study’s thesis, that campaign
strategies are primarily responsible for mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections. Yet the lack of a concrete basis for
evaluation does not invalidate this study’s thesis. This study has uncovered many
important indications that its thesis is for the most part valid.

Chapter V: Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Study

This study tests the thesis that campaign strategies of
gubernatorial candidates and their state party organizations are the
primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and
presidential candidates of different parties in the same election year. It
does so by presenting data interpretations, media analysis, and case
studies featuring personal interviews with campaign participants and
observers.

The previous chapter has already indicated that this study’s thesis necessitates
qualification to reflect the varying roles of state party organizations in developing and
implementing gubernatorial campaign strategies. Drawing firm conclusions on the
validity of this study’s thesis is further complicated by conflicting evidence on the
influence of presidential coattails. Recent electoral data presented in Chapter II show that
mixed partisan outcomes occur more frequently in separated versus simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections. Yet the explanation for this disparity is elusive.
The preceding case studies of Vermont and Montana’s 2004 gubernatorial elections
exhibit no evidence of significant presidential coattail effects. Moreover, data presented
later in this chapter indicate that, while presidential elections produce much higher
gubernatorial vote totals in simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial elections, they do
not exert discernible coattail effects. In fact, the most recent electoral data actually
indicate that gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party improve their
vote percentages in simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential
elections, while outperforming gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning presidential
party in simultaneous elections.
The intriguing disconnect between these data require further research. It also
complicates evaluations of this study’s thesis. If presidential coattails significantly
influence simultaneous gubernatorial election results, this is all the more reason to expect
that persuasive gubernatorial campaign strategies are necessary to produce mixed partisan
outcomes. On the other hand, if presidential coattails do not significantly influence
simultaneous gubernatorial elections results, there is nothing unique about the role of
gubernatorial campaign strategies in causing mixed partisan outcomes in these elections.

This is not to say that gubernatorial campaign strategies then would not be decisive and
this study’s thesis would be invalid, only that they would be equally consequential in all
cases of gubernatorial and presidential mixed partisan outcomes. As a result, there would
be no need for gubernatorial campaigns to compensate in any way for simultaneous
presidential elections. There would also be no reason to further study simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections as a unique phenomenon and no reason for state
legislators to concern themselves with scheduling gubernatorial elections so as to avoid
presidential influences.
This chapter presents conclusions on the significance of simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections, in terms of how they impact gubernatorial
campaigns and election outcomes. It draws on these conclusions to evaluate the validity
of this study’s thesis, and proposes areas for further study.

Differing Dynamics Among States With Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential
Elections

Chapter II indicates that there is no clear formula for predicting which types of
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections will produce mixed partisan
outcomes. Recent election data indicate that there are no sweeping votes for change and
no correspondence between mixed partisan outcomes in close elections or landslides.
Each election must be examined individually to determine the reasons for its outcome. As
Bob Brown explained, “If you look at the governor’s race in Kentucky or Missouri or
Florida or wherever, you’d find a set of circumstances unique to that state and that

election and that time.”294 Although only four states produced mixed partisan outcomes
in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections in 2004, they represented a
remarkably diverse set of states and political environments. Moreover, the campaigns
examined in this work’s two case studies demonstrate that presidential elections do not
affect simultaneous gubernatorial elections uniformly.
Mixed Partisan Outcomes in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections Occur in a Variety of States and Political
Environments

The occurrence of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections is not restricted to particular types of states or political
environments. The 2004 elections produced such results all over the country, including
New England (Vermont), the Mid-Atlantic (West Virginia), the South (North Carolina),
and the West (Montana). Moreover, they occurred in less populated, rural states
(Vermont, West Virginia, Montana), as well as a more populated and industrial state
(North Carolina).
In terms of political environments, mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections occurred in Republican presidential states (West
Virginia, North Carolina, Montana) and a Democratic presidential state (Vermont); they
occurred in a presidential swing state (West Virginia),295 the neighbor of a swing state
(Vermont, neighbor of New Hampshire), a weakly contested state (North Carolina), and a
virtually uncontested state (Montana); they occurred by narrow margins in gubernatorial
elections (Montana), as well as by gubernatorial landslides (West Virginia, North
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Carolina, Vermont);296 they occurred in incumbent gubernatorial elections (Vermont,
North Carolina), as well as open seat elections (West Virginia, Montana); they occurred
at the same time that the winning gubernatorial candidate’s party gained control of their
state legislatures (Montana, North Carolina), at the same time that the winning
gubernatorial candidate’s party lost control of its state legislature (Vermont), and at the
same time that the winning gubernatorial candidate’s party maintained control of its state
legislature (West Virginia).
Gubernatorial Campaigns Do Not Uniformly Incorporate Simultaneous Presidential Elections

The case studies presented earlier on Vermont and Montana’s 2004 gubernatorial
elections demonstrate that presidential elections have widely varying impacts on
simultaneous gubernatorial election campaigns. The presidential election and national
politics played a very prominent role in Vermont’s gubernatorial campaign. Democratic
gubernatorial candidate Peter Clavelle made Republican Governor Jim Douglas’ support
of Republican President George W. Bush and the Iraq war a central campaign issue
during the campaign’s final month. Clavelle’s first television ad featured a car with a
bumper sticker for the Bush-Cheney presidential ticket alongside a Douglas for Governor
bumper sticker. Clavelle’s first Internet ad featured a caricature of Douglas in cowboy
dress, speaking in a thick Texas accent about his support for the Bush ticket.
Rhetorically, Clavelle and his campaign representatives told voters that they could not
support Douglas’ candidacy without also supporting Bush’s candidacy.
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In Montana, Democrat Brian Schweitzer defeated Republican Bob Brown, 51% to 47%; in West
Virginia, Democrat Joe Manchin defeated Republican Monty Warner, 64% to 34%; in North Carolina,
Democrat Mike Easley defeated Republican Patrick Ballantine, 56% to 34%; in Vermont, Republican Jim
Douglas defeated Democrat Peter Clavelle, 59% to 38%.

By contrast, the campaign of Montana Republican gubernatorial candidate Bob
Brown did not attempt to tie Democratic opponent Brian Schweitzer to Democratic
presidential nominee John Kerry, despite Kerry’s unpopularity in the state. Brown also
did not emphasize national political issues, such as the Iraq war. Schweitzer, for his part,
did not discuss the presidential election and national politics. He was not a visible
supporter of Kerry, whereas Governor Douglas served as chairman of the Bush-Cheney
campaign in Vermont.

Conclusions on the Relevance of Presidential Elections to Simultaneous Gubernatorial
Elections

Analysis of simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections,
particularly voting data from the 2004 elections, lead to two important
conclusions about the relevance of presidential elections to
simultaneous gubernatorial elections. First, the total votes cast for
governor increases dramatically when coinciding with a presidential
election. Second, the increase in votes cast for governor during a
presidential election year does not confer a detectable benefit, or
coattail effect, on the gubernatorial candidate of a state’s winning
presidential party. The second conclusion, as discussed earlier in this
chapter, conflicts with the evidence presented in Chapter II

demonstrating that mixed partisan outcomes are more likely to occur in
separated versus simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections.
Thus, further study is required to explain this conflict before any
definitive conclusions can be reached on the influence of presidential
coattails on simultaneous gubernatorial election results.
Increases in Gubernatorial Voting
Presidential elections have a clear and dramatic impact on the total votes cast for
governor. In simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections, the total votes cast for
governor are nearly identical to the number cast for president; in 2004, 15,225,053 votes
were cast for governor in states that also cast 15,371,615 votes for president. The
gubernatorial vote total in states with simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
elections thus equaled 99% of the total votes cast in those states for president. This is in
sharp contrast to states with separated gubernatorial and presidential elections; in these
states, 70,241,301 votes were cast for governor in elections held between 2001 and 2003,
whereas 106,774,207 votes were cast in these states for president in 2004. The
gubernatorial vote total in states with separated gubernatorial and presidential elections
thus equaled only 65.8% of the total votes cast in those states for president. This means
that gubernatorial voting rates increased by more than half in simultaneous versus
separated gubernatorial elections. (See Chart 1 for gubernatorial and presidential vote
total comparisons in simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential
elections, 2001-2004.)

Chart 1. Gubernatorial and Presidential Vote Total Comparisons in Separated Versus Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential
Elections, 2001-2004

Separated Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California*
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Mass.
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
S. Carolina
S. Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia

Election
Year
2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2003
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2002
2002
2001
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2002
2001

Presidential
Vote Total
1,883,415
312,598
2,012,585
1,054,945
12,450,804
2,129,630
1,578,769
7,609,810
3,298,790
429,013
598,376
5,274,322
1,506,908
1,187,756
1,795,860
1,943,106
740,752
2,384,238
2,912,388
4,839,252
2,828,387
1,152,145
778,186
829,587
3,611,691
756,304
7,448,266
5,627,903
1,463,758
1,836,782
5,765,764
437,134
1,619,898
388,215
2,437,319
7,410,749
3,198,367

Gub'torial
Vote Total
1,366,603
231,484
1,226,111
805,332
8,657,915
1,412,602
1,022,942
5,058,272
2,025,861
376,656
411,477
3,538,883
1,025,802
818,688
1,083,443
1,407,842
494,578
1,693,014
2,192,878
3,177,565
2,252,473
894,487
480,991
504,079
2,185,027
484,229
4,579,078
3,228,617
1,035,620
1,257,549
3,582,560
331,834
1,106,562
334,559
1,624,087
4,553,982
1,871,411

Presidential
Minus Gub'l
-516,812
-81,114
-786,474
-249,613
-3,792,889
-717,028
-1,106,688
-2,551,538
-1,272,929
-52,357
-186,899
-1,735,439
-481,106
-369,068
-712,417
-535,264
-246,174
-691,224
-719,510
-1,661,687
-575,914
-257,658
-297,195
-325,508
-1,426,664
-272,075
-2,869,188
-2,399,286
-428,138
-579,233
-2,183,204
-105,300
-513,336
-53,656
-813,232
-2,856,767
-1,326,956

Gub'l % of
Prs'l Vote
72.6
74.1
60.9
76.3
69.5
66.3
64.8
66.5
61.4
87.8
68.8
67.1
68.1
68.9
60.3
72.5
66.8
71.0
75.3
65.7
79.6
77.6
61.8
60.8
60.5
64.0
61.5
57.4
70.8
68.5
62.1
75.9
68.3
86.2
66.6
61.5
58.5

2002
Wisconsin
2,997,007
1,720,749
-1,276,258
57.4
Wyoming
2002
243,428
185,459
-57,969
76.2
Totals
106,774,207 70,241,301 -36,532,906
65.8
* California held a special recall vote for governor in 2003. Its regular elections take place in even nonpresidential years (2002, 2006).

Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections
Delaware
Indiana
Missouri
Montana
N. Hampshire
N. Carolina
N. Dakota
Utah
Vermont
Washington
W. Virginia
Totals

Election
Year
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004
2004

Presidential
Vote Total
375,190
2,468,002
2,731,364
450,434
677,662
3,501,007
312,833
927,844
312,309
2,859,084
755,886
15,371,615

Gub'torial
Vote Total
365,008
2,448,503
2,719,599
446,146
665,539
3,486,688
309,873
919,960
309,285
2,810,058
744,394
15,225,053

Presidential
Minus Gub'l
-10,182
-19,499
-11,765
-4,288
-12,123
-14,319
-2,960
-7,884
-3,024
-49,026
-11,493
-146,562

Gub'l % of
Prs'l Vote
97.3
99.2
99.6
99.0
98.2
99.6
99.1
99.2
99.0
98.3
98.5
99.0

Additional Voters in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections Do Not Create a Presidential Coattail Effect

The Douglas campaign, according to Lunderville, was concerned in 2004 that increased turnout among partisan
Democrats for the presidential election “could have the effect of swallowing the governor’s campaign” in Vermont. Indeed, the
disparity between gubernatorial vote totals in presidential and non-presidential years indicates that a large segment of the
presidential-year gubernatorial electorate, approximately 33%, turns out only because it is motivated by the presidential
election. Logic suggests that these voters are less knowledgeable and passionate about the gubernatorial election than the twothirds of the presidential electorate that also turns out for separated gubernatorial elections. Logic further suggests that less
knowledgeable and passionate gubernatorial voters motivated primarily by presidential politics will be heavily influenced by
presidential politics when deciding their gubernatorial votes. In other words, presidential year gubernatorial voters seem
much more likely than off-year gubernatorial voters to vote for the same party in gubernatorial and presidential elections.
Surprisingly, the evidence does not support this logic.
Judging by the most recent electoral data, gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party actually
benefit more from simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections than gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning
presidential party. (See Chart 2, listing state votes for gubernatorial candidates of the winning and losing presidential parties
in separated versus simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections.) In gubernatorial elections held from 2001 to 2003,
gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning presidential party received 47.9% of the gubernatorial vote, compared with
45.9% for gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party. In 2004, gubernatorial candidates of a state’s
winning presidential party received 48.7% of the gubernatorial vote, compared with 49.7% for gubernatorial candidates of a
state’s losing presidential party. This data indicate that voters were not more likely in a presidential election year to base their
gubernatorial votes on presidential preferences than they were in non-presidential years. In fact, quite the opposite appears to
have been the case. The vote percentage of gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party not only increased in
a presidential election year, it exceeded that of gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning presidential party.
Moreover, gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party exceeded their party’s presidential vote
total in 2004, while gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning presidential party fell short of their party’s presidential vote
total. In these elections, gubernatorial candidates of a state’s winning presidential party earned 7,407,084 votes, equal to
85.3% of the state presidential winner’s 8,681,482 votes. Gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party, on the
other hand, earned 7,564,986 votes, equal to 115.8% of the state presidential loser’s 6,535,504 votes.
Chart 2. State Votes for Gubernatorial Candidates of the Winning and Losing Presidential Parties in Separated Versus Simultaneous
Elections

Separated Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections

Elxn

Presidential

Gubernat'l

Pr'l Winner

Win.Pr.Party

Year

Vote Totals

Vote Totals

Vote Totals

Gu.VoteTotals

Vote Totals

Gu.VoteTotals

%

1,366,603

1,176,394

672,225 (R)

57.1

693,933

669,105 (D)

96.4

1,883,415

Party
%

Pr'l Loser

Los.Pr.Party

Party

Alabama

2002

Alaska

2002

312,598

231,484

190,889

129,279 (R)

67.7

111,025

94,216 (D)

84.9

Arizona

2002

2,012,585

1,226,111

1,104,294

544,465 (R)

49.3

893,524

566,284 (D)

63.4

Arkansas

2002

1,054,945

805,332

572,898

427,082 (R)

74.5

469,953

378,250 (D)

80.5

California*

2003

12,450,804

8,657,915

6,745,485

2,724,874 (D)

40.4

5,509,826

4,206,284 (R)

76.3

Colorado

2002

2,129,630

1,412,602

1,101,255

884,583 (R)

80.3

1,001,732

475,373 (D)

47.5

Connec.

2002

1,578,769

1,022,942

857,488

448,984(D)

52.4

693,826

573,958 (R)

82.7

Florida

2002

7,609,810

5,058,272

3,964,522

2,856,845 (R)

72.1

3,583,544

2,201,427 (D)

61.4

Georgia

2002

3,301,867

2,025,861

1,914,254

1,041,677 (R)

54.4

1,366,149

937,062 (D)

68.6

Hawaii

2002

429,013

376,656

231,708

179,647 (D)

77.5

194,191

197,009 (R)

101.5

Idaho

2002

598,376

411,477

409,235

231,566 (R)

56.6

181,098

171,711 (D)

94.8

Illinois

2002

5,274,322

3,538,883

2,891,550

1,847,040 (D)

63.9

2,345,946

1,594,960 (R)

68.0

Iowa

2002

1,506,908

1,025,802

751,957

456,612 (R)

60.7

741,898

540,449 (D)

72.8

Kansas

2002

1,187,756

818,688

736,456

376,830 (R)

51.2

434,993

441,858 (D)

101.6

Kentucky

2003

1,795,860

1,083,443

1,069,439

596,284 (R)

55.8

712,733

487,159 (D)

68.4

Louisiana

2003

1,943,106

1,407,842

1,102,169

676,484 (R)

61.4

820,299

731,358 (D)

89.2

Maine

2002

740,752

494,578

396,842

238,179 (D)

60.0

330,201

209,496 (R)

63.4

Maryland

2002

2,384,238

1,693,014

1,334,493

813,422 (D)

61.0

1,024,703

879,592 (R)

85.8

Mass.

2002

2,912,388

2,192,878

1,803,800

985,981 (D)

54.7

1,071,109

1,091,988 (R)

Michigan

2002

4,839,252

3,177,565

2,479,183

1,633,796 (D)

65.9

2,313,746

1,506,104 (R)

65.1

Minn.

2002

2,828,387

2,252,473

1,445,014

821,268 (D)

56.8

1,346,695

999,473 (R)

74.2

Miss'ppi

2003

1,152,145

894,487

684,981

470,404 (R)

68.7

457,766

409,787 (D)

89.5

101.9

Nebraska

2002

778,186

480,991

512,814

330,349 (R)

64.4

254,328

132,348 (D)

52.0

Nevada

2002

829,587

504,079

418,690

344,001 (R)

82.2

397,190

110,935 (D)

27.9

New Jer.

2001

3,611,691

2,185,027

1,911,430

1,256,853 (D)

65.8

1,670,003

928,174 (R)

55.6

New Mex.

2002

756,304

484,229

376,930

189,090 (R)

50.2

370,942

268,674 (D)

72.4

New York

2002

7,448,266

4,579,078

4,314,280

1,534,064 (D)

35.6

2,962,567

2,262,255 (R)

76.4

Ohio

2002

5,627,903

3,228,617

2,859,764

1,865,007 (R)

65.2

2,741,165

1,236,924 (D)

45.1

Oklah.

2002

1,463,758

1,035,620

959,792

441,277 (R)

46.0

503,966

448,143 (D)

88.9

Oregon

2002

1,836,782

1,257,549

943,163

618,004 (D)

65.5

866,831

581,785 (R)

67.1

Penns.

2002

5,765,764

3,582,560

2,938,095

1,913,235 (D)

65.1

2,793,847

1,589,408 (R)

56.9

Rhode I.

2002

437,134

331,834

259,760

150,147 (D)

57.8

169,046

181,687 (R)

107.5

S. Car.

2002

1,619,898

1,106,562

937,974

585,422 (R)

62.4

661,699

521,140 (D)

78.8

S Dakota

2002

388,215

334,559

232,584

189,920 (R)

81.7

149,244

140,263 (D)

94.0

Tenness.

2002

2,437,319

1,624,087

1,384,375

786,803 (R)

56.8

1,036,477

837,284 (D)

80.8

Texas

2002

7,410,749

4,553,982

4,526,917

2,632,541 (R)

58.2

2,832,704

1,819,843 (D)

64.2

Virginia

2001

3,198,367

1,871,411

1,716,959

887,234 (R)

51.7

1,454,742

984,177 (D)

67.7

Wiscon.

2002

2,997,007

1,720,749

1,489,504

800,515 (D)

53.7

1,478,120

734,779 (R)

49.7

Wyoming

2002

243,428

185,459

167,629

88,873 (R)

53.0

70,776

92,662 (D)

130.9

106,774,207

70,241,301

58,914,966

33,670,862

57.2

46,712,537

32,233,384

69.0

Totals

*California held a special recall vote for governor in 2003. Its regular elections take place in even non-presidential
years (2002,2006).
Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections

Delaware

Elxn

Presidential

Gubernat'l

Pr'l Winner

Win.Pr.Party

Party

Year

Vote Totals

Vote Totals

Vote Totals

Gu.VoteTotals

%

Pr'l Loser
Vote Totals

Gu.VoteTotals

Los.Pr.Party

Party
%

2004

375,190

365,008

200,152

185,687 (D)

92.8

171,660

167,115 (R)

97.4

Indiana

2004

2,468,002

2,448,503

1,479,438

1,302,907 (R)

88.1

969,011

1,113,879 (D)

Missouri

2004

2,731,364

2,719,599

1,455,713

Montana

2004

450,434

446,146

266,063

N. Hamp.

2004

677,662

665,539

N. Car.

2004

3,501,007

3,486,688

115.0

1,382,419 (R)

95.0

1,259,171

1,301,442 (D)

103.4

205,313 (R)

77.2

173,710

225,016 (D)

130.0

340,511

339,925 (D)

99.8

331,237

325,614 (R)

98.3

1,961,166

1,495,021 (R)

76.2

1,525,849

1,939,154 (D)

127.1

N. Dakota

2004

312,833

309,873

196,651

220,803 (R)

112.3

111,052

84,877 (D)

76.4

Utah

2004

927,844

919,960

663,742

531,190 (R)

80.0

241,199

380,359 (D)

157.7

Vermont

2004

312,309

309,285

184,067

117,327 (D)

63.7

121,180

181,540 (R)

149.8

Washing.

2004

2,859,084

2,810,058

1,510,201

1,373,361 (D)

90.9

1,304,894

1,373,232 (R)

105.2

W. Virg.

2004

755,886

744,394

423,778

253,131 (R)

59.7

326,541

472,758 (D)

144.8

15,371,615

15,225,053

8,681,482

7,407,084

85.3

6,535,504

7,564,986

115.8

Totals

Although a simultaneous presidential election produces a substantial increase in votes cast for governor over
separated elections, the above data indicate that voters motivated to turn out by the presidential election do not automatically
select gubernatorial candidates of the same party as their preferred presidential candidate. In fact, voters distinguish between
gubernatorial and presidential elections and often choose candidates of different parties. This evidence, as well as the
qualitative evidence gathered from the Vermont and Montana case studies, afford no method for explaining the consistent
advantage of separated versus simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections in producing mixed partisan outcomes, as
detailed in Chapter II.
Some speculative explanations for the mixed evidence of presidential coattails are worth considering. Perhaps
separated and simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections are trending toward similar rates of mixed partisan
outcomes and it is only showing in the most recent electoral results. This would explain why evidence from elections held
between 2001 and 2004 give different indications about presidential coattail effects in gubernatorial elections than evidence
from elections held between 1980 and 2004. Graph 3 from Chapter II indeed shows a smaller gap in recent years between
simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential elections than in previous years when the gap widened
consistently. In 2000, the rates of mixed partisan outcomes were virtually identical, and in 2004 there actually would have been
a higher rate in simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential elections had only 130 more Washingtonians
voted for Republican gubernatorial candidate Dino Rossi.
The last point highlights another important consideration; with only eleven states holding simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections today, compared with thirty-nine states that hold them separately, comparisons
between rates of mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous versus separated gubernatorial and presidential elections are highly
sensitive to the political phenomena of a single state. Perhaps the small group of eleven states now holding simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections, or even an influential one or two, weighs presidential coattails differently than most
other states and that skews the overall statistics. These are possible explanations, but the truth is not yet clear. Perhaps
election data from 2008 and beyond will provide needed clarification.

Conclusions on the Role of Gubernatorial Campaign Strategies in Producing Mixed Partisan Outcomes in Simultaneous Gubernatorial
and Presidential Elections

The mixed evidence of presidential coattail effects in simultaneous gubernatorial election complicates evaluation of
this study’s thesis. If presidential coattails do not have a significant impact on simultaneous gubernatorial election results, the
thesis would be valid yet misleading. It would then imply that campaign strategies of gubernatorial candidates and their state
party organizations are the primary factors affecting state voter choice of gubernatorial and presidential candidates of
different parties in the same election year, but not in other years. If presidential coattails do not significantly impact
simultaneous gubernatorial elections, the primary factors affecting their outcome must be the same that affect all other types
of gubernatorial elections. In other words, simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections would be unexceptional and
the thesis’ focus on them would be unnecessary.
While the above scenario would render the thesis somewhat misleading, it would not render it invalid. The thesis
could still be valid, only it would need to be put in context. A more troubling obstacle when attempting to certify the thesis’
validity is the lack of conclusive data, as well as methods for discovering them. Exit polling presents advantages toward
producing such data, but, for reasons discussed below, it is not a conclusive source of information.
The best available tools for testing the thesis are utilized in this study, including data interpretation, media analysis,
and case studies of Vermont and Montana’s 2004 gubernatorial elections featuring campaign polls and personal interviews
with campaign participants and observers. These sources of information yield valuable understandings of the campaign
strategies useful to gubernatorial candidates running in the same year that their party’s presidential candidate loses their
state’s vote.

Would Improved Exit Polling Help to Assess This Study’s Thesis?

Exit polling has two distinct advantages over other methodological tools. First, unlike polls conducted during the
gubernatorial campaign, they only elicit responses from people who have actually voted. Second, voters provide information to
exit pollsters at the end of the campaign, after they have made their election decisions and absorbed all the potential factors
influencing their votes.
Voters’ responses to several exit poll questions would help to evaluate this study’s thesis. Useful questions would
include, “How important was the gubernatorial campaign run by your preferred gubernatorial candidate and his state party
organization in influencing your vote?” “What campaign strategies were persuasive to you?” “What other factors influenced
your vote?” “Did the presidential election influence your vote for governor?”
While responses to the questions would be helpful in assessing this study’s thesis, respondent and institutional
defects prevent exit polling from providing conclusive data. In terms of respondent defects, most voters are incapable of
pinpointing with absolute certainty what factors have decisively influenced their votes. Some voters are able to identify exactly
why they voted for a given candidate; for example, they may be single-issue voters or inflexible partisans. For most voters,
however, their decisions are more complicated. Many factors contribute to human decision-making processes, consciously and
subconsciously, making it extremely difficult for any individual to comprehensively assess the interplay and consequences of
all the factors influencing their vote choices. Therefore, most voters would be unable to give exit pollsters a reliable
explanation of their choices. Voters might also be incapable of distinguishing between campaign strategies and other factors
independent of campaigns. For example, who and what is responsible for a vote cast in favor of Governor Jim Douglas based
on a favorable opinion of his personality? Does the voter learn to value Douglas’ personal traits by meeting him at campaign
events designed to familiarize voters with him, or by observing him through the media coverage inevitably given to a sitting
governor?
Voters’ vanities might also obstruct accurate exit polling. Voters typically want to believe that they are
knowledgeable and conscientious enough to reach electoral decisions on their own terms, rather than being manipulated by
gubernatorial campaign strategies. They are also likely to be too embarrassed to admit the influence of presidential coattails
on their gubernatorial votes, because their admission would make them appear uninformed and illogical. Exit polling is also
complicated by institutional defects: absentee voters are not included in exit polls; not every voter is willing to reveal his vote
or his understanding of the reasons behind it; not all respondents are honest when responding to exit pollsters.
The 2004 presidential election provides a fine example of the unreliability of exit polling. Election Day polls showed
Kerry defeating Bush, only to have Bush win the nation’s popular and electoral votes. Thus, exit polling is uniquely valuable
because it polls actual voters at the end of the election campaign, but it is not a conclusive source of information for evaluating
this study’s thesis.

Campaign Polls and Interviews Indicate the Thesis’ Validity

Although they lack the delineated advantages of exit polling, polls conducted during the gubernatorial campaign
provide valuable indications of developing voter sentiment. One of the most important contributions they make to this study is
the revelation that the final election results in Vermont and Montana’s gubernatorial elections did not take shape until the end
of the campaigns. In Vermont, Governor Douglas maintained a bare majority in polls conducted during the gubernatorial
campaign, but he finished with a much higher share of the gubernatorial vote, 59%. Brian Schweitzer never polled a majority
of respondents during his campaign, but he earned 51% of the vote on Election Day. The disparities between the candidates’
performances during the campaign and in their elections indicate that gubernatorial campaign strategies had an opportunity
to influence electoral outcomes, perhaps decisively. Other factors often cited in explaining Douglas’ victory, such as
incumbency and greater familiarity to voters than his opponent, were known from the outset of the campaign. Similarly, in
Montana Republicans were divided from the beginning of the general election campaign, Bob Brown’s weaknesses as a
candidate were immediately evident, and Schweitzer had established his personal appeal in the 2000 Senate election. Yet
campaign polls indicate that the decisive final results of these elections were not shaped early in the campaign when these
realities first emerged. Since institutional factors such as those just described were constants throughout the campaign and
gubernatorial campaign strategies are dynamic influences tailored to developing campaign conditions, it is reasonable to
conclude that these strategies made the difference when voters formed their crucial final decisions at the end of the campaigns.
Without conclusive data to determine the validity of this study’s thesis, perhaps the most useful source of
information is the assessments by the campaign observers and participants who were most intimately involved with the
gubernatorial campaigns. All interviewees for this study, including winning and losing gubernatorial candidates and their
campaign chairmen, described gubernatorial campaign strategies as very important or decisive in shaping the election results.
For example, Lunderville claimed that the Douglas campaign’s September health care advertisement discredited Clavelle so
thoroughly that it virtually ended the Clavelle campaign’s chances of victory. In Montana, Brown described Schweitzer’s
selection of Republican John Bohlinger for his ticket’s lieutenant governor candidate as the strategic maneuver that won
Schweitzer the gubernatorial election. This is not to say that, according to the interviewees, the election outcomes would have
been reversed if not for one strategy or another. Instead, they recognized the potential of gubernatorial campaign strategies to
strongly influence public opinion, and they believed that this was accomplished by the winning gubernatorial campaigns in
their races.

Which Gubernatorial Campaign Strategies Are Most Useful in Producing Mixed Partisan Outcomes in Simultaneous Gubernatorial
and Presidential Elections?

The Vermont and Montana case studies provide valuable bases for evaluating which gubernatorial campaign
strategies are most useful in producing mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. The
central challenge to a gubernatorial candidate in these circumstances is overcoming the electorate’s biases against his national
party at a time when national partisan sentiments are charged by the presidential election. Many campaign strategies evident
in the Vermont and Montana case studies were useful in overcoming voters’ national partisan biases. First, the winning
candidates muted discussions of ideology by emphasizing their interest in pragmatic, bipartisan governance. They often spoke
of themselves as moderates and bolstered these claims through their actions and rhetoric. They also focused their campaigns
on broad, unifying themes rather than divisive partisan issues; Douglas sought to build on his first-term record, particularly in
terms of promoting economic growth, and Schweitzer focused on the need for change in state leadership.
One of the most effective ways in which the winning gubernatorial candidates overcame their electorates’ national
partisan biases was by adopting symbolically important state issues typically associated with the opposing party. Governor
Douglas recognized that environmental protection was uniquely important to Vermont voters, and internal polls indicated that
it was the only issue on which he needed to distance himself from President Bush. In response, Douglas touted his lawsuit
against the Bush Administration over Midwest coal pollution and his efforts to remove phosphorous from Lake Champlain.
He spoke of these issues prominently on the campaign trail and in television commercials. Environmental protection was a
particularly safe issue for Douglas to adopt because it appealed to voters who typically would not support Republicans, but it
also did not alienate state Republican voters who tended to favor stricter environmental policies than those advanced by their
national counterparts.
Brian Schweitzer chose to emphasize hunting and fishing rights in the Montana gubernatorial election, an issue
uniquely important to state voters and typically associated with the Republican Party. Montana had the nation’s highest rate
of gamesmen, and 70% of its residents owned guns. Consequently, Schweitzer identified himself very visibly as a hunter
during the gubernatorial campaign. His campaign aired statewide an ad featuring Schweitzer and his brother carrying rifles
and wearing hunting equipment. The ad also touted his “A-” rating from the NRA Political Victory Fund on gun issues.
Substantively, Schweitzer gained a valuable advantage on hunting and fishing issues by promoting increased land access for
gamesmen. These efforts led Montanans to regard Schweitzer as the campaign’s more aggressive protector of hunting and
fishing rights. A Schweitzer campaign poll showed that Montanans believed Schweitzer shared their values more than Brown
did. Like Douglas, Schweitzer adopted an issue that appealed to voters typically unfavorable toward Democrats. At the same
time, land access did not alienate Democratic state voters because it encouraged environmental protection and maintained
state control over public lands.
Adopting symbolic issues was important because it helped Douglas and Schweitzer to gain the trust of the electorate
and avoid categorical demonization as members of parties disfavored in their states. Another important way in which the
gubernatorial candidates gained voters’ trust was by meeting with them personally. Douglas was one of the most familiar faces
in Vermont politics, having been a regular candidate for elective office since 1970. As treasurer and governor, he traveled
extensively through the state, to the point that many opponents criticized him for excessive traveling. Douglas was widely
regarded as a nice and genuine person. His cultivation of this reputation made it very difficult for Clavelle to foster distrust
and dislike of Douglas when associating him with President Bush, the object of antipathy for many Vermonters.
Schweitzer was not as well known in Montana as Douglas was in Vermont, due primarily to his limited political
experience. His run for the U.S. Senate in 2000, however, made Schweitzer a better-known candidate among the electorate
than his opponent, Bob Brown. Schweitzer built on voter familiarity with him by meeting and talking with as many potential
voters as he could during the gubernatorial campaign. Observers recalled debates at which Schweitzer would spend his extra
time shaking hands with nearly everyone in the room, while Brown sat on the stage studying his notes. The Schweitzer
campaign also gained voters’ trust and approval by projecting the “Brawny Rancher” image that made Montanans believe he
was “one of them.” Television ads featured Schweitzer herding cattle, and he typically campaigned in jeans and flannel shirts.
Beyond overcoming national partisan biases among the electorate, gubernatorial campaign strategies were
necessary to exploit opponent weaknesses. In Vermont, Clavelle was not well known to voters, his previous membership in the
Progressive Party unnerved many Democrats and Independents, he was unable to clearly explain his universal health care
program, and he focused intently and fruitlessly on national politics. The Douglas campaign exploited these weaknesses very
effectively. It targeted voters unfamiliar with Clavelle, as well as moderate Democrats and Independents, when defining
Clavelle early on as a liberal extremist and highlighting his participation in a 1989 pro-Sandinista march. The Douglas
campaign also magnified Clavelle’s failed attempt to clearly explain his universal health care proposal at a press conference,
by using excerpts in a high-profile campaign advertisement.
In Montana, Brown was also not well known to voters, he led a Republican Party divided by a bitterly contested
primary, he lacked compelling campaign issues, and he was widely regarded as an uninspiring, reluctant candidate. The
Schweitzer campaign agitated existing divisions in the Republican Party by selecting Republican John Bohlinger as its
nominee for lieutenant governor, while neutralizing the bipartisan appeal that was central to Brown’s intended campaign. The
Schweitzer campaign also successfully defined Brown as an extension of the governing political establishment for voters who
did not fully understand his background and his place within the Montana Republican Party.
Lastly, the winning candidates were wise to dismiss national politics and the simultaneous presidential election.
Certainly, gubernatorial candidates of a state’s losing presidential party would be foolish to bring presidential politics into
their campaigns. In Vermont, though, Douglas was forced to confront the presidential election and national politics because
his opponent made them central issues in the gubernatorial campaign. Rather than defending President Bush and the Iraq

war when pressed by Clavelle, Douglas dismissed discussions of national politics as irrelevant to a gubernatorial election. He,
like Schweitzer, remained focused on state issues. When insignificant issues distracted the gubernatorial campaigns, including
national politics in Vermont and trivial issues such as car purchases in Montana, the Douglas and Schweitzer campaigns
reminded voters that more serious and relevant issues merited discussion, such as the economy and health care. Based on
discussions with the gubernatorial candidates and their top campaign officials, it is clear that the campaigns regarded national
politics as irrelevant to gubernatorial elections. Many other participants and observers have agreed with this approach, and
voters responded favorably to it.

Scant Evidence that Gubernatorial Campaign Strategies Useful in Simultaneous Gubernatorial and Presidential Elections Are
Uniquely Applicable to Such Elections

The case studies of Vermont and Montana’s 2004 gubernatorial elections indicate that the above strategies are
useful for gubernatorial candidates running in the same year that a presidential candidate of their party is expected to lose the
state’s presidential vote. Yet these strategies (emphasizing practical, bipartisan governance; embracing broad, unifying
themes; adopting symbolically important state issues; familiarizing voters with the candidate; exploiting opponent
weaknesses; dismissing presidential politics to focus on state issues) seem equally applicable to gubernatorial candidates
running in states that vote for presidential candidates of a different party in another year.297 Perhaps some strategies are more
consequential in presidential voting years when voters intuitively seem more likely to bring national partisan biases into their
gubernatorial voting decisions. Yet the data presented earlier in this chapter indicate that voters are not especially likely to
apply their national partisan biases to gubernatorial votes in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections. If this is
an accurate indication, then there is no need for gubernatorial campaigns to craft their strategies any differently in a
presidential year than they would in a non-presidential year. Whether this is the case, of course, depends on whether
presidential coattails have a significant impact on simultaneous gubernatorial election results, and the available evidence is
mixed.

Areas for Further Study

This study provides useful insights about simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections. It also highlights related issues
worthy of further study that would help clarify contradictions in the
election data and inform further research in the field. Specifically, it
proposes further study of presidential coattail effects in simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections, and partisan incoherence in
gubernatorial popularity trends.
297

For most of the strategies, this observation is obvious. Dismissing presidential politics in favor of state
issues is one strategy that may strike some as particular to simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
elections. Yet national politics often figure prominently in off-year elections, even in non-congressional
election years. For example, in 2005, a year in which no federal offices were on the ballot, the campaign of
New Jersey’s winning Democratic gubernatorial candidate, Jon Corzine, ran advertisements focusing on
Republican gubernatorial candidate Doug Forrester’s ties to President Bush. Bush was very unpopular in
New Jersey at the time.

Resolving Mixed Evidence of Presidential Coattails in
Simultaneous Gubernatorial Election Results

Do presidential coattails significantly impact simultaneous
gubernatorial election results? Or are presidential coattails an
antiquated phenomenon ready to be declared nonexistent in today’s
electoral system? The mixed evidence of presidential coattails
presented in this study indicates that further research must be done
before these questions are answered with certainty. How can this be
done?
This study was designed to explain the occurrence of mixed
partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
elections. Expanding its scope would help to determine whether
presidential coattails still exist. First, case studies could be conducted
on coherent partisan outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and
presidential elections. Evidence of presidential coattails in
simultaneous gubernatorial elections are most likely to be found in

cases where state voters choose gubernatorial and presidential
candidates of the same party in the same year. For example, a case
study of Indiana’s 2004 gubernatorial election might be instructive.
Indiana voted heavily for President Bush at the same time that it elected
Republican Mitch Daniels to replace a Democratic governor. Perhaps
presidential coattails were responsible for the governorship’s partisan
shift. Or perhaps the electoral results were driven by other factors.
Further study would illuminate the true causes, and help to gauge the
influence of presidential coattails in simultaneous gubernatorial
election results.
Other presidential election years must also be studied in order to
measure the impact of presidential coattails in gubernatorial elections.
Case studies could be conducted on gubernatorial elections from other
presidential years, particularly if doing so would introduce examples
that differ importantly from those presented in this study.
Gubernatorial elections from non-presidential years should also
be studied to determine why these elections are more likely than
simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections to produce mixed
partisan outcomes. Such research would seek answers to two questions:

Do national politics play a different role in off-year gubernatorial
elections than in presidential year elections? Do national politics play a
different role in congressional election years than in odd-numbered
years, when no federal offices appear on the ballot?

Partisan Incoherence in Gubernatorial Popularity Trends
This study’s focus on mixed partisan outcomes in simultaneous
gubernatorial and presidential elections highlights the frequent
incoherence of voters’ state versus national political preferences.
Another fascinating, and vastly underappreciated, example of this
incoherence is found in gubernatorial popularity trends. Recent polls
consistently show governors of different parties than their states’ 2004
presidential favorite with higher approval ratings than governors of the
same party as their state’s presidential favorite. According to a
February 2006 Survey USA poll, the two most popular governors in the
country were Connecticut’s Jodi Rell, a Republican in a solidly proKerry state, and West Virginia’s Joe Manchin, a Democrat in a solidly
pro-Bush state. Meanwhile, the two least popular governors were
Republicans from pro-Bush states, Alaska’s Frank Murkowski and

Ohio’s Bob Taft. In fact, of the thirty governors with approval ratings
of 50% or higher, seventeen were governors of different parties than
their state’s presidential favorite. Of the twenty governors with
approval ratings of less than 50%, sixteen were governors of the same
party as their state’s presidential favorite.298 The reasons for this
counterintuitive trend would provide a fascinating study. It would also
help to clarify many areas of scholarship related to this study, including
straight and split-ticket voting and state versus national political
alignments.
In short, this study is indicative but not conclusive. It presents
qualitative data that support its thesis, including media analysis and
case studies featuring personal interviews with campaign participants
and observers. In terms of quantitative data, campaigning polling and
comparisons of gubernatorial and presidential voting behavior also
support this study’s thesis. However, conclusive quantitative data are
not available to test the thesis. Moreover, two instances of mixed
evidence necessitate clarification. First, the varying role of state party
organizations in developing and implementing gubernatorial campaign
298

“Approval ratings for all 50 governors as of 02/14/06,” http://www.surveyusa.com/50State2006/50State
Governor060214 Net.htm. Accessed March 25, 2006.

strategies means that they are not essential to producing mixed partisan
outcomes in simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential elections.
Second, if presidential coattails do not significantly influence
simultaneous gubernatorial elections, as much of this study’s evidence
indicates, campaign strategies are equally consequential in all
gubernatorial elections. Hence, this study raises important research
questions and provides answers that differ from some of the literature
of the field. Further study is needed to test whether these findings are
definitive.
The particular contribution to political science literature that this study makes is to:
document the historical development of simultaneous gubernatorial and presidential
elections; develop a compelling primary explanation for mixed partisan outcomes in
such elections; present case studies that examine the influence of presidential politics
and campaign strategies in simultaneous gubernatorial elections. This study also
proposes areas for further research that will be useful in clarifying lingering questions
and developing the literature of the field.
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